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Foreword
At the first annual meeting of the Global 
Humanitarian Forum on ‘The Human Face of 
Climate Change’, in June 2008, Swiss Re and 
the International Research Institute for Climate 
and Society hosted a policy roundtable on the 
use of index insurance for poverty reduction. 
The discussion brought together experts from 
fields as diverse as reinsurance, climate science, 
economics and food security to take stock 
of their experience and insights on how this 
innovative tool can best serve development. 
They highlighted how index insurance is being 
tested in the context of development, disaster 
management and climate change adaptation. 
Pilot experience had shown that index insurance 
has the potential to reduce conditions of 
chronic underdevelopment by both enabling 
investment and reducing shocks in agricultural 
livelihoods. At the roundtable, important issues 
were identified, such as the role of different 
stakeholders, the challenges for scaling up to 
meet broader development objectives and the 
value of index insurance as a development tool. 
Outcomes of the inaugural Forum made it 
clear that we have the technology, the expertise 
and the financial resources to take on the 
challenge presented by climate change – but that 
action to tackle these problems is largely missing. 
We need to step out of our narrow confines and 
areas of expertise and share our knowledge – to 
pool our resources and act together in order to 
have real impact. This publication, born out of 
discussions at the Forum and subsequent 
meetings, represents the commitment of one 
group of experts to pool and share their 
experience and knowledge of index insurance.  
I applaud the efforts of this community to take 
the time and energy to capture current 
knowledge and experience and make it available 
to the broader global development community.
For several years our eyes have been set on 
Copenhagen. As a global community we have 
been trying to focus attention on climate change 
impacts and to bring innovation to the service 
of equity and sustainability. This year the United 
Nations International Strategy for Disaster 
Reduction (UNISDR) launched the global 
assessment report on disaster risk reduction – 
which continues to remind us how ill-prepared 
we continue to be in the face of climate-related 
hazards. As an innovation, index insurance may 
hold answers for some of the more obstinate 
problems faced by the poor and the vulnerable. 
I hope this publication will help us to appreciate 
how much has been learned over the last few 
years, and show us where we can usefully 
concentrate our collective efforts.
Kofi A. Annan
President
Global Humanitarian Forum
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Partner statement
Partner statement
Before the current economic crisis, the 
preceding years of global economic growth 
were optimistically reflected in the progress 
indicators of the Millennium Development 
Goals. In sub-Saharan Africa, for example, the 
economies of countries grew at more than 6% 
in 2007. As the world’s economy has slowed, 
these advances are now being threatened. These 
trends imply risks of deepened hunger and 
reduced affordable access to adequate nutrition.
At the same time, the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change’s fourth assessment 
report has warned us that climate change is 
likely to reduce food production potential, 
especially in some already food-short areas. 
It further states that there is now higher 
confidence in the projected increases in 
droughts, heat waves and floods, as well as their 
adverse impacts – which will be hardest felt 
by the most vulnerable, who are often in the 
weakest economic position.
Climate has always presented a challenge to 
those whose livelihoods depend on the weather. 
Even though a drought (or a flood, or a 
hurricane) may happen infrequently, the threat 
of the disaster is enough to block economic 
vitality, growth and wealth generation during 
all years – good or bad. The risk of drought and 
flooding can keep people in poverty traps, as 
risk-adverse behavior limits productivity and 
the willingness of creditors to lend to farmers, 
for example. Lack of access to financial services, 
especially in rural areas, in turn restricts access 
to agricultural inputs and technologies, such as 
improved seeds and fertilizers. At the national 
level, when disaster strikes, many developing 
countries rely on humanitarian aid, whose delay 
can lead to higher human and economic costs. 
There is a global recognition of the pressing 
need for fresh approaches to confront these 
challenges at scale. This type of thinking 
is epitomized by the Hyogo Framework, 
which advocates for a new approach to 
disaster management focusing on disaster 
risk reduction, as well as the Bali Action Plan 
which advocates for a more comprehensive 
consideration of risk sharing and transfer 
mechanisms, such as insurance. In this 
publication, we discuss one innovative response 
to enable poverty reduction through better 
climate risk management: index insurance.
The partners and contributors to this 
publication are working together in their 
networks throughout the world on developing 
and testing index insurance as an approach 
which, when combined with other financial, 
governance, structural and policy options, can 
enable us to better meet our collective goals of 
poverty reduction and economic growth. This 
entails working with national governments, 
such as the Ethiopian government and those 
of the Caribbean region, to enable more 
timely and reliable disaster response. It means 
working together with farmers and the private 
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sector in places such as India, Mongolia, China, 
Ethiopia, Nicaragua and Thailand to remove 
the barrier of climate risk and enable access 
to credit. It involves using innovative climate 
science, such as remote sensing, to expand 
coverage of index insurance to areas where data 
are sparse or limited.
As we move forward towards meeting 
international goals such as poverty reduction 
or climate change adaptation, we are applying 
new thinking to confront old and new 
problems. As the publication details, we 
are doing this by bringing state-of-the-art 
knowledge and practice into new settings: by 
applying innovative science and technology, 
by enhancing the role of private sector players, 
by connecting to international risk pooling, 
and by working with countries in developing 
the capacity of their people and institutions. 
Increasingly, we have recognized that 
strengthening capacity – from the community 
level to the global scale – is at the centre of 
the development challenge. This publication 
highlights the relevance of our work and the 
critical importance of tackling this agenda 
together.
Raj Singh
Chief Risk Officer, Swiss Re
Josette Sheeran
Director, World Food Programme (WFP)
Raymond Offenheiser
President, Oxfam America
Stephan Zebiak
Director General, International Research 
Institute for Climate and Society (IRI)
Kanayo Nwanze
President, International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD) 
Olav Kjorven
Assistant Secretary-General,
Assistant Administrator & Director, 
Bureau for Development Policy, United Nations  
Development Programme (UNDP)
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Climate, poverty and index insurance
Climate and poverty
The climate has always presented a challenge 
to those whose livelihoods depend on it. 
Moving away from such dependence is usually 
an early step in economic development, but 
many millions have not yet succeeded in 
taking that step. As climate variability and 
uncertainty increase with climate change, 
human development reversals are a distinct 
possibility (UNDP, 2007). Climate has thus 
become an urgent issue on the development 
agenda.
For poor people, a variable and unpredict-
able climate presents a risk that can critically 
restrict options and so limit development. 
The climate presents a challenge to small-scale farmers and can significantly limit their 
options; Scott Wallace/World Bank 
The risk materializes at two levels: the direct 
effects of a weather shock, and the indirect 
effects due to the threat of a weather shock 
(whether it occurs or not).
When a weather shock occurs, poor people 
are vulnerable. Local coping strategies often 
break down. Poor people have few assets to 
fall back on, and may be forced to sell these in 
order to survive so that when the crisis is over 
they are in a much worse position than before. 
These impacts can last for years in the form of 
diminished productive capacity and weakened 
livelihoods. And climate change threatens 
both more frequent and more severe extreme 
events (IPCC, 2007).
Climate, poverty and index insurance
2
Under the threat of a possible weather 
shock, poor people avoid taking risks 
(Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993). They shun 
innovations that could increase productivity, 
since these innovations may increase their 
vulnerability, for example by exhausting the 
assets they would need to survive a crisis or by 
requiring them to spend money without being 
sure of a return (Dercon, 1996). Creditors 
are unlikely to lend to farmers if drought (for 
example) might result in widespread defaults, 
even if loans can be paid back easily in most 
years. This lack of access to credit critically 
restricts access to agricultural inputs and 
technologies, such as improved seeds and 
fertilizers. Even though a drought (or a flood, 
or a hurricane) may happen only one year in 
five or six, the threat of the disaster is enough 
to block economic vitality, growth and wealth 
generation in all years – good or bad.
Poverty limits the capacity of people to 
manage weather risks, while these same risks 
contribute to keeping people poor. Climate 
change will greatly exacerbate this situation; 
and developing countries, which are least 
responsible for climate change, face its greatest 
impacts. New tools are urgently needed to help 
vulnerable people deal with climate change, 
and the uncertainty that accompanies this.
It is not only the poor who need such 
tools. After a climate-related disaster, govern-
ments struggle to finance relief and recovery 
efforts and maintain essential government 
services. Disaster response can be delayed for 
several months as humanitarian aid trickles 
in, which results in even higher human and 
economic costs (Goes and Skees, 2003). 
Risk transfer approaches such as insurance 
have played a role in mitigating climate risk 
in many parts of the world. However, they 
have generally not been available in develop-
ing countries, where insurance markets are 
limited if they exist at all, and are not oriented 
towards the poor. A new type of insurance – 
index insurance – offers new opportunities for 
managing climate risk in developing coun-
tries. If designed and introduced carefully, it 
has the potential to contribute significantly 
to sustainable development, by addressing a 
gap in the existing climate risk management 
portfolio. However, this potential has yet to 
be proven; and there are some significant 
challenges that must first be addressed.
Index insurance can be applied across a 
diverse range of weather-related risk prob-
lems, from loss of crops due to drought, to 
loss of livestock in harsh winter conditions, 
to losses resulting from hurricanes. It can 
be purchased at different levels of society 
– at ‘micro-level’ by small-scale farmers, at 
‘meso-level’ by input suppliers or banks, or at 
‘macro-level’ by governments, for example. It 
is not a ‘cure-all’ and will be inappropriate in 
many situations; but it may be a useful option 
in many others. As awareness and knowledge 
of this new tool increase, and if the challenges 
described in this publication can be overcome, 
index insurance could become widely avail-
able as an additional option for those facing a 
weather risk.
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The introduction of index insurance 
can bring together a new set of actors and 
new resources to address some of the more 
persistent problems associated with poverty. It 
also reflects a growing interest in, and a move 
towards, market-driven solutions to these 
problems. Shifting responsibilities from public 
agencies, which ‘provide’ interventions to ‘ben-
eficiaries’, to market-based mechanisms where 
people choose the services and technologies 
they prefer, may offer the poor a more sustain-
able development model. Public–private 
partnerships and private-sector development 
are key to this approach, which must ulti-
mately deliver what customers demand.
Climate risk management
Climate risk is not a new phenomenon, and 
climate risk management (CRM) in the broad 
sense has long been practised. Farmers antici-
pate the rains, using various indicators, and 
time their planting and inputs based on their 
best estimates; they install irrigation systems 
if they can; and they reduce risk exposure by 
diversifying their livelihoods as far as possible 
(Dercon, 1996; Ellis, 2000). Scientists have 
also sought ways to help manage the risk 
that climate presents. Agricultural research 
has developed crop varieties that are drought 
tolerant, for example, and soil management 
practices that increase soil moisture-holding 
capacity. Weather forecasts have been a major 
advance in helping people plan appropriately.
In recent years, advances in climate science 
have catalyzed the development of new CRM 
practices. The improved use of climate infor-
mation in planning and resource management 
has contributed to robust advances in disaster 
risk reduction and climate change adaptation 
(Meza et al., 2008; IFRC, 2008). The first 
publication in the Climate and Society series 
describes and analyses some examples of 
CRM in Africa (Hellmuth et al., 2007).
Index insurance is proposed as a new 
CRM tool that may help people cope with 
current weather-related risks and, if designed 
properly, perhaps also future risks associated 
with climate change. Depending on their 
circumstances, people have a variety of risk 
management mechanisms available to them. 
Index insurance will not replace these options, 
but should find a role alongside them. It could 
fill the gap that occurs in the current portfolio 
of coping mechanisms when these break 
down in the face of a weather shock.
A brief introduction to index 
insurance
Index insurance is insurance that is linked 
to an index, such as rainfall, temperature, 
humidity or crop yields, rather than 
actual loss. This approach solves some of 
the problems that limit the application of 
traditional crop insurance in rural parts of 
developing countries. One key advantage is 
that the transaction costs are lower. In theory 
at least, this makes index insurance financially 
viable for private-sector insurers and afford-
able to small farmers. Another important 
advantage is that index insurance is subject to 
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less adverse selection and moral hazard than 
traditional insurance.1
An example of index insurance, and the 
most common application in developing 
countries so far, is the use of an index of 
rainfall totals to insure against drought-
related crop loss. Payouts occur when rainfall 
totals over an agreed period are below an 
agreed threshold that can be expected to 
result in crop loss. Unlike with traditional 
crop insurance, the insurance company does 
not need to visit farmers’ fields to assess losses 
and determine payouts. Instead, it uses data 
from rain gauges near the farmer’s field. If 
these data show the rainfall amount is below 
the threshold, the insurance pays out.
As well as reducing costs, this means that 
payouts can be made quickly – a feature that 
reduces or avoids distress sales of assets. This 
process also removes moral hazards such as 
the ‘perverse incentives’ of crop insurance, 
where under certain conditions farmers may 
actually prefer their crops to fail so that they 
receive a payout. With index insurance, the 
payout is not linked to the crop’s survival or 
failure, so the farmer still has incentives to 
make the best decisions. Another feature that 
reduces moral hazard is that index insurance 
1 Adverse selection occurs when potential borrowers or insurees 
have hidden information about their risk exposure that is not 
available to the lender or insurer, who then becomes more likely 
to erroneously assess the risk of the borrower or insuree. Moral 
hazard occurs when individuals engage in hidden activities 
that increase their exposure to risk as a result of borrowing or 
purchasing insurance. These hidden activities can leave the 
lender or insurer exposed to higher levels of risk than had been 
anticipated when interest or premium rates were established.
uses objective, publicly available data, so 
individuals are unable to distort a situation to 
their benefit.
Rapid payouts are the major advantage of 
index insurance when this is used as a disaster 
management tool. Again, time-consuming 
loss assessments are not needed, as payouts are 
based on objective data. With index insurance 
in place, governments and relief agencies can 
plan ahead of crises, knowing that funds will 
be available when they need them. Planning is 
also facilitated because governments and relief 
agencies can track the index and prepare an 
early response.
But several critical components need care-
ful attention if index insurance is to be work-
able. Index insurance is new, and can be diffi-
cult for stakeholders to understand – time and 
resources must be invested in explaining how 
it works. It depends on the availability and 
reliability of quality data, which is a signifi-
cant challenge in most developing countries. 
But perhaps most importantly, index insur-
ance is vulnerable to basis risk. Simply put, 
basis risk is when insurance payouts do not 
match actual losses – either there are losses 
but no payout, or a payout is triggered even 
though there are no losses. Obviously, if either 
of these situations occurs too frequently, the 
insurance scheme will not be viable, and may 
even damage livelihoods (Skees, 2008). The 
contract design, and in particular the selection 
of an appropriate index, is crucially important 
in minimizing basis risk. Other factors that 
have implications for basis risk are proximity 
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of the insured crop to a weather station, and 
availability of climate data (Carriquiry and 
Osgood, 2008). 
The potential of index insurance has been 
demonstrated by a number of projects in 
various developing countries. A selection of 
these projects, representing different regions 
of the world and different applications of 
index insurance, are presented as case studies 
in this publication.
Index insurance is just one of a number 
of related index-based financial risk transfer 
products that work on the same principles (for 
details of others, see Skees et al., 2008b). In 
this publication, the term index insurance is 
used loosely to include the range of products. 
Some of the case studies, for example, use 
other related products such as weather deriva-
tives, but for ease of reading we call them all 
index insurance. The reader should bear in 
mind that much of the discussion is relevant 
to the broader range of products. Also, the 
discussion refers mainly to index insurance for 
crop failure due to drought, since this is the 
most common application so far; but much 
of it is also relevant to applications beyond 
drought and crop failure.
Index insurance for development
Index insurance may be able to help people 
manage the weather risk that is partially 
responsible for keeping them in poverty traps. 
Poor people are not only at direct risk from 
extreme weather events, but even without bad 
weather they are at a disadvantage because the 
risk blocks their opportunities. Lenders, for 
example, may not extend credit to them. They 
are therefore unable to invest in inputs that 
would improve productivity in good-weather 
years. Evidence suggests that farmers often 
sacrifice 10–20% of income when using tradi-
tional risk management strategies (Gautam et 
al., 1994).
But if they can take out insurance, 
either individually or collectively (by farmer 
associations, for example), the picture may 
change. When lenders know that borrowers 
are covered by insurance, they may be more 
likely to extend credit to them. Farmers may 
then choose to make investments that may 
raise their productivity. If the weather is bad 
and crops fail, the insurance will pay out and, 
as a Malawian farmer put it, “I do not have 
to worry about paying back loans in addi-
tion to looking for food to feed my family” 
(Hellmuth et al., 2007). This insurance can be 
sold either at the micro-level – to individual 
farmers or households, or at the meso-level – 
to banks or cooperatives for example.
Many of the case studies illustrate this 
use of index insurance (Tables 1 and 2). 
‘Unlocking development potential in Malawi’, 
on page 13, is a good example. Malawi is one 
of Africa’s poorest countries, with the majority 
of its workforce engaged in smallholder farm-
ing. Crops are mostly rainfed, and drought 
is an ever-present risk. These farmers have 
little or no access to formal financial credit to 
buy agricultural inputs, because the chance of 
them defaulting on loans is high (although, 
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as the case study shows, not always because 
of drought). The case study illustrates how 
providing index insurance linked to loans may 
help them to invest in inputs for cash crops 
such as groundnuts and tobacco.
Of course, loan markets face many 
challenges, of which climate risk is only one. 
The Malawi case illustrates the importance 
of these other challenges, and highlights the 
need to identify the best role for insurance if 
it is to contribute to development.
Index insurance for disaster 
management
Several pilot projects have been exploring the 
use of index insurance as part of the disaster 
risk management portfolios of governments 
and relief agencies (Tables 1 and 2). Disaster 
risk reduction emphasizes preparedness 
ahead of disasters, in order to limit the lives, 
livelihoods and assets lost. Governments and 
relief agencies, which usually bear the costs of 
responding to large-scale disasters, have taken 
Table 1. Some features of index insurance for development and for disaster relief 
Index insurance for development Index insurance for disaster relief
Intended 
development 
uses that are 
being actively 
explored 
Help farmers escape poverty by removing 
barriers preventing them from being 
more productive, e.g. enabling access 
to credit so that farmers can be more 
effective in ‘good’ weather years. Direct risk 
management. Protecting investments
Save lives and livelihoods through 
more cost-effective and timely disaster 
response. The timelier response may help 
prevent people from falling into poverty 
traps
Target group Smallholder farmers and agricultural 
laborers with growth potential, or their 
suppliers and financers; institutions within 
the agricultural supply chain that work 
with farmers. Contract is held at meso- or 
micro-level by household, farmer group, 
cooperative, microfinance institution, 
NGO, or contract farming corporation
Those vulnerable to disaster, particularly 
those in chronic poverty. Contract is held 
at macro-level by government or relief 
agency
Subsidies? Hotly debated! Subsidies can severely 
distort incentives and encourage the 
promotion of ineffective or inappropriate 
products. However, if used responsibly, 
subsidies may play an important role in 
launching products
Yes. Disaster relief programs are by 
definition subsidized. The insurance is a 
financing mechanism designed to ensure 
more effective use of these subsidies
Case studies Ethiopia, Honduras, India, Jamaica, Malawi, 
Mongolia, Nicaragua, Peru, South Africa, 
Thailand, Ukraine, Vietnam
Brazil, Caribbean, Ethiopia, India, Malawi, 
Millennium Villages Project, Mexico
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out insurance policies linked to weather indi-
ces that will pay out when extreme weather 
events precipitate a disaster. The key advan-
tages are the speed of payout, which allows 
rapid response; and the ability to plan ahead 
of a disaster, in the knowledge that funds will 
be available when they are needed.
As in the case of index insurance products 
designed for development, integrating index 
insurance into disaster management strategies 
can help poor people whose livelihoods are 
closely linked to the weather and who are at 
risk of falling into poverty traps if a weather 
shock occurs. Such people have assets – 
animals or farming equipment, for example 
– but may be forced to sell them to survive 
a crisis, and then find themselves without 
the means to earn a living once the crisis is 
over (Baulch and Hoddinott, 2000; Barrett et 
al., 2001; McPeak and Barrett, 2001). Here, 
insurance is designed to enable prompt disaster 
response, allowing people to hold on to their 
assets and quickly recover after the crisis.
In Ethiopia, for example, the Government 
and the World Food Programme (WFP) have 
worked together on a pilot project that uses 
a rainfall index-based insurance contract to 
provide emergency relief (see ‘Disaster insur-
ance in Ethiopia’ on page 17). Drought drives 
agricultural losses, which in turn result in food 
and income shortfalls and subsequently an 
increase in the number of food aid beneficiar-
ies. Rainfall is used as a proxy for economic loss 
resulting from drought and serves as a simple, 
objective basis for the contract. Payouts are 
not dependent on time-consuming and often 
Index insurance has potential to help people escape poverty; Eric Holthaus/IRI
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subjective needs assessments, and can therefore 
be made much more quickly. The rainfall-based 
drought index produced for this pilot project 
shows high correlation (around 80% for the 
period 1994–2004) between losses that would 
have been covered by the index and the number 
of food aid beneficiaries. As this type of project 
proceeds, it will be valuable to substantiate this 
correlation with direct measurements of crop 
yields and beneficiary livelihoods (WFP, 2007).
Climate change and index 
insurance
There is much debate about the implica-
tions of climate change for index insurance, 
centered around the following three questions. 
Can index insurance contribute to adaptation 
strategies in developing countries? Can it play 
a role in managing the uncertainty associ-
ated with climate change? And does climate 
change challenge the viability of index-based 
insurance products?
There are at least three ways in which 
index insurance might help build adaptive 
capacity: as a risk transfer mechanism within a 
comprehensive strategy for managing cli-
mate risk in the face of climate change; as a 
mechanism to help people access the resources 
needed to escape climate-related poverty; and 
as a mechanism to incentivize risk reduction.
A comprehensive strategy for adapta-
tion in the agricultural sector, for example, 
could include adapted crop varieties, micro-
irrigation, rainwater harvesting and improved 
soil conservation practices. However, a certain 
amount of risk would remain – and this 
remaining risk might be covered by index 
insurance.
The second way index insurance can 
contribute to adaptation is through building 
more resilient livelihoods by enabling access 
to increased credit, technology and inputs. 
Insured loans allow lenders to recuperate their 
money even in a year where the climate causes 
production losses. The loans allow people to 
invest in more intensive livelihood strategies 
which may help them to escape poverty traps. 
The increase in wealth and in economic 
resilience allows people to buffer themselves 
from the direct impacts of the climate.
Beyond this, a key challenge in designing 
insurance in the face of climate change is 
to incentivize risk reduction through price 
signals and risk management stipulations. 
For example, contracts could stipulate that 
certain risk reduction mechanisms, such 
as the adoption of wind-resistant cropping 
patterns or drought-tolerant crop varieties, 
must be in place if crops are to be covered. 
In Ethiopia, a pilot project is testing a scheme 
in which cash-constrained farmers pay for 
insurance premiums through their labor on 
community assets which reduce risk, such as 
water-harvesting structures. The cost of the 
premiums in this project contains a compo-
nent that is a price signal to reflect long-term 
trends (Oxfam America, 2009; see ‘A farmer-
centric approach in Ethiopia’ on page 44 and 
‘Climate variability and change and index 
insurance’ on page 38).
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Climate change has implications for index 
insurance design and pricing, but need not 
make such insurance non-viable. Contracts 
are typically drawn up for a single season or a 
few years at most, so they can be adapted as 
climate change takes hold. The challenge is 
to accommodate the added uncertainty due 
to climate change while keeping premiums 
affordable. Most of the pricing in insurance 
contracts at present reflects year-to-year 
variation, with only a small element allowing 
for longer term trends. If, over time or in some 
locations, incremental climate changes were 
to lead to prohibitively expensive insurance, 
that would signal the need to switch to more 
radical forms of adaptation, such as changing 
the crops grown or, in marginal areas, giving 
up crop production altogether and taking up 
livestock production, or migration. Climate 
science can play a role in reducing uncertainty 
through better understanding of the climate 
system and how climate is likely to change 
over the coming decades.
The climate variations experienced over 
the next few decades will include variations 
due to increasing greenhouse gases, but also 
variations arising from natural processes 
within climate systems. With the world’s cli-
mate scientists largely focusing on the former, 
the latter are currently little understood. Yet 
these internal components are likely to have at 
least as much impact on the climate over the 
coming decades as increased emissions. This 
realization is leading to increased efforts to 
understand these decadal processes.
The box ‘Climate variability and change 
and index insurance’ on page 38 illustrates 
climate change issues and their implications 
for index insurance and the CRM portfolio.
Next steps – this publication
Most projects involving index insurance have 
so far been small-scale, with two notable 
exceptions in India and Mexico, which have 
successfully scaled up. The projects have 
tested the use of index insurance in a range 
of applications and for different groups, 
from supporting poor farmers in their efforts 
to protect and enhance their livelihoods 
to helping governments or relief agencies 
manage climate-related crises. It is still an 
open question whether index insurance can 
contribute significantly to sustainable devel-
opment and to disaster management. If it 
is to do so, it will need to scale up to reach 
very many more people. This publication 
looks at the challenges – both technical and 
operational – that accompany this proposed 
scale-up. 
At the same time it is acknowledged that 
scaling up may not be sufficient by itself to 
impact on poverty reduction and develop-
ment and that index insurance may not be 
appropriate in many places. Impact studies are 
urgently needed to better understand under 
what conditions index insurance can play 
this role. These conditions may prove quite 
restricted.
Many of the pioneers of index insur-
ance have contributed case studies to this 
Climate, poverty and index insurance
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publication, capturing the challenges they 
encountered and the lessons they learned. 
These case studies are found in three sections 
beginning on pages 13, 42 and 72.
The next section focuses on the index 
insurance product – the contract, including the 
index itself – and highlights the main issues 
that need attention if scale-up is to be suc-
cessfully achieved. It draws on the case studies 
in explaining and discussing these issues; and 
it outlines new approaches that might help 
overcome some of the limitations currently 
facing index insurance contract design.
In the following section, the operational 
challenges encountered by many of the case 
studies are examined, particularly those asso-
ciated with the development of new insurance 
markets in areas with little prior experience in 
weather index insurance.
Key messages and recommendations 
resulting from this study are then presented. 
This section is particularly aimed at those 
who would like to see index insurance realize 
its potential as a tool for sustainable devel-
opment. It identifies where investment is 
needed to enable scale-up. Many donors have 
expressed an interest in index insurance and 
are keen to invest, but this must be done with 
care if insurance-based interventions are to 
achieve development objectives.
The final brief section looks at some of 
the ongoing and planned global initiatives 
that could support the development of index 
insurance markets.
Index insurance is a tool that could be added to the existing portfolio of CRM options; Jason Hartell/GlobalAgRisk
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Table 2. Case studies
Case study 
Development 
or disaster 
relief? Risk Index Target user
Year first 
implemented
No.  of beneficiaries in 
2008 (or most recent 
available figures) Notes
Case study section I, starts on page 13
Unlocking 
development  
potential in 
Malawi
Development Drought Rainfall Tobacco 
farmers
2005–06 2500 Began targeting 
groundnut (and maize) 
farmers, but due to 
supply chain issues 
changed to support 
the stronger tobacco 
system
Disaster 
insurance in 
Ethiopia
Disaster relief Drought Rainfall WFP 
operations in 
Ethiopia
2006 316,000 (2006) No payout in 2006. 
Policy not renewed in 
following years. US$25 
million contingency 
financing contract 
paid out in 2008. Scale 
up to US$250 million 
planned for 2010
Case study section II, starts on page 42
National-level 
drought risk 
management 
in Malawi
Disaster relief Drought Rainfall 
(linked 
to maize 
production)
Government 
of Malawi
2008 Currently in first trial 
year
A farmer-
centric 
approach in 
Ethiopia
Development Drought Rainfall Teff farmers in 
Adi Ha 
Under 
development
Insurance 
for contract 
farming in 
India
Development Late blight 
disease
Temperature 
and humidity
Potato 
farmers under 
contract to 
PepsiCo
2007 4575
Disaster relief 
in Mexico 
Disaster relief Natural 
disasters 
impacting 
smallholder 
farmers, 
primarily 
drought and 
flood
Rainfall State 
governments
2002 800,000
Catastrophe 
risk insurance 
in the 
Caribbean 
Disaster relief Hurricanes 
and 
earthquakes 
Wind speed 
and shaking 
Caribbean 
country 
governments
2007 16 countries
Insuring 
development 
goals in the 
Millennium 
Villages 
Project
Disaster relief Drought Combination 
of rainfall and 
vegetation 
remote 
sensing
Inhabitants of 
villages in the 
MVP
2007 Experimental product 
transacted in three 
MVP villages in Kenya, 
Ethiopia and Mali in 
2007. Not repeated in 
2008
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Table 2. Case studies
Case study 
Development 
or disaster 
relief? Risk Index Target user
Year first 
implemented
No.  of beneficiaries in 
2008 (or most recent 
available figures) Notes
Vietnam: Flood 
insurance in 
the Mekong 
Delta
Development Early flooding 
of rice fields 
River level The state 
agricultural 
bank
Under 
development
Business interruption 
insurance contract 
currently being 
considered by the state 
agricultural bank
Case study section III, starts on page 72
Central 
America –  
a different 
approach for 
launching 
index 
insurance
Development Drought and 
excess rainfall
Rainfall Commercial 
groundnut 
and rice 
farmers 
2007 16 (400 anticipated  
in 2009)
Barriers to 
implementation 
in the Ukraine 
Development Drought Rainfall Smallholder 
farmers of 
grain crops 
2005 2 (2005) One year only; project 
discontinued
The private 
sector builds a 
market in India
Development Drought, 
flood, 
extreme 
temperatures, 
weather-
linked crop 
diseases, fog, 
humidity 
Various, 
mostly simple 
weather 
parameters
Farmers 
(small, 
medium and 
large)
2003 Estimated  
150,000 in total
Laying the 
foundations 
for farm-level 
insurance in 
Ethiopia
Development Drought Rainfall Smallholder 
maize farmers
2006 28 (2006),   
13 (2007)
Small pilot as part of 
feasibility study
Supporting 
farmers – and 
a government 
seed program 
– in Brazil
Disaster relief Drought Area yield Maize 
farmers in 
government 
seed program
2001 c. 15,000
Stakeholder 
communication 
is key in Thailand 
Development Drought Rainfall Smallholder 
maize farmers 
2007 388
Scaling up 
in India: the 
public sector
Disaster relief Drought, 
excess rainfall
Rainfall Farmers 
(small, 
medium and 
large)
2004 700,000
Livestock 
insurance in 
Mongolia 
Development Large 
livestock 
losses due to  
severe 
weather 
Area livestock 
mortality rate 
Nomadic 
herders 
2006 4100
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Case studies I
Unlocking development potential in Malawi
A pilot project in Malawi illustrates how 
index-based weather insurance can be used 
to strengthen supply chain relationships and 
support lending to small-scale farmers. This 
project has also revealed a number of opera-
tional challenges, with interesting lessons for 
others setting out on this path.
In Malawi, contract farming is becoming 
more common, but credit to the rural sector, 
which would allow small-scale farmers to take 
advantage of this opportunity by increasing 
their access to inputs, has been relatively 
limited. Index insurance can support such 
farmers as they become more market-oriented 
and take on higher levels of risk by buying 
improved seeds and fertilizers. 
Managed by a partnership comprising the 
World Bank, the pro-poor international insur-
ance group MicroEnsure and local stakeholders, 
the pilot project is now in its fourth year. The 
The project supports small-scale farmers in Malawi; Janot-Reine Mendler de Suarez/GEF-IW:LEARN
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International Research Institute for Climate 
and Society (IRI) has contributed technical 
support to this project. During the first year, the 
2005–06 cropping season, 892 farmers located 
within 20 km of four weather stations purchased 
the insurance, which was bundled with a loan 
for groundnut production inputs. The ground-
nut sector was chosen for this pilot operation 
because (i) the crop is relatively drought 
sensitive, (ii) farmers had been unable to invest 
in new groundnut varieties due to their high 
cost, and (iii) the farmers’ union had established 
a new marketing system for the crop, which 
envisaged loan recovery at the point of sale.
For the 2006–07 cropping season the pilot 
expanded, with the addition of maize and a 
fifth weather station, taking numbers up to 
1710 farmers. The marketability of groundnuts 
was used to secure insurance and loans for 
maize, which is the main food crop in Malawi. 
Maize suffers from significant price volatility 
and fragmented marketing, so farmer loans are 
generally not available for maize inputs alone 
without some other collateral for the lender. 
By combining a loan (and weather insurance) 
for maize with a loan for a cash crop covered 
by insurance, lenders felt comfortable that the 
profits from the cash crop could be used to 
repay the loan for maize if necessary.
These pilots stimulated interest among 
banks, financiers and supply chain participants 
such as processing and trading companies and 
input suppliers. However, they also demon-
strated that other risks within the supply chain 
can have a serious impact on loan recovery rates 
and on the sustainability of the supply chain 
itself, threatening the viability of a stand-alone 
index insurance scheme. For example, during 
the 2005–06 season there were problems due 
to poor seed quality. In addition, during the 
initial pilot operation, banks learned that the 
new marketing arrangements in the groundnut 
supply chain were not sufficiently organized to 
ensure loan recovery at the point of sale, leading 
to substantial side-selling and related failures 
and delays in loan repayments. This showed 
that to scale up the groundnut insurance would 
require an associated scaling up of the nascent 
marketing chain. The banks agreed that the 
weather insurance tool would be more useful 
in a commodity sector with stronger marketing 
arrangements and oversight of farmers, such 
as tobacco, and possibly paprika, tea, coffee 
and cotton, where similar marketing chains are 
developing.
Thus, during the 2007–08 season, the pro-
gram moved to the tobacco sector and ceased 
operations in groundnuts. Malawi’s tobacco 
sector currently represents the largest pool of 
recipients of credit in the country; demand 
for credit is high because of the input needs 
associated with tobacco production. Because 
all tobacco in Malawi is sold through auc-
tion, there is a constriction point that allows 
banks to recover loans directly before farmers 
receive their sales proceeds. This creates more 
certainty for lenders, who have an assured 
and trusted mechanism for recovering loans. 
Traditionally, maize inputs are also included 
in farmer tobacco loan packages.
Index insurance, development and disaster management
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In 2007–08, weather insurance covered 
a portfolio of loans jointly held by a tobacco 
processing/trading company, Alliance One, 
and the Opportunity International Bank 
of Malawi (OIBM), rather than individual 
loans held by farmers. OIBM bought an 
index-based weather insurance policy from 
the Insurance Association of Malawi (IAM) 
in November 2007. The policy covered 
Alliance One tobacco farmers within 30 km 
of Lilongwe and Kasungu weather stations. 
Though the policy was a portfolio policy 
designed to cover the OIBM and Alliance 
One’s exposure, the contract was based on 
individual insurance so that the companies 
could easily associate payouts triggered by 
specific stations with specific farmer groups 
and crops. OIBM and Alliance One shared 
the cost of the insurance with the farmers, 
but did not engage in detailed communica-
tion with them on the nature of the product, 
given that this was a pilot. Since the value 
of the initial tobacco transaction was greater 
than the sums insured under previous pilots, 
the IAM was able to establish contracts with 
the international reinsurance market for 
these products for the first time. A portion of 
this risk was thus reinsured by IAM on the 
international risk markets in late 2007.
All of the companies involved, and several 
new players, expanded this program during the 
2008–09 season. Both the portfolio approach 
pioneered in 2007 and a farmer-level approach 
were offered. While Alliance One chose to 
pursue a portfolio approach again, Limbe Leaf, 
a contract farming company, chose to offer the 
product directly to their farmers. In addition 
two more banks agreed to provide financing for 
these loans. The size of the program increased 
significantly, covering 2500 farmers and a total 
value of transactions exceeding US$2 million. 
There are plans to expand the program still 
further for the 2009–10 season.
Lessons
The groundnut pilot revealed that problems 
related to production, marketing and sales can 
undermine credit repayment and hence the 
effectiveness of the insurance policy. To make 
insurance viable for this sector, complementary 
investments are necessary to strengthen con-
tractual relationships. These will likely feature 
additional flows of resources, improved farmer 
advice and oversight, and better links between 
input provision and commodity sale. Efforts to 
reduce side-marketing will also be important.
The conclusion for Malawi, therefore, 
is that insurance should be closely linked to 
more formal and better coordinated supply 
chains. The aims now are to scale up index 
insurance in conjunction with such chains, 
and to expand into new areas and crops only 
when these meet this criterion. 
The low density of automated rainfall 
stations in the country is a limitation to scal-
ing up in Malawi. For example, an estimated 
110,000 smallholder tobacco growers curently 
cultivate close to a reliable weather station. If 
53 new rain gauges were installed, an addi-
tional 200,000 farmers could be included in 
Case studies I
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Food Security, staff of participating commercial 
banks, contract farming companies and local 
research institutes. The ADP-SP provides 
funding for this activity.
For the pilot, nine insurance companies 
worked together to underwrite the risk. 
National regulatory approval was not required 
during the pilot phase, although the regulator 
closely observed the program’s development. 
If the private sector is interested in expand-
ing the program, it will need to engage the 
national regulatory authority so that it gains 
a better understanding of the risks being 
insured, and can make necessary changes or 
additions to existing regulation and policies. 
Support for the development of an appropri-
ate legal and regulatory framework is also 
included in the ADP-SP.
the program. A government program sup-
ported by the World Bank and Norway, the 
Agricultural Development Project – Support 
Program (ADP-SP), is currently investing in 
new weather stations and infrastructure.
The development of capacity and techni-
cal expertise in insurance will be critical for 
continued growth of the sector. The pilot 
program includes some training, but more will 
be needed. Specifically, national players will 
need to take a larger role in contract design and 
underwriting. To date, contract design has been 
carried out by the World Bank and its partner, 
MicroEnsure, with limited support from local 
experts. In the coming years, the IAM will 
need to take over responsibility in collaboration 
with experts from the Meteorological Services 
Department, the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Index insurance, development and disaster management
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Disaster insurance in Ethiopia
attempted to demonstrate the transfer of 
national drought risk to the global insurance 
market. Although there was no payout that 
year, as rainfall was above average, the project 
successfully demonstrated the feasibility of 
the concept. The policy was not renewed in 
2007 due to lack of donor support; however, 
scale-up is now under way, with a US$250 
million contract planned for 2010.
The insurance targets a group described 
as the ‘transiently food-insecure’ – some 
5 million people who are directly at risk when 
a drought occurs. The Ethiopian government 
has a Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) 
that targets the chronically food-insecure, 
that is, the poorest people who face ongoing 
food insecurity whatever the weather. The 
Ethiopia provides an example of how index 
insurance is being used to revolutionize 
disaster response. The current response system 
waits for evidence that people are hungry 
before appealing to donors and eventually 
providing relief, which misses the opportunity 
to act in time to prevent famine. However, 
impending drought-related famine can be 
detected, and used to trigger an index insur-
ance payout during the growing season. By 
acting quickly, disaster response can be much 
more effective at much lower cost.
The country’s first national index-based 
disaster insurance program was implemented 
in 2006. Developed by a partnership of the 
World Food Programme (WFP) and the 
Government of Ethiopia, the pilot project 
Some 5 million people in Ethiopia are directly at risk when a drought occurs; Daniel Osgood/IRI
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transiently food-insecure, who are able to feed 
themselves in a good season but suffer when 
the rains fail, are largely overlooked. The 
emergency appeal system that should help 
them during extreme drought is usually too 
slow in its response to prevent distress sales of 
assets, and they then move into the chroni-
cally food-insecure group. Ultimately, this 
makes the PSNP unsustainable – unless the 
weather risk component can be addressed.
Index insurance provides the missing piece 
of the puzzle, allowing timely relief to come 
to those in need quickly when rains fail. In 
this way, the PSNP program can focus on 
its core task of supporting the chronically 
food-insecure. Another advantage is that the 
insurance product facilitates price discovery 
for Ethiopian drought risk in international 
financial markets. Putting a price on drought 
risk allows for better understanding of invest-
ment tradeoffs for mitigation/management of 
drought risk. 
The reinsurance company AXA Re won 
the bid to provide the insurance for the pilot 
project. The premium was set at US$930,000, 
WFP signed the contract on behalf of the 
Government of Ethiopia, and United States 
Agency for International Development 
(USAID) paid most of the premium. The 
contract stipulated a maximum payout of 
US$7,100,000 in the event of severe drought. 
Although rainfall was above normal that year, 
the pilot demonstrated the feasibility of index 
insurance at this level. It included capacity 
building with government and local partners, 
strengthened the national meteorological 
reporting network, and demonstrated that 
there is sufficient quality meteorological data 
in Ethiopia for disaster index insurance.
The contract
The Ethiopia Drought Index (EDI) was 
developed using historical rainfall data from 
the national meteorological agency, and a 
crop–water balance model. The index had an 
80% correlation with the number of food aid 
beneficiaries from 1994 to 2004, indicating 
that it is a good proxy for human need when 
drought strikes.
As the 2006 agricultural season pro-
gressed, rainfall was monitored daily at 26 
weather stations across the country. Extension 
officers in the field reported that the index 
effectively tracked rains and crop growth 
during the 2006 season; at the same time, 
areas where the index and approach could 
be improved were noted. Remote sensing of 
rainfall was used to ensure that there was no 
tampering with station-based rainfall data.
The EDI value at the end of the contract 
period, 31 October 2006, was well below the 
US$55 million trigger level, so there was no 
payout (see figure).
Some basis risk was evident within the 
contract. Standard Famine Early Warning 
System Network (FEWS-NET) sowing 
periods were used to calibrate the 2006 
model, but these did not always correspond 
with actual farming practices. For example, 
the traditional cereal teff, used to make bread 
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and for forage, was sown later than modeled. 
In some cases it experienced water stress 
because the rains ended early, but accord-
ing to the model the crop had already been 
harvested and was not shown to be affected. 
Standard growing cycles from FEWS-NET 
and Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations (FAO) were also used, 
but in Ethiopia growing cycles vary greatly 
according to altitude and local crop variety; 
in some areas, for example, a 240-day variety 
of sorghum is grown, but the model assumed 
a standard 150-day variety. This also led to 
discrepancies. Information on actual sowing 
periods and growing cycles for the main crops 
in the different areas was being collected for 
future projects, to reduce this source of error.
LEAP
In preparation for the second phase of the 
Ethiopia drought insurance project, WFP 
and the World Bank have developed a piece 
of software called LEAP, which stands for 
Livelihoods, Early Assessment and Protection. 
Based on the FAO Water Requirement 
Satisfaction Index (WRSI), the software allows 
users to quantify and index the drought and 
excessive rainfall risk in a particular administra-
tive unit in Ethiopia. LEAP can then be used 
to monitor this risk, and to guide disburse-
ments for a PSNP scale-up.
LEAP uses ground and satellite rainfall 
data to cover the whole of Ethiopia, even 
areas where weather stations do not exist, 
so that every administrative unit in the 
country can be included. It runs localized 
models to convert rainfall data into crop or 
rangeland production estimates and subse-
quently into livelihood stress indicators for 
vulnerable populations. It then estimates the 
financial magnitude of the livelihood-saving 
interventions these people need in the event 
of a weather shock. Thus, LEAP provides a 
good proxy estimate of the funding needs of 
protecting transiently food-insecure people’s 
livelihoods at a time of shock through an 
independent, objective, verifiable and replica-
ble index of livelihood stress. 
The Ethiopia Drought Index, 1952–2006.
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Scaling up index insurance: The contract
Scaling up index insurance presents many 
challenges. This section focuses on the issues 
surrounding the design of insurance contracts 
– issues that must be addressed if large-scale 
implementation is to be feasible. Getting 
the contract ‘right’ is critical – but there is 
no shortcut to doing this. What is largely 
an experimental product will require a great 
deal of adaptation and validation to meet the 
diverse applications and objectives that many 
expect of it.
Scaling up in context
Expectations are high for index insurance 
– perhaps unrealistically so. To successfully 
scale up insurance for development objectives, 
contracts are expected to be affordable and 
easy to understand; to have minimal basis 
risk; to provide extensive coverage in different 
areas; and to deliver this performance against 
a background of limited or non-existent 
markets, limited capacity, weak distribution 
and regulatory systems, and limited contract 
design skills.
Contracts developed for development-
oriented pilot projects have usually been 
highly tailored prototypes, ‘handcrafted’ by 
experts and developed for very specific and 
local needs. The main challenge now is to 
efficiently develop contracts with basic design 
principles that are well understood and gen-
eralizable, so that they can be transferred and 
adapted to different places and conditions. 
And importantly, the task of the initial con-
tract exploration, or ‘seeding’, and designing 
must be manageable at the local level, so that 
contracts genuinely respond to local demands 
and changing needs. Training, and innovative 
training technologies, will be vital.
Some of these challenges are less acute at 
the disaster relief level, since just one contract 
can address the risk for an entire nation. 
Nevertheless, improvements in methodology 
Scaling up will require capacity building at the local level;  
Marjorie Victor/Oxfam America
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are needed, as there are many challenges faced 
at this level as well, particularly associated 
with integration into national disaster man-
agement programs and reaching the target 
beneficiaries. Malawi provides an example of 
how index insurance is being integrated into 
national risk management to support national 
food security (see ‘National-level drought risk 
management in Malawi’ on page 42).
A considerable problem is the shortage 
of historical and real-time data in the very 
regions of the world that are most in need 
of risk management solutions. Data are the 
essential building blocks of index insurance 
– they are needed in order to build a loss 
history, to link this to an index, and to work 
out loss probabilities as a basis for pricing. 
They are key to identifying and reducing 
basis risk. Solutions to the data problem may 
seem straightforward – it is relatively easy to 
install new rain gauges in remote areas, for 
example. But historical data are also essen-
tial, and these will still be lacking. There are 
potential solutions to this problem – histori-
cal datasets can be simulated with the help of 
existing weather stations, for example – but 
they are not always simple, and some depend 
on advancing current science and developing 
new technologies.
The benefits that index insurance offers 
for both development and disaster manage-
ment have, not surprisingly, attracted the 
attention of professionals in these fields. 
Many are advocating scale-up as the next 
stage – but this must be accompanied by a 
caution. We do not yet fully understand the 
behavioral responses to index insurance, or the 
impacts it may ultimately have. There is an 
urgent need for impact studies, as discussed at 
the end of this section.
There is also a danger that eagerness to see 
benefits from index insurance may cause pilots 
to be scaled up too rapidly, before appropri-
ate methodologies have been developed or 
before supporting markets and systems can 
be strengthened. While funding is needed to 
expand and replicate projects, investments 
must be made carefully, allowing products 
to scale up at a strong but realistic rate and 
to adapt as new knowledge is generated and 
shared. In parallel, time and resources must 
be invested in capacity building at the local 
level. It will be important to strengthen the 
innovation system as a whole, so that index 
insurance can play its part in a robust portfo-
lio of responses to climate risk that include a 
range of management options.
The rest of this section looks at contract 
design against the backdrop of these chal-
lenges. It is structured according to the main 
tasks faced by the designers of index insurance 
contracts, namely: 
•	 Identifying	and	quantifying	the	risk
•	 Measuring	index	parameters
•	 Establishing	probabilities
•	 Estimating	the	price.
A final section discusses the need for 
evaluation studies to answer the many ques-
tions surrounding index insurance and its 
impacts.
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Identifying and quantifying the risk 
At the core of contract design is determining 
what risks should be addressed and how these 
might be addressed through an index. The 
contract design question is not how to cover 
every risk, but which risks can best be covered 
using this financial tool, and when this tool 
is more cost-effective than other options for 
managing a particular risk.
The ‘right’ risk that index insurance can 
address is one that is an important livelihood 
constraint, is not adequately addressed through 
other options, and can be closely correlated 
with an index that can be reliably measured. It 
is important to remember that there are many 
risks that cannot be addressed through index 
insurance. Also, the insurance must respond to 
customer needs and demands.
To identify the right risk for farmer-level 
projects, a unique blend of local knowledge and 
science is needed. Interaction between clients 
and insurance experts as well as good demand 
assessments are key. In Ethiopia, a pilot project 
implemented by Oxfam illustrates how the risk 
can be identified through extensive stakeholder 
interactions, and particularly by listening to 
farmers (see ‘A farmer-centric approach in 
Ethiopia’ on page 44).
Determining the right risk to meet client 
demands essentially involves analysis of the 
existing risk management portfolio – the 
coping mechanisms, management practices 
and technical or institutional innovations 
already available – and the gaps. Agricultural 
systems modeling can be useful as a way to 
integrate the multiple sources of informa-
tion needed to understand risks, and to 
build an index that minimizes basis risk for 
crop- or livestock-related applications (see 
‘Agricultural systems modeling’) As with any 
technology, it is important to use agricultural 
systems modeling appropriately, ensuring 
that models are well calibrated and validated. 
Ultimately, the client is the only person 
who possesses a detailed understanding of 
the risks they face and of their alternative 
risk management options, so communica-
tion efforts that facilitate the sharing of 
this knowledge are critical if contracts are 
to address clients’ real needs. As projects 
prepare to scale up, a key lesson from experi-
ence so far is that a high level of stakeholder 
interaction needs to be ongoing to improve 
contract design. For example, in India the 
contract developed by BASIX and partners 
has been substantially altered following 
farmer feedback sessions.
For social protection and disaster manage-
ment purposes, identification of key risks is 
somewhat easier. Major threats to lives and 
livelihoods at the local, regional and national 
scales are well known and are already the 
focus of national disaster management efforts. 
Thus identifying the risk falls upon the 
disaster management system.
In most of the farmer-level case studies, 
the task of identifying the risk and choos-
ing the index has been addressed in part 
through a participatory stakeholder process. 
Index designers model potential indices 
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Agricultural systems modeling
Agricultural systems modeling was first developed in the 1960s and 1970s to help understand interactions 
between the environment and crop and livestock systems. It has evolved so that today very complex systems 
can be modeled. Indeed, systems modeling is not limited to biological processes but can also look at climate and 
livelihood systems, for example. 
These models can be used to produce indices that better correlate with crop production than simple rainfall 
indices. This is because models better reflect the ‘real-life’ situation, where yields depend not simply on the 
amount of rain but on interactions between the weather, soil–water–nutrient dynamics, crop management and 
crop physiology. Better correlation reduces basis risk, making these models attractive for index insurance contract 
designers. Accuracy can be improved by incorporating remote sensing of vegetation conditions or soil surface 
moisture into modeling. Agricultural systems modeling offers an array of tools of varying complexity, from simple 
water balance models such as the FAO Water Requirement Satisfaction Index (WRSI) to sophisticated process-
based models such as the Decision Support System for Agrotechnology Transfer (DSSAT) suite. 
There are a few examples of agricultural systems models being used in index insurance. The Agriculture 
Insurance Company of India (AIC) used the INFOCROP model developed by the Indian Agricultural Research 
Institute (IARI) to model weather–yield relationships and design weather indices for different crops and locations 
in 2007–08 (see ‘Scaling up in India: The public sector’ on page 87). WRSI-related products have been used as 
indices in the Ethiopian government’s disaster relief contract as well as some of the Millennium Villages Project 
(MVP) contracts. WRSI is based on a relatively simple model that predicts water-limited crop yields by looking at 
evapotranspiration (actual and potential) against crop sensitivity during the different growth stages. The WRSI is 
essentially a rainfall index, but one that also takes account of how crops respond to rainfall. At the other end of 
the complexity spectrum, an index insurance product based on DSSAT yield predictions has been used for maize 
production in southern Georgia, USA (Deng et al., 2008).
Agricultural systems modeling can also be useful in modeling the linkages between the index and the risk, 
as well as in understanding the role insurance might play among the suite of risk management options. Another 
use is to demonstrate the potential benefits of index insurance by modeling how improved access to resources 
such as fertilizer might impact production and income. Models can also estimate optimum levels of inputs to 
production systems, and hence levels of credit (or inputs) that might be usefully bundled with insurance. Finally, 
models can help to understand how seasonal forecasts may affect index insurance and agricultural management 
decisions (see box ‘Seasonal forecasts’ on page 35).
As with any tool, agricultural systems modeling is not a panacea, and it will produce unreliable results if used 
inappropriately. It is important not only to validate the model with past outcomes but also to physically verify 
the predictive capacity of the model during implementation. When considering use of a crop or forage model 
as the basis for an index, one should understand its capabilities and limitations, and also understand the system 
being modeled, consider the levels of accuracy needed, evaluate model performance for the given application, 
and ensure that calibration is performed if needed, ideally by an independent technical institution. Discussion of 
model assumptions and outputs with farmers and local experts can be very valuable in this process. For example, 
in Tanzania it was found through validation with stakeholders that the most vulnerable period for maize occurred 
a few weeks later than had been modeled. If the climate and agricultural knowledge of farmers and local experts 
had not been included, this could have led to contracts with a high level of basis risk. Closing the loop through 
responsible agricultural systems modeling and communications yielded a much improved product.
Adapted from Baethgen et al. (2008).
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with stakeholders, allowing for feedback on 
critical issues, particularly trade-offs such as 
how much (if any) of the premium should be 
dedicated to addressing competing risks, or 
between payout size and payout frequency. 
Experimental approaches are being explored 
as possible methodologies for index selection. 
In Kenya, Malawi and Ethiopia, farmers 
have played games based on index contracts, 
using real money. The farmers select between 
the alternative versions of the index contract 
being considered by designers, under simu-
lated weather conditions and events. During 
the game, the farmers are asked questions 
about how similar the game is to their own 
experiences, to quantify agreement and 
mismatches between farmer experience and 
other information sources (Patt et al., 2008). 
For scale-up, methodologies will need to be 
established to perform this time-intensive 
exercise more systematically and efficiently.
The tailored approach to identifying and 
quantifying the risk has been effective in 
pilot projects but was at times very costly (see 
‘Participation: Key to farmer uptake?’). It is 
critical that efforts continue to streamline 
these procedures, relying more on local 
champions, to build more replicable indices. 
The challenge is to balance efforts to lower 
the costs of scaling with the need for reliable 
and effective contracts.
Measuring index parameters
Once a contract period has begun, the 
parameter indexed needs to be measured, 
with data that are reliable and tamper proof. 
Measurements need to be made close to 
the insured location so that they accurately 
reflect weather events at that location. With 
pilots, these requirements have been relatively 
easy to meet; with larger scale projects it is a 
different matter.
For a rainfall-based index insurance 
contract, data are typically obtained from a 
meteorological station. Requirements are that 
the station should be managed by the national 
meteorological service or a reliable private 
provider, should meet international weather 
measurement standards such as those set 
by the World Meteorological Organization 
(WMO), and should be secure, preferably 
Collecting rainfall data; Stephane de Messieres/ 
Oxfam America
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Participation: Key to farmer uptake?
Ultimately, scaling up of index insurance for poverty reduction and development will depend on a large number of 
farmers choosing to take up the insurance. This must be an informed choice based on a clear understanding of the 
insurance – what it covers, what it does not cover, and what it offers vis-à-vis other risk management options. This 
is no simple matter. Index insurance is new and can be complex, and farmers (as well as other stakeholders) have 
a difficult time understanding it. Farmer decision making is also not a simple process. The concern is that farmers 
may, for these reasons, make a decision that is against their own interests and miss an opportunity to reduce the 
risks they face.
Participation may be the key. By involving the potential beneficiaries of index insurance projects in design and 
implementation, it is hoped that their input and assistance will both improve the design and create greater support 
for the project within the target communities. The interactions during these stages should also enhance trust in the 
project and among its participants.
All of the pilot projects invested a great deal of time in interaction between stakeholders. This has been a two-
way process, helping implementers to understand the needs of farmers as well as helping farmers to understand 
the insurance and its potential benefits. At the same time, alongside some of the pilots, there has been research 
into farmer decision making. This has yielded some interesting and sometimes unexpected results, which have 
implications for scaling up.
Both economic and non-economic factors play a role in decisions whether to buy insurance. From an economic 
perspective, researchers found that farmers did not always make the ‘obvious’ choice – the one that would be most 
likely to benefit them economically in the long run. Instead, the decision depended on factors such as the cost of the 
premium, the timing of the premium and the payouts, and the bundling of the insurance with other inputs in a loan 
package. In Ethiopia, for example, farmers explained that they only had cash available to pay the premium just after 
the harvest, so efforts to sell premiums to them at other times would likely fail. Farmers in both Ethiopia and Malawi 
Many factors influence farmer decision-making; Eric Holthaus/IRI
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automated. To make the insurance product 
workable, insured farmers must usually be 
located close to such stations. However, it is a 
fact that there is a shortage of these stations, 
particularly in the regions of the world where 
index insurance might prove most useful for 
development and disaster relief. This needs to 
be addressed as a fundamental constraint to 
scale-up.
Projects in India and Mexico came up 
against a shortage of weather stations as 
they began to scale up (see ‘Insurance for 
contract farming in India’ and ‘Disaster relief 
in Mexico’, on pages 47 and 49). Both have 
addressed this problem by building new 
private stations. In India, some 1200 new 
stations have so far been set up, by private 
and public companies. In Mexico, Fundación 
Produce is building some 764 automated 
stations. Alongside the urgent need to 
expand the network of weather stations, 
whether through public or private sector 
efforts, capacity building and resources to 
manage both the stations and the data are 
also required.
The Caribbean Catastrophe Risk 
Insurance Facility (CCRIF) is currently 
investigating the feasibility of including 
confirmed that it was important for them to receive payouts at roughly the same time that cash from crop 
sales would have materialized, as they had arranged their financial commitments around this period.
But researchers also found that non-economic factors often override economic considerations. 
Investigations in Malawi, Ethiopia and India all show trust to be a crucial factor in guiding people’s decisions 
over insurance – trust in the product itself, and in the organizations involved in selling and managing it. 
People are more likely to buy insurance if they see other members of their community buying it; and their 
own prior experience with insurance is most important of all. In particular, this translates into willingness 
to buy if there has been experience of a payout.
There are many other factors that influence decision making, some at the individual or household level, 
for example a potential customer’s perception of risk and degree of risk aversion. All of these factors will 
be very relevant in efforts to scale up index insurance. Indeed, the researchers who investigated decision 
making in the pilot studies strongly recommend that similar levels of interaction are included as projects 
are scaled up and out. They believe that participation has a crucial role in developing trust in the institutions 
involved, in the product, and also in the clients’ own decisions to purchase the insurance – and without 
this trust there may not be sufficient uptake. Of course, a balance must be established between the level 
of interaction and the cost of interaction at large scales.
The same researchers also stress the importance of regulation, by the government, international 
bodies and the insurance industry itself. Regulation needs to ensure that contracts are fair, that they 
are accompanied by transparent information, and that claims will be paid promptly. It is crucial that the 
commercial actors in index insurance markets are honest players, and that their actions contribute to trust 
in the product, rather than destroying trust. A single bad example could, the researchers say, set index 
insurance development back by many years.
Adapted from Patt et al. (2008).
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rainfall in its catastrophe insurance, following 
Hurricane Noel which caused severe damage 
due to flooding that was not covered in exist-
ing contracts (see ‘Catastrophe risk insurance 
in the Caribbean’ on page 52). However, 
adequate rainfall data, both historical and cur-
rent, are limited in the region. As a solution, 
a new ‘extreme weather monitoring network’ 
has been proposed which will record extreme 
rainfall and wind events and act as a verifica-
tion mechanism.
There are other ways to address the lack 
of data, especially for disaster management 
applications. Remote sensing can be useful 
for verification purposes and perhaps even as 
a source of data for the insurance index (see 
box, ‘Remote sensing’, page 28). Remotely 
sensed data can either be blended with 
ground-collected data to improve overall data 
quality, or used alone, if they have already 
been validated and shown to reflect conditions 
on the ground accurately. In the Ethiopia 
disaster relief project, for example, remotely 
sensed rainfall data are used to extend the 
index to areas where there are insufficient 
ground data. In the Millennium Villages 
Project (MVP) remotely sensed greenness is 
used to enhance an index based on rainfall 
data (see ‘Insuring development goals in the 
Millennium Villages Project’ on page 56).
One advantage of remote sensing is 
that data cannot be tampered with by the 
client. Even when such data are not accurate 
enough to be directly used to measure the 
index, they can be very useful for validating 
ground measurements and confirming that 
the latter have not been tampered with. 
This validation is particularly important in 
national-level projects where an index meas-
ured by government weather stations may 
determine large payouts to that government.
Typically, products involving remotely 
sensed data have been used by governments 
or intermediaries rather than in farmer-level 
projects because it is difficult for farmers 
to relate the performance of their crops to 
such intangible indices. Farmers also may 
not trust the insurance company to use such 
data responsibly in calculating payouts. These 
concerns may change as farmers become 
more experienced with index products and 
the level of trust builds between the insurance 
company and the farmer. The micro-level 
Oxfam America-led project in Ethiopia is 
using remotely sensed rainfall for farmer-level 
contracts until newly installed rain gauges can 
be sufficiently calibrated; this project is devot-
ing significant time and energy to engaging 
farmers and building trust and understanding 
of products.
Spatial basis risk – the failure of the 
index to represent individual losses because 
of differences across locations – is a major 
challenge to scale-up. It is correlated with 
the distance between the weather station 
and the insured location, but the acceptable 
distance varies according to factors such as 
homogeneity of the landscape. An arbitrary 
maximum distance of 20 km has often been 
used in pilots for rainfall index products, 
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Remote sensing
Data from satellites can be used in index insurance as an alternative or a supplement to ground-collected data. 
These remotely sensed data have several advantages. Data are independent and tamper-proof, for example, and 
are available across large areas of the Earth and in near real-time. They, and their derived products, are easily 
available via the internet. However, the data are not direct measures but proxy measures of, for example, rainfall or 
vegetation. This means they come with a level of uncertainty. The majority of data from satellites is relatively ‘coarse’, 
i.e. low quality and low resolution; the satellites with highest resolution often do not have global coverage and 
are usually very new. And many satellites are deployed for temporary research projects, so collection of long-term 
data may not be part of their program. Given these caveats, there is a great deal of promise in remote sensing 
if effort is taken to research, validate and improve products. Remotely sensed data may be particularly useful 
coupled with other types of information; and offer a valuable fallback option when a ground-based observation 
station fails during the contract period.
Rainfall
There are two main ways of estimating rainfall from satellites. One uses thermal infra-red imaging to look at storm 
clouds and their height. The assumption is that more rain falls from storm clouds with deeper vertical extent. The 
height is related to the temperature of the top of the cloud, which is obtained from the infra-red images. The 
colder the temperature, the higher the cloud top. Rainfall is estimated based on the length of time the cloud top 
is below a certain temperature.
Passive microwave measurement offers an alternative way of estimating rainfall. The sensors measure actual rainy 
areas rather than clouds, making this a more accurate method. However, these sensors are not currently available 
on geosynchronous satellites, so fewer data are available (in both time and space). (Geosynchronous satellites have 
orbits that match the earth’s rotation, keeping them above the same spot on the earth all the time.)
Data from these two approaches may be merged to combine the better rainfall identification of the passive 
microwave method with the better sampling of data from the thermal infra-red images. These data can also be 
blended with rain gauge data to further improve accuracy.
Remotely sensed rainfall data are potentially very useful where there are limited rain gauge data, because of few 
weather stations or uneven distribution of gauges, for example. This is often the case in rural parts of developing 
countries – which are precisely the areas that index insurance is targeting with development objectives. However, 
the level of uncertainty with these data is high, and they often fail to adequately reflect the actual amount of rainfall. 
Thermal infra-red sensors do not allow for variation in rainfall intensity under the clouds; rain may fall from lower 
clouds, for example near coasts or in mountainous areas; and cirrus clouds may incorrectly indicate rainfall because 
of their height, whereas in fact they are not deep enough for rainfall to develop. Passive microwave limitations are 
mainly due to background emission from the land surface, which varies for different vegetation and soil water 
content, as well as to the relatively few data available, including historical data.
There are ongoing efforts to extend and enhance archived satellite rainfall data to produce useful time series. 
Other plans for the future include a satellite mission with advanced passive microwave and radar instruments, 
which should greatly improve satellite rainfall estimation (the Global Precipitation Measurement Mission, 
http://gpm.gsfc.nasa.gov/).
Adapted from Dinku et al. (2008).
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Vegetation
The vegetation measure that is most commonly used for index insurance is the Normalized Difference Vegetation 
Index (NDVI) (although new, improved vegetation measures are on the way). The NDVI is derived from satellite 
measures of ‘greenness’, which reflect the level of photosynthesis in the vegetation on the ground. Higher values 
of NDVI indicate greater vigor and amounts of vegetation, and index insurance contracts generally insure against 
a decline in NDVI over an area, which would usually be due to drought.
The assumption with NDVI is that crop (or forage) production correlates with remotely measured vegetation 
vigor over a given area and over time. This usually works well for forage, but is less straightforward with food crops 
such as maize, soybean and wheat. Here, final crop yield (seed production) is affected by factors such as nutrient 
availability or water stress during critical growth stages, which may not be reflected in average ‘greenness’.
Nonetheless, NDVI has been piloted for index insurance in different parts of the world, with some success. In 
the USA, where crops are grown on a large and uniform scale which enhances the NDVI correlation, the Vegetation 
Index Plan of Insurance is being trialed for pasture, rangeland and forage (http://www.rma.usda.gov/policies/
pasturerangeforage). The Millennium Villages Project (MVP) has developed index insurance using NDVI combined 
with a rainfall index to insure against maize losses.
Where crops are mixed with natural vegetation, such as over much of Africa, monitoring crop status with the 
NDVI is more of a challenge. In this case, NDVI is often not used to measure yields directly, but rather to detect a 
drought that would cause losses. The MVP index used the average NDVI over a large region to detect the browning 
of natural vegetation during times of year when a lack of rainfall would severely damage crops.
Many NDVI products are now available through the internet. Some datasets extend from the early 1980s, 
providing very useful time series. Reprocessing of older data has improved resolution, while sensors with ever 
higher spatial resolution are also becoming available – currently down to 10 meters, allowing the identification of 
very precise areas with pasture or crop problems. The US Department of Agriculture is also developing an NDVI 
product with 9-hour latency and 500-meter resolution, which will enable rapid analysis of crop conditions.
Adapted from Ceccato et al. (2008).
The HARITA project in Ethiopia is using satellite data to complement ground 
data (see page 44); Google, LeadDog Consulting, MapData, TerraMetrics; 
prepared by Daniel Osgood and Chris Small/IRI
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and up to 50 km for products based on 
temperature and humidity; but analysis is 
lacking on how to establish such distances. 
Again, the implication is a need not only for 
more weather stations but also for improved 
understanding of the differences in climate 
between locations and across regions. 
Remote sensing may have a role here too, 
to give a sense of the magnitude of these 
differences.
The vulnerability of an index to spatial 
basis risk also depends on the index itself 
as well as the risk being targeted. Because 
of the nature of drought, for example, it is 
often relatively easy to develop indices for 
this risk that are robust. Since drought is a 
phenomenon that builds slowly over time, 
differences in daily rainfall between locations 
are often not critical; instead it is the longer 
term total which is important. The problem 
can be much more challenging for excess 
rainfall, flood, wind or frost insurance, in 
which a single highly localized event may 
drive the bulk of the loss. Where these risks 
must be dealt with in the course of scaling up, 
research is needed to quantify them in more 
detail. For a discussion of index insurance 
applications and challenges in water resources 
applications, see ‘Applications for reservoir and 
flood management’ on page 31, and ‘Vietnam: 
Flood insurance in the Mekong Delta’ on page 
59. These challenges are particularly great 
for farmer-level projects. For disaster relief 
projects, contracts can be designed to pay 
out when large aggregate losses are likely to 
occur so that relief efforts can be financed 
without having to determine exactly where 
the losses occur.
Establishing probabilities
Getting the index ‘right’ depends on a solid 
understanding of the probabilities associated 
with a given risk. This typically depends on 
long datasets of acceptable quality, which 
enable the likelihood of an extreme event, 
the level of vulnerability and exposure, and 
the losses incurred to be reliably estimated. A 
key scale-up issue is the limited availability of 
data, both historical and current; and ways to 
circumvent this lack of data.
One common approach, known to insur-
ance designers as ‘historical burning cost 
analysis’, is extremely transparent and can be 
easily communicated to stakeholders. For this 
analysis, the probability distribution of the 
indexed parameter is calculated entirely by 
observing past measurements. For example, for 
a rainfall index, the past several decades of rain 
gauge data are used to represent the set of pos-
sible rainfall events. These are then used to cal-
culate possible payouts. Although useful, when 
applied without other analyses this approach 
has significant limitations. For example, one or 
two major events can distort the probabilities, 
while any event that has not happened in the 
historical record is not considered.
Because of the limitations of historical 
burn analysis, it is typically complimented 
with rainfall modeling and simulation (see 
‘Rainfall simulation’, page 34). Using data that 
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Applications for reservoir and flood management
Index insurance has so far mostly been used to insure against drought, but it has promise beyond this. Its 
application to water resources, particularly reservoir and flood management, is attracting interest as an alternative 
or complementary strategy to traditional methods.
Reservoir index insurance can help smooth costs associated with shared demands on limited water resources. 
Where urban needs compete with irrigated agriculture, for example, payouts to farmers in dry years would 
compensate their losses. Experts envisage a combination of insurance, forecasting and adaptive operation strategies 
as the way forward – though they emphasize that success depends on water managers being open to new ways of 
working. Progress also depends on the development of effective indices, which is a significant challenge. Reservoir 
inflows have been used, but are susceptible to basis risk where there may be diversions upstream.
After drought, floods are the next biggest threat to agriculture – does index insurance have a role in managing 
flood risk? Work is still experimental, and flood is clearly more problematic than drought to link accurately to an 
index, but there is some potential.
Disasters arising from floods may also be managed using index insurance, with the same advantages – rapid 
payouts, not dependent on actual assessments of damage or destruction – as other disasters. Again, the challenge 
is to develop an appropriate and effective index.
Southeast Asia has the highest number of people affected by flooding, and studies to investigate the feasibility 
of index insurance have been carried out in Thailand and Vietnam. The Thailand project examined farmer-level 
insurance, and concluded that it was unlikely to be workable. Frequent, localized flooding in the river valley would 
lead to the scheme attracting only high-risk farmers and would also lead to very high premiums. Results from 
Vietnam were more promising. Rather than targeting farmers, this project looked at the feasibility of ‘business 
interruption insurance’, to be purchased by the Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development. The bank 
would lend money to rice farmers and would cover itself against losses in the event of flooding early in the 
growing season. This may be trialed in the near future, with a contract based on recorded water levels at a main 
river gauge station (see ‘Vietnam: Flood insurance in the Mekong Delta’ on page 59).
These two studies provide some useful lessons for those working on the development of flood insurance. 
First, farmers do to some extent manage their own risk exposure to floods where these have some pattern. 
Insurance is only feasible for infrequent, unpredictable and widespread flooding. Second, there are significant 
technical issues that need to be addressed. Each floodplain is unique, and its specific characteristics need to be 
considered. Upstream development can affect flood events downstream, for example. Defining agricultural flood 
events requires a good understanding of various aspects of flooding – extent, duration, depth, etc – and their 
relationship to the different stages of crop growth. As a crop grows, the critical thresholds at which a flood event 
results in damage also change. This issue of timing makes modeling of flood risk for agriculture very challenging. 
However, remote sensing may be a useful tool here, enabling rapid and objective assessment of flood extent and 
duration, even at high resolution. Application of these technologies is most feasible for river inundation flood 
rather than flash flood events.
Farmer-level flood insurance has additional technical challenges because of highly localized variation in flood 
exposure and the potential for anti-selection against the insurer. Flood index insurance aimed at intermediaries such 
as banks, or at governments, therefore seems more promising in the current data and technological environment 
than schemes directly targeting farmers. Risk management projects need to take a more holistic approach in 
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working with intermediary clients like agricultural banks. It is important to understand the credit risk management 
methodology used by these institutions, specifically related to how natural disaster risks are currently treated and 
the broader policy environment in which they operate. A flood insurance product can complement and support 
more formal procedures for credit risk management such as interest or principal repayment scheduling.
Flood risk mapping and remote sensing have additional applications. Notably, risk mapping can provide 
agricultural credit banks with an objective assessment of risks of default arising from such factors as flood timing 
and duration. Better mapping of flood risks, linked to geo-location of borrowing farmers, should enable banks 
to refine their lending policies and to plan risk transfer or loan rescheduling policy and pricing. It may support 
government departments in advising on farming practices, variety selection, etc. Further, detection of flooded 
areas using remote sensing can support objective ex-post compensation systems, where these exist.
Adapted from Block et al. (2008)
Index insurance for flooding faces technical challenges; V.J. Villafranca/IRIN
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are available, plus an understanding of the 
variables that influence rainfall, the modeling 
generates thousands of years of synthetic 
rainfall data, which include events that are 
possible but have not actually occurred in the 
past. This approach can be used to extend 
limited datasets, allowing more realistic indi-
ces to be developed. In Mexico, for example, 
rainfall and temperature simulations are being 
used to replace missing data and produce long 
time series for estimating probabilities when 
building indices. In 2008 these synthetic 
series were used with actual (though limited) 
data from 75 weather stations to insure farm-
ers growing crops on some 250,000 hectares 
of land (see page 49).
Rainfall modeling has a range of complex-
ity, from simple distributions for rainfall to 
sophisticated algorithms that factor in climate 
models, multiple stations and remote sens-
ing. At any level of sophistication, modeling 
rainfall accurately enough for index insurance 
design and pricing is challenging, and research 
is necessary to address the many known 
problems.
For many locations where index insurance 
could be useful, there are few or no histori-
cal rainfall data to ‘train’ a model, and other 
approaches are needed to fill the historical data 
gap. Satellite-based remote sensing again can 
be useful here (see ‘Remote sensing’, page 28). 
Satellite imagery can be used to estimate aver-
age rainfall over a pixel as opposed to rainfall 
at a particular point, as measured by a station. 
Some datasets from satellites extend back 
as far as 30 years, and efforts are under way 
to enhance these. However, even enhanced 
satellite data are relatively crude estimates of 
rainfall, and work must be done to determine 
whether they can be used to build sufficiently 
robust indices.
One way of arriving at proxy historical 
rainfall and losses and of complementing exist-
ing datasets is to interview farmers and experts. 
Currently, most pilot projects hold focus group 
interviews even when historical data are good, 
to validate the link between client percep-
tions and what is measured at the rain gauge. 
Although the data from these interviews 
are qualitative rather than quantitative and 
may have a great deal of inaccuracy, they do 
provide an additional source of information on 
historical events. Again, the issue for scaling up 
purposes is whether this level of interaction is 
necessary on a large scale, and whether it can 
be replicated in large-scale projects.
Seasonal climate forecasts are relevant to 
index insurance because they may alter the 
probability of losses expected on the basis of 
other data (see ‘Seasonal forecasts’, page 35). 
There is a danger that seasonal forecasts 
might be used strategically by clients, under-
mining the financial stability of the products. 
However, if insurance contracts can integrate 
forecasts, the farmer can take advantage of the 
forecast while being insured against forecast 
inaccuracies. In theory, insurance contract 
and project designers could combine the use 
of forecasts with that of insurance to provide 
price incentives for conservative behavior 
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Rainfall simulation
Models that simulate rainfall are very useful where there are limited actual rainfall data. Using the data that do 
exist, and an understanding of the variables that influence rainfall, the modeling software generates thousands 
of years of synthetic rainfall, which includes events that are possible but may not have occurred in the past. Thus, 
the use of rainfall simulators can lead to more robust contracts and pricing.
Modeling also helps improve understanding of rainfall correlations between different locations within a region. 
This understanding has the potential to help insurers spread risks across areas (see page 36 and ‘Spreading risk’ on 
page 37). A third role for rainfall models is to incorporate seasonal forecasts, decadal trends, and climate change 
into index insurance contracts (see ‘Seasonal forecasts’ on page 35). 
There are different types of rainfall models, and they vary in complexity. Generalized linear models are the 
simplest, and have the advantage that they can account for climate change over long timescales. Nonhomogeneous 
hidden Markov models are useful because of their ability to reflect real scientific phenomena, such as regional 
atmospheric conditions. Nonparametric models have the advantage of more flexibly describing relationships 
between rainfall and other variables, because they do not rely on standard probability distributions. Finally, 
mechanistic models are a relatively new approach to rainfall modeling in which the occurrence and movement 
of rain storms and rain cells are modeled explicitly.
The uncertainty inherent in rainfall simulations is reduced where more actual data are available and used to 
‘train’ the model. Also, as understanding improves of the variables affecting rainfall, for example, El Niño–Southern 
Oscillation (ENSO) effects, models will become more reliable at predicting future rainfall.
As with any tool, rainfall models and simulations have their limitations, particularly since they were not 
developed for index insurance design. They often under-represent the true variation in rainfall, leading to indices 
and prices that underestimate risk. They are also bad at representing seasonality, the beginning of a rainy season, 
the end of a rainy season, dry spells and other features that are usually of importance in crop losses and index 
payouts. Since these tools are often applied in pricing and design, research is needed to improve their performance 
for these types of rainfall features.
Adapted from Shirley et al. (2008).
in years with forecasts of bad weather, and 
for productive investments in years where 
such investments face low levels of risk 
(Osgood et al., 2008). However, a great deal 
of methodology must be developed before this 
combination can be implemented in practice. 
Similarly, long-term climate trends can also 
be built into index products – in theory. 
However, the current level of technology 
available for updating insurance probabilities 
and for distinguishing between short-term 
processes and long-term change are in their 
infancy and a great deal of work remains to 
be done to provide workable techniques for 
practical application.
Estimating the price
The price of insurance reflects the prob-
abilities of payouts, which are in turn driven 
by the probabilities of adverse weather events 
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Seasonal forecasts
Forecasts of the weather for the season ahead are becoming increasingly skilful, particularly in some tropical 
regions, and this has implications for index insurance. On the one hand, forecasts could undermine insurance 
schemes as farmers might decide to insure only when the forecast is for a bad season. On the other, if insurance 
contracts can be designed to incorporate the seasonal forecast, this could enhance decision making in response 
to the forecast. For example, where a seasonal forecast predicts a wetter than normal season ahead, a farmer 
might take advantage of the likely good growing conditions by purchasing inputs – but at the same time use 
insurance to protect against the lesser likelihood of a drier than normal season. In this way index insurance can 
help manage the uncertainty inherent in probabilistic forecasts.
The Malawi case study ‘Unlocking development potential in Malawi’ on page 13 helps to illustrate this. El Niño, 
La Niña and neutral years are identified using historical rainfall data, and insurance cost and size of the input loan 
are adjusted as if these had been forecast. Premiums decrease in La Niña years, when there is very little drought 
risk and farmers would have been able to cover a significantly larger loan. The figure shows how gross revenue 
can greatly increase due to these inputs in La Niña years.
This is a very simple example, and seasonal forecasts have not yet been integrated into index insurance 
contracts in practice (although planned contracts on sea surface temperatures in Peru will put some of the key 
pieces in place). More work is needed to better understand the effects of a forecast on the insurance, and especially 
people’s behavior in the light of a forecast. Tools are also needed to help design and price insurance that integrates 
a forecast. Climate forecast products that can be readily applied to insurance would also facilitate integration. 
Different strategies might be developed to address the issue of seasonal forecasts depending on the ability 
of clients to respond to the information in the forecasts. Where there is no potential to change activities in the 
light of a forecast, strategies include closing contract sales before forecasts are available, multiple-year contracts, 
or selling options on the right to purchase the insurance. But if farmers have the capacity to make better decisions 
based on the forecast it would be appropriate to integrate forecasts into contracts.
Rainfall simulation methods offer a way of integrating forecasts into insurance contracts. Forecasts are treated 
as variables, and rainfall is simulated for different forecasts. Contract design optimization and pricing can then be 
based on these simulations.
Agricultural systems modeling can be used to better understand how people might change their decisions 
in the light of a forecast. The assumption is that farmers would intensify production under anticipated favorable 
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reflected in the index. These probabilities 
must be accurately assessed so that prices are 
fair to both buyers and sellers and properly 
reflect the costs of transferring the risk. The 
challenges this entails have been discussed in 
in the previous section.
Arriving at a workable price is clearly 
critical to scale-up, where the aim is a product 
that will be bought and sold on the open 
market. Yet negotiating a price is particularly 
challenging because there is a great deal of 
uncertainty over probabilities. There is also 
intense pressure to provide products that have 
a great deal of coverage at a low price.
Ultimately, prices are determined through 
tough negotiation between clients, insurers 
and reinsurers. Deciding how uncertainties 
should be handled is thus a complex matter 
involving the perceptions, trust and negotiat-
ing skills of these actors. If these commu-
nications and trust are not built, large-scale 
projects may pose more problems than pilot 
projects, where the sums of money at stake 
are low and negotiations come under scrutiny 
from the international community. But even 
small-scale projects have had difficulties, 
notably in reaching agreement between 
insurer and reinsurer. Transparent and 
comprehensive documentation and improved 
methods for risk characterization for the 
reinsurer should reduce uncertainty and keep 
prices realistic.
Scaling up can open up options that 
reduce prices. From the risk-carrier’s view-
point, errors may cancel out, while aggregat-
ing and pooling risks can reduce variability 
for reinsurers, thereby reducing their need for 
a safety margin in pricing. Also, in scaling up 
it may be possible to access larger pools of 
capital, which can help cushion against poor 
profitability in the early stages.
In some cases, the climate itself can be 
sufficiently predictable to allow the price 
of insurance to be reduced. Particularly in 
the tropics, global processes such as the 
El Niño–Southern Oscillation (ENSO) 
often lead to strong spatial weather pat-
terns. Drought in some parts of the world is 
often associated with ample rainfall in other 
regions. Experiences in the case studies show 
how this could work – for example, payouts in 
Southern and Eastern Africa typically occur 
in different years, linked to ENSO status. In 
effect, different regions can insure each other 
through a central pool, as the world’s climate 
provides a natural hedge (see ‘Spreading risk’).
conditions and be more conservative under a forecast of adverse conditions. Models include additional 
farm-level factors that influence decision making, including farmers’ goals, constraints and attitudes 
to risk. These models can help develop insurance packages that exploit forecasts to support farm 
management.
Adapted from Robertson et al. (2008).
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Spreading risk
Risk spreading by insurance (and reinsurance) companies makes index insurance more affordable. Scaling up will 
open up new risk-spreading opportunities, particularly as climate patterns and relationships across space and 
time become better understood.
Risk spreading across space – geographic risk spreading – is feasible where complementary climate patterns 
have been identified in different regions. In Africa, for example, a dry season in the eastern region is often associated 
with a wetter season in the southern region, and vice versa. This observation is linked to the ENSO phenomenon – la 
Niña events are associated with lower rainfall in eastern Africa and higher rainfall in southern Africa, while during 
El Niño the reverse pattern is often seen.
Insurance companies could take advantage of this pattern by developing programs that cover both regions: 
drought insurance contracts would be very unlikely to pay out simultaneously in both regions, thus reducing the 
company’s risk exposure. Vicarelli (2008) illustrates the potential for premium savings through pooling of contracts 
from Malawi and Tanzania, while Hess and Syroka (2005) have estimated premium savings of 23% if the regions 
could be covered together in a single insurance portfolio.
Risk spreading may be particularly relevant with climate change ahead. Much of the damage from climate 
change is expected to occur through extreme events, but it is unlikely that these events will simultaneously 
blanket the earth; rather, they will occur in some places in some years and other places in other years, driven by 
processes similar to those we observe today. The global climate can thus self-insure against the risks of extremes 
from climate change.
From an institutional point of view, geographic risk spreading might translate into the development of large-
scale (national and multi-national) risk mitigation strategies as well as partnerships between national governments 
and the insurance and reinsurance sector.
The Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF) is based on geographic risk spreading. Participating 
countries pool their country-specific risks into one, better diversified portfolio. Since natural disaster risks in any 
given year among the Caribbean islands are randomly distributed, the cost of coverage for the pooled portfolio 
is less than the sum of premiums that countries would have to pay individually for the same coverage. In practice, 
premiums are reduced by almost half (see ‘Catastrophe risk insurance in the Caribbean’ on page 52).
Adapted from Vicarelli (2008).
Climate processes, including climate 
change and decadal processes, have implica-
tions for pricing (see ‘Climate variability 
and change and index insurance’, page 38). 
For example, when analyzing climate risks, 
Swiss Re works to forecast future climate 
conditions by observing prices of weather 
risks that are traded in liquid markets and 
by modeling, such as splitting the time series 
into seasonal, climate change and residual 
variability. They also use seasonal forecasts to 
adjust pricing for conditions in the next few 
months. Increased understanding of the links 
between different climate systems and proc-
esses should feed into pricing in the coming 
decades.
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Climate variability and change and index insurance
To arrive at index insurance products that make effective adaptation tools – ones that are not undermined by 
climate processes – it is essential to remember that climate is more than a long-term trend. Climate is a complex 
system of anthropogenic and natural processes operating at yearly, decadal and long-term timescales. If climate 
science and index insurance methodologies continue to improve, addressing the complete spectrum of climate 
processes, it is likely that index insurance can be robust to climate variability and change and hence a useful part 
of societies’ adaptation toolbox.
Today’s insurance need not be built to cover a loss 100 years into the future. Instead, insurance addresses the 
coming year, and can therefore be adapted over time, improving as our understanding of climate improves. For a 
given year, short-term climate (and market) processes dominate, with long-term trends representing only a small 
fraction of the climate variability faced. However, over time, as the cumulative impacts of climate change start to 
materialize, they can be reflected in insurance in ways that incentivize gradual adaptation.
Because the dynamics of climate vary from region to region, the implications of climate processes for index 
insurance will not be uniform over the globe. For example, for the Sahel in West Africa, medium-term climate 
processes are particularly strong – more than a quarter of the variation in measured rainfall is on a decadal 
timescale (Greene et al., 2008). In this region, it is especially important to build index insurance that is robust to 
decadal processes (Skees et al., 2008a). For Sahel index insurance contracts in the MVP, substantial work had to be 
done to explore decadal scale insurance adaptation algorithms. 
For the index insurance contracts in Nicaragua, the picture is different. The past 40 years of data do not suggest 
any trend in rainfall (Osgood et al., 2009). However, climate predictions by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) suggest that in Nicaragua there could be strong drying trends due to climate change. The figure 
below presents the individual IPCC models (light lines) as well as their average (heavy line) for this region. It can 
be seen that, over the next decade or so, the models provide little evidence of a drying trend. However, over the 
next 100 years, most (but not all) of the models predict a slow reduction in rainfall, roughly 0.25% per year.
Nicaragua illustrates that the timing of 
these processes must be taken into account 
when developing insurance contracts. In the 
near future, climate change is unlikely to affect 
the probability of a drought. For approximately 
the next decade, the yearly price of insurance 
can therefore be expected to be driven by 
year-to-year variability, because that is the 
climate risk faced. During this period, farmers 
should be able to use insurance to safeguard 
investments that increase their productivity. 
This should help them build wealth and 
acquire the assets needed to allow them to 
shift into other livelihoods if this becomes 
necessary. In the further future, the probability 
of drought increases slightly each year. As this 
Precipitation at Managua, Nicaragua
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trend unfolds, the price of the insurance should gradually increase. Over time, the cumulative rise could incentivize 
improvements in farming systems or a gradual transition to other livelihood activities.
For the projects in Ethiopia, the climate picture again looks different. IPCC predictions show little evidence 
of any trend in precipitation (see figure). If anything, the models suggest increases in rainfall. In contrast to the 
models, over the past decade, there are some sites in Ethiopia where the instrumental record shows decreased 
rainfall. This is the case for Adi Ha, where the Oxfam-led pilot is located. Here the observed trend, a decline of about 
1% per year, is strong enough to have increased the insurance price.
The difference between observations and 
IPCC predictions is being debated by climate 
scientists as they work to understand what 
is likely to occur in the future, what is due to 
climate change and what is driven by other 
processes (Funk et al., 2005). Many scientists 
argue that the drying observed is not due to 
long-term climate change but is a decadal 
process. Research on this issue has fundamental 
implications for the design of index insurance 
and for the broader policy environment. If the 
drying is due to climate change, it could signal 
the importance of an eventual transition out 
of the insured activities, or of fundamental 
changes that enable these activities to be 
viable with less rainfall. In addition, if the drying 
is driven by greenhouse gas emissions, the 
burden faced by the farmers is directly due 
to those emitting the gases. However, if the 
drying is part of a decadal cycle, it will be more important for contracts to be built into climate risk strategies that 
protect against alternating decadal periods of drought and high rainfall. 
Temperature is an additional, complicating element. There is a consensus that climate change will lead to 
higher temperatures in Ethiopia, as in much of sub-Saharan Africa. This anthropogenic temperature increase 
will increase the water needs of crops, leading to more severe and more frequent water stress. However, higher 
temperatures could also lead to higher yields in years with large amounts of rainfall. Thus, on top of any impacts 
climate change has on rainfall, its temperature impacts are likely to increase the variability faced by farmers and 
hence also increase the value of insurance.
Although science does not yet provide us with definitive answers to these questions, what is currently known 
is revealing important issues for index insurance design. Substantial effort needs to be put into advancing climate 
science and index insurance methods, so that these can keep pace with climate change.
Adapted from Greene et al. (2008).
Precipitation at Adi Ila, Ethiopia
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Understanding impacts 
Index insurance appears to be a promising 
tool for improving the management of climate 
risks. However, some fundamental questions 
about it remain to be answered. 
What is the impact of index insurance on 
the incomes, assets and investment decisions 
of those insured? If there is an impact, what 
is its distribution in the population? Whom 
does index insurance benefit and for whom 
does it not work? How does the design of 
index insurance affect its impact? In summary, 
what role can we expect index insurance to 
play in development and disaster relief and 
how can we design index insurance for differ-
ent socio-economic and physical conditions in 
order to maximize its beneficial impact?
To answer these questions, we need 
rigorous impact evaluations of index insurance 
programs and projects. Ideally, evaluations 
should be integrated into program or project 
implementation. Impacts of index insurance 
for development and for disaster manage-
ment should both be addressed. Evaluation 
methods must be unbiased towards projects at 
different scales so that decisions based on the 
evaluations are not themselves biased.
Because insurance for development 
typically covers events that happen only once 
in five to ten years, it will be important to 
study impacts across different geographical 
areas in order to increase our understanding 
more quickly. While long-term data from 
one place will be extremely useful and would 
provide the most robust data for evaluation, 
even short-term impact evaluations – which 
combine analysis of limited data with models 
of the physical environment and of behavioral 
responses – can help to improve understand-
ing. However, the limitations of impact 
evaluation methodology are often tested when 
applied to index insurance. Although it may 
not always be possible to disentangle the 
impacts of insurance from the interventions 
it is bundled with, it is important to at least 
understand the value of the bundle.
Some of the pilot projects have included 
evaluation, but this has usually focused on 
adoption rates rather than impacts, and in 
some cases the results have led to confusion. 
In Malawi, for example, researchers compared 
farmer take-up rates for two packages – a 
standard insurance and loan package, or a loan 
without insurance (Giné and Yang, 2007). 
The research project made the latter option 
available by itself guaranteeing the loan repay-
ment to the bank. Take-up rates for the pack-
age with insurance were lower than for the 
loan only, reflecting either the fact that farm-
ers do not expect real repercussions in case of 
default, or perhaps that farmers placed little 
value on the insurance beyond its originally 
intended role of giving access to credit. These 
findings have often been misinterpreted as 
showing the product to be unpopular or to 
have little impact, whereas in fact demand for 
the product was so high that it overwhelmed 
the project delivery resources and associated 
supply chains. The missing evaluation would 
have compared impacts between farmers who 
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had access to loans because of the insurance 
and farmers who did not have access to either, 
so as to determine whether or not their liveli-
hoods had improved.
In India, the International Crops 
Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics 
(ICRISAT) and the World Bank conducted 
two large surveys with Swiss funding in 2004 
and 2006, covering 1000 farmers, many of 
whom were repeat buyers of insurance who 
had started buying in 2003. The results 
showed that, while take-up rates had been 
high overall, the unsubsidized premiums 
to be paid up-front led to low amounts of 
insurance bought by the BASIX microfi-
nance and livelihoods group, farmers and 
self-help groups. Thus, behavior and invest-
ment patterns did not change much. The 
survey also found that trust in BASIX as well 
as education levels mattered a great deal for 
the buying decision, whereas risk aversion 
did not matter much (Giné et al., 2006). 
Studies of this kind will be essential in the 
future, to support scale-up.
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Malawi provides an example of how index-
based risk management can be used at the 
national level by governments and donors 
to manage weather exposure as part of an 
integrated and comprehensive approach to 
managing risk. As part of the risk management 
component of its Agricultural Development 
Programme (ADP), the Government of 
Malawi, with support from the World Bank 
and the UK’s Department for International 
Development (DFID), initiated a pilot in 
October 2008 that transferred the financial risk 
of severe and catastrophic national drought to 
the international risk markets. This involved 
the purchase of a weather derivative contract 
from the World Bank Treasury, which simulta-
neously entered into a contract with a leading 
reinsurance company.
The ADP aims to strengthen maize 
markets in the country so that farmers and 
other stakeholders can respond effectively to 
price and production shocks. The transaction 
will provide predictable and early financing, 
in the form of a payout to the government, 
in the event of a severe national drought. 
The contract is based on rainfall measure-
ments and does not depend on actual maize 
production. Payments can therefore be 
Case studies II
National-level drought risk management in Malawi
The transaction will provide a payout to the Malawi Government if the maize crop in the country fails due to drought;  
Curt Carnemark/World Bank
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triggered as soon as the contract ends in 
April, rather than waiting for the harvest 
assessments in June. 
The weather derivative contract is struc-
tured as a put option that is triggered by a 
rainfall index. The index links rainfall – its 
amount and distribution during the grow-
ing season – to the expected level of maize 
production in the country. If the index falls 
to 10% below the historical average, the 
government will receive a payout at the end 
of the season, up to a maximum of US$5 
million. For the first trial year the sums were 
relatively small, but they may be increased 
in the future as experience is gained and 
the role of this tool within the govern-
ment’s broader risk management portfolio 
is better understood. The government plans 
to use any payout to buy an option to cap 
the import price of maize ahead of actual 
imports, potentially saving large sums of 
money if major imports are needed later 
in the year and prices on the international 
market rise. With future grain prices capped, 
the private sector is better placed to respond 
to domestic shortages by placing orders 
for commercial imports. Strengthening 
local market responses to production and 
price shocks in this way is a critical part of 
Malawi’s overall risk management and food 
security strategy.
The index uses rainfall data from 23 
weather stations throughout the country and 
is based on the government’s own national 
maize yield assessment model. This is a water 
balance crop model, based on an FAO model, 
that the government has been using since 1992 
to forecast maize production each season. It 
appears robust, having clearly picked up previ-
ous droughts in the country.
The World Bank Treasury’s intermedia-
tion facilitated access to the international risk 
market. This arrangement reduced start-up 
costs for stakeholders and increased confidence 
in the transaction. The World Bank’s inter-
mediation role is temporary, and the goal is to 
build capacity in Malawi so as to enable future 
contracts to be negotiated directly between the 
country and the international financial markets.
Strategically, it is important to integrate an 
index-based weather risk management activity 
into a country’s overall risk management strat-
egy – that of the ADP, in the case of Malawi. 
Anchoring risk management activities within 
this type of larger investment program is criti-
cal to ensuring local ownership. Additionally, a 
connection with the larger investment program 
ensures integration with wider policy issues, 
while multi-donor coordination can help 
identify synergies with other programs and 
activities. It will also allow the initiative to 
transition from a pilot phase into a long-term, 
comprehensive, risk-management strategy for 
the government by supporting the develop-
ment of an appropriate institutional framework 
for the optimal use of such tools over time.
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A farmer-centric approach in Ethiopia
and methods that allow cash-constrained 
farmers to pay for premiums with their labor.
Swiss Re’s role is to review and adapt 
weather index insurance contracts for com-
mercial viability and conformity to market 
standards. One of the world’s leading reinsur-
ance companies, Swiss Re has pioneered 
weather risk transfer instruments in develop-
ing countries; in 2007, the company launched 
the Climate Adaptation Development 
Programme (CADP) to develop and imple-
ment weather risk transfer solutions in 
non-OECD countries. OA’s role is to convene 
Another index insurance pilot is being devel-
oped in Ethiopia by Oxfam America (OA) 
and Swiss Re, in collaboration with IRI, the 
Relief Society of Tigray (REST) and other 
partners. Still at a relatively early stage, this 
project is taking a farmer-centric approach, 
and is working to integrate index insurance 
with other risk reduction activities such as 
improved agronomic practices, conservation 
measures, and seasonal and daily weather 
forecasting. Project innovations include the 
extension of weather insurance to communi-
ties that are technically challenging to serve, 
Farmers in Adi Ha; Eric Holthaus/IRI
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the various stakeholders from the local to 
the global levels and facilitate a holistic risk 
management model. IRI provides technical 
expertise.
The project, which is called Horn 
of Africa Risk Transfer for Adaptation 
(HARITA), is initially targeting teff farm-
ers in the village of Adi Ha in Tigray, with 
expansion to other villages and crops planned 
after 2009. OA and REST have been work-
ing with farmers in Adi Ha for more than a 
decade. HARITA began in late 2007 with 
visits by OA, IRI and REST to Adi Ha to 
explore the potential for microinsurance and 
gauge the community’s interest in a pilot. 
OA commissioned an independent demand 
study in the community during the dry season 
of 2007–08. With farmers’ backing, in early 
2008 OA contracted IRI to draft a prototype 
weather index microinsurance contract, details 
of which are currently under review. The 
National Meteorological Agency (NMA) 
is collecting meteorological data in Adi Ha, 
aided by a new weather station purchased by 
OA and installed by NMA in August 2008.
Lack of delivery channels for reaching 
remote and inaccessible rural customers is 
often a major obstacle to offering microinsur-
ance. To overcome this challenge, the financial 
institutions involved in the pilot will employ 
a partner–agent model. Dedebit Credit and 
Savings Institution (DECSI), the second larg-
est microfinance institution in Ethiopia, will 
act as the insurance agent. DECSI has very 
extensive operations throughout Tigray, and 
will harness its strong community relation-
ships and reputation to market and deliver 
insurance on behalf of Nyala Insurance, the 
primary insurance supplier.
A significant feature of HARITA is its 
efforts to engage farmers as partners in index 
insurance design. Many similar projects have 
struggled to engage farmers due to the techni-
cal nature of the index and time pressures to 
develop a commercial product in the first year. 
A team of five community members from Adi 
Ha was recruited to join the HARITA project 
management team. The project has conducted 
workshops with farmers in the village to build 
their financial literacy. Recently, it carried 
out experimental economic risk simulations 
(‘games’) with the farmers to understand their 
preferences for key parts of the insurance 
contract, such as coverage and frequency of 
payout.
The project is also working on ways of 
overcoming weather data limitations. IRI 
has led the exploration of new techniques to 
enhance sparse local datasets through a com-
bination of satellite data, rainfall simulators 
and statistical tools that interpolate data from 
stations nearby. Satellite data will also be used 
to improve understanding of the correlation 
between rain gauge data and actual losses on 
farms. With this information, the project may 
be able to reduce basis risk by answering the 
difficult question of what is the maximum dis-
tance between farm and rain gauge for which 
the rain gauge measurement of precipitation 
is valid.
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An advantage of this project is that it 
builds on established relationships. Oxfam 
has had a presence in Ethiopia since the 
1960s, and thus has long-standing networks 
of trust and knowledge of the country. These 
relationships, together with Oxfam’s history of 
high-profile successes in other development 
projects, paved the way for local partners’ 
willingness to experiment with the ‘radical’ 
solution of weather index insurance. Other 
partners are also highly respected. REST has 
an outstanding track record in high-impact 
development, and communities place an 
unusually high degree of trust in REST 
following the life-saving assistance it provided 
to Tigray during and after the Ethiopian civil 
war.
The HARITA project complements 
Ethiopia’s innovative social protection 
scheme, the PSNP. This reaches approximately 
8 million vulnerable people, about 11% of 
Ethiopia’s total population. The PSNP pro-
vides payments to participating households 
in exchange for labor to build community 
assets such as water harvesting structures. 
Such households tend to be chronically food- 
and resource-insecure, and are likely to be 
unable or unwilling to pay cash for insurance 
premiums, despite finding risk management 
highly relevant to their livelihood strategies. 
HARITA is exploring ways to build upon 
the PSNP model by enabling farmers to pay 
insurance premiums in kind rather than in 
cash. Under the scheme, farmers will have the 
option of working a few additional days in 
exchange for an insurance voucher that pro-
tects them against drought. OA’s focus group 
interviews with farmers in communities across 
the country suggest that many more people 
may be willing to purchase larger amounts of 
insurance if premiums can be paid for in labor 
rather than cash.
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Insurance for contract farming in India
and offers per kilo increments according to the 
quality of potatoes, the use of fertilizers and 
pesticides, and the purchase of index insurance.
Designed by WRMS and available since 
2007, the insurance pays out based on the 
number of consecutive days of average relative 
humidity greater than 90% and/or average 
temperatures between 10°C and 20°C. The 
product is designed to cover yield losses above 
40%, with farmers bearing losses up to this 
point. Some 4250 farmers purchased the 
insurance in 2007, and 4575 in 2008; approxi-
mately 50% were smallholders, owning less 
than 5 acres (2.02 hectares) of land.
The first season of 2007 revealed a certain 
level of basis risk. In some locations the index 
showed 85% loss, whereas actual losses were 
roughly 50%; other locations received payouts 
without suffering any loss; while in still others 
the loss predicted by the index (45%) was 
less than the actual damage (50–60%). In 
response, more weather stations were installed 
near farms. In the second 2007 season, basis 
risk still occurred, but was reduced. Payouts 
matched the observed damage in two loca-
tions, though for another two the index 
showed lower levels than the actual losses. The 
first season of 2008 gave satisfactory results, 
primarily due to a further increase in the 
number of weather stations.
WRMS had installed 250 weather stations 
by the end of 2008, and aims to operate a total 
In 1995, to secure its supply of potatoes for 
potato chips, PepsiCo started a contract 
farming program in India. PepsiCo distributes 
fertilizer, provides access to pesticides, and 
requires contracted farmers to use their potato 
seed. It also offers farmers technical advice 
on production practices through a network 
of agronomists, extension workers and local 
facilitators. In 2008, PepsiCo contracted with 
approximately 10,000 potato farmers across 
the country; it plans to increase that number 
to approximately 15,000 by the end of 2009.
Contracted farmers have the option of 
buying a weather index-based insurance 
product, which is sold by ICICI Lombard 
and managed by Weather Risk Management 
Services (WRMS). The product is intended 
to protect against losses caused by late blight, 
a fungal disease linked to temperature and 
humidity, and the index incorporates both of 
these variables. PepsiCo was motivated to add 
index insurance to its contract farming pack-
age in order to limit farmers’ weather-related 
risk and establish longer term relationships 
with farmers.
Contract farming appears to be an effective 
way of involving Indian smallholders in a value 
chain. PepsiCo farmers produce 11–14 tonnes 
of potatoes per acre, compared with the average 
on-farm yield of 8–10 tonnes/acre. Farmers are 
offered price incentives: PepsiCo sets a base 
buyback price at the beginning of the season 
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of 400 weather stations by year-end 2009. 
(In comparison, the Indian Meteorological 
Department operates 600 weather stations 
across India.) The cost of installing this new 
infrastructure will be recovered through rev-
enue generated by the insurance program and 
sales of services to commercial farmers and 
to outlets such as newspapers, Reuters and 
television stations. WRMS also sends weather 
advisory messages and information on how 
to prevent crop loss directly to farmers via 
mobile phone. To cover all of India, WRMS 
estimates that an additional 10,000 weather 
stations would be needed, requiring an invest-
ment of approximately US$5–6 million.
The lack of historical data is more difficult 
to overcome, presenting a real obstacle to 
scaling up the program. Further challenges 
include designing products that balance good 
coverage with an affordable premium; secur-
ing delivery channels for product distribution; 
expanding the limited target market – limited 
because farmers who borrow from state banks 
are required to take out the government insur-
ance; creating new indices that blend index 
insurance and area-based insurance; and using 
technology that more accurately captures 
weather events and trends, such as NDVI. The 
limited participation of reinsurers is another 
constraint to scale-up. Reinsurance companies 
are reluctant to enter the market due to the 
difficulty of estimating its size and their risk 
exposure.
Nonetheless, if these challenges can be 
addressed, the potential to apply this contract 
farming model to other crops and value chains 
seems high. Farmers integrated into a value 
chain have better potential for sustained 
growth in their income and improvements 
in their quality of life. They are also better 
positioned to take advantage of income-
generating options that require up-front 
investment. Index insurance can play a key 
role in protecting these investments against 
weather shocks.
Surveys conducted by WRMS indicated 
that farmers trust the program for its capac-
ity to reflect actual losses and provide timely 
claim settlements. Farmers also seem to have 
a good grasp of the likely impact of weather 
on yields. In many locations, farmers had 
calculated their claims and expected the 
forthcoming payouts, which allowed them to 
plan their future investments accordingly.
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Disaster relief in Mexico
available to the federal and state governments, 
and it effectively transfers the risk from the 
government (and the Mexican tax payer) to 
the international reinsurance market.
PACC targets poor farmers – most of 
those benefiting have an income of less than 
US$74 per month, with none earning more 
than US$222 per month. Table A shows the 
levels of support provided through PACC for 
such farmers. PACC distributes support for 
post-disaster recovery for up to 5 hectares of 
land per farmer, to a maximum of US$410 for 
farmers growing annual and perennial crops 
and US$2275 for small-scale farmers growing 
high-value crops.
The index insurance package currently 
covers drought and flood (with plans to 
include frost soon). Insurance is purchased 
exclusively by state governments, or by the 
federal government for a specific state. Federal 
 
Table A. PACC support to farmers for weather-related disasters
Type of crop/farmer Area covered Amount of the support
Annual/producers with less 
than 20 ha
Up to 5 ha per producer
US$ 82 dollars per ha
Perennial/producers with 
less than 5 ha 
Fruits, coffee, nopal/producers 
with less than 5 ha
US$ 455 dollars per ha
Source: Rules for the Operation of PACC
Mexico’s subsistence farmers are vulnerable 
to both excess and lack of rainfall, as 78% 
of the country’s arable land is non-irrigated, 
depending exclusively on the seasonal rains 
from May to November. When disaster 
strikes, the rural population is supported in 
part by federal assistance funds provided by 
the Climatologic Contingency Attention 
Programme (Programa de Atención a 
Contingencias Climatológicas, PACC). Paid 
exclusively from tax revenues, PACC is a 
costly and unsustainable attempt to manage 
risk after a disaster event. 
An index insurance program for cata-
strophic risk was designed by Agroasemex, the 
state reinsurance company, with the purpose 
of improving PACC by increasing the effi-
ciency, timeliness and distribution of federal 
funds to farmers following climate-related 
crop failure. The insurance is exclusively 
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Table B. Average minimum and maximum triggers determined for drought (mm) in Mexico
Year/ 
Stage
Maize Bean
Sowing Flowering Harvesting Sowing Flowering Harvesting
2003 43 146 27
2004 36–58 79–149 27–122
2005 29–66 44–308 14–218 29–58 45–107 24–128
2006 31–66 44–351 14–218 33–58 45–107 25–128
2007 29–66 44–239 14–180 29–54 45–107 25–128
2008 29–66 49–239 26–180 26–58 45–107 24–128
funds are distributed to state governments 
according to the level of marginalization of 
the insured population: for municipalities 
characterized by a high level of marginaliza-
tion, 90% of the insurance premium is covered 
by the federal government and only 10% by 
the state government; in less marginalized 
areas, federal funds pay 70% of the insurance 
premium.
On average over six years and across states, 
the premium has been 13% of the total sum 
insured. The insurance guarantees to pay at 
least the amounts promised by PACC, i.e. 
at least US$82 per hectare, in the event of 
extreme drought or flood. These funds become 
available to governments for distribution 
to farmers. However, since the insurance is 
contracted by the government, farmers do not 
participate in the decision to purchase coverage 
and, most of the time, are not even aware that 
they are insured. Agroasemex manages the 
program, and covers itself through reinsur-
ance contracts. The index insurance product 
has been registered with Mexico’s National 
Insurance Commission, as required by law.
The contract for drought uses a rainfall 
index, with triggers based on cumulative rain-
fall for the different crop development stages 
(sowing, flowering and harvesting). Triggers 
are highly specific to the crop, development 
stage and region, and are adjusted each year 
(Table B).
Agroasemex has indicated that the level 
of basis risk is low and therefore acceptable 
to its client, the government. However, since 
there have been no studies of the program’s 
impact, it is not possible to determine how 
the current level of basis risk affects the 
smallholders who are ultimately covered by 
the program. There were some cases in 2005 
where triggers caused payouts when farmers 
had not actually experienced crop damage; 
while the opposite occurred in 2006, when 
some farmers experienced crop losses but 
no payments were triggered. In the state of 
Guanajato in 2006, only one weather station 
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out of 27 in the state triggered inadequate 
payouts. In this particular case, Agroasemex 
decided not to include this station in the 
following years, because it does not report on 
a daily basis.
In the event that the index insurance trig-
ger fails to respond to a real loss, the govern-
ment will step in and use contingency funding 
to cover the loss.
The program has grown considerably 
from 2002 (75,000 hectares and five weather 
stations) to 2008 (1.9 million hectares and 
251 weather stations). In 2008, some 800,000 
low-income farmers were covered, with a sum 
insured of US$132.3 million. In that year, the 
purchase of risk transfer instruments repre-
sented 61% of the PACC budget.
Although impressive, scale-up has been 
constrained by the limited number of weather 
stations producing useable data, and by 
limited technical capacity. Only half of the 
country’s functioning 1200 weather stations 
have good enough real-time or semi-real-time 
data to build and monitor effective indices. 
A rural producers’ association, Fundación 
Produce, is attempting to fill the gap by 
building a network of some 764 automated 
weather stations. When up and running, these 
will provide data to supplement those from 
government-run stations. Agroasemex is also 
experimenting with data from remote sensing, 
and in particular, incorporating the NDVI 
into its product.
The lack of historical data is also being 
addressed so that the program can continue to 
expand. Rainfall and temperature simulations 
are used to replace missing data and produce 
long time series as a basis for estimating prob-
abilities when building indices. In 2008 these 
synthetic series were used with actual (though 
limited) data from 75 weather stations to 
extend coverage over 250,000 hectares. In 2009 
a further 160 government-run stations and 100 
Fundación Produce stations will be included, 
supported by simulated data series, allowing a 
further 2 million hectares to be covered.
Agroasemex is investigating expanding the 
program by marketing insurance to individual 
farmers, although delivery channels are likely 
to be a challenge. As a first step, microfinance 
institutions may serve as an intermediary. So 
far, the farmer-level insurance has been a fully 
subsidized state-run program, with no involve-
ment of the private sector. 
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Catastrophe risk insurance in the Caribbean
were to approach the reinsurance market 
independently.
Countries are insured against earthquakes 
and hurricanes, with rapid payout once the 
trigger (a specified level of shaking or wind 
speed respectively) is reached. The aim is to 
provide immediate cash to begin recovery 
efforts after a major natural disaster. In 2007, 
the first year of operation, contracts were 
designed to cover hurricane or earthquake 
events of a magnitude that would be expected 
less frequently than once in 20 years, with 
the exact level of cover being negotiated with 
the member countries individually. Contracts 
based on more frequent (less catastrophic) 
The Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance 
Facility (CCRIF) is unique, being the 
world’s first multinational index insur-
ance scheme, with 16 member countries. 
This spreads the risk (and costs) across the 
Caribbean region, making insurance much 
more affordable for individual countries (see 
figure). Since natural disaster risks in any 
given year are randomly distributed among 
the Caribbean islands, the cost of coverage 
for the pooled portfolio is less than the 
sum of individual coverages. The pooling of 
country-specific risks allows for a reduction 
of individual insurance premiums by almost 
half, compared with the cost if a government 
1-in-200 year PML as a percentage of the aggregate individual country PMLs 
Note: The PML is the probable maximum loss for a 1-in-200 year event. It can be interpreted as the risk capital requirements (including reserves and 
reinsurance) the Facility should hold if it is to survive such an event. The graph shows how the participation of each additional Caribbean country affects 
the level of risk capital needed by the Facility relative to the aggregate of the 200-year PML for each individual country. For example, the relative risk capital 
requirement by the CCRIF is reduced by 65% when seven countries participate. It is further reduced by 75% if the CCRIF portfolio includes 17 countries.
Source: CCRIF Background Document, World Bank, 2007
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disasters would have required higher premi-
ums than they were willing or able to pay. 
However, following experiences in the first 
year, an optional lower deductible (the part 
of the loss paid by the insured) was offered in 
the second year, taking coverage to an event 
that might occur once in 15 years.
The CCRIF is a not-for-profit Cayman 
Islands-registered insurance company owned by 
a Special Purpose Trust, with the participating 
countries as beneficiaries of the Trust. Core 
funding to set up the CCRIF was provided by 
international donors, and on joining each member 
country paid a participation fee. These amounts, 
together with income from premiums and rein-
surance purchased on the international markets, 
provide the core capital for paying claims.
The contract
To develop the indices, catastrophe risk 
models were used to estimate probabilities and 
associated losses. Using historical hurricane 
and earthquake activity records and estimated 
losses for these past events, as well as scientific 
inputs, these models project hurricane and 
earthquake activity thousands of years into 
the future. With these figures, a country risk 
profile is created for each member country, 
around which indices are developed. The index 
for hurricanes is based on wind speed, while 
that for earthquakes uses level of shaking.
Over a season, the indices are tracked 
across the region at selected measuring points 
(see map). These points are weighted to give 
greater value to those representing areas of 
Bahamas
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greater economic value, so a country’s capital 
and major economic centers will have a 
greater weight than undeveloped rural areas. 
This is so that the index acts as a good proxy 
for actual losses to governments.
Measurements are objective and transpar-
ent. For earthquakes, data from the global 
seismic data centre of the United States 
Geological Survey (USGS) are used to 
determine the level of shaking at the measur-
ing points. Wind speed measurements are 
calculated using information published by 
the US National Hurricane Center (the 
WMO’s regional reporting agency for tropical 
cyclones), and modeled using simplified 
wind models. When a trigger event occurs a 
preliminary calculation is made immediately 
after the event, but the final calculation is 
made 14 days later, to ensure that the best 
information is available from the reporting 
agencies. The payment for any given event is 
made based on a sliding scale relative to the 
scale of the loss. The limit of total payments to 
a country in a policy year is agreed with each 
country individually, although no country can 
purchase coverage worth more than US$100 
million per hazard.
Experiences
In the first year that the CCRIF was opera-
tional, from 1 June 2007 to 31 May 2008, 
one earthquake triggered payouts. This 
occurred on 29 November 2007 in the eastern 
Caribbean, resulting in payouts in Dominica 
and St Lucia which were made on 13 
December 2007. The earthquake also caused 
significant damage in Martinique, which is 
not a member of the CCRIF.
Six tropical storms reached hurricane 
status in the region during this period, but 
none triggered payouts. Hurricanes Noel and 
Dean caused the most impact in member 
countries. Hurricane Noel was at no more 
than tropical storm force when it was over 
member countries, so wind speeds were not 
excessive; however, it was accompanied by 
very heavy rains, which caused widespread 
flooding and damage in some member coun-
tries. Because the index is based on wind 
speed there were no payouts. The CCRIF is 
currently investigating adding rainfall to the 
product in future years. This would increase 
the premium, as premiums are calculated 
directly from the amount of risk being 
transferred. Obtaining adequate rainfall data, 
both historical and current, is a challenge, 
and the development of an ‘extreme weather 
monitoring network’ is proposed to support 
the required modeling and contract develop-
ment.
Hurricane Dean affected the south of 
Jamaica. Because of its compact size only 
Category 1 winds were felt at the measuring 
points; and the measuring points affected 
were mostly in rural areas, which have low 
weighting. Agriculture was greatly affected, 
accounting for more than half the estimated 
costs of the hurricane, which totaled US$327 
million. However, agricultural losses were 
excluded from the country risk profile as they 
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do not have a short-term impact on govern-
ment finances, and cover for such losses was 
not factored in when calculating the premium. 
Other losses from Dean fell within the 
deductible of the policy and so did not qualify 
for a payout. In future, the agricultural risk 
may be addressed through index insurance 
provided directly to farmers.
The lack of payouts following Hurricane 
Dean led to unfavorable publicity for the 
CCRIF and revealed a lack of understanding 
of the contracts and their coverage. The lesson 
learned here is that good communications and 
public relations are needed to improve aware-
ness of the CCRIF and its purpose. 
During the 2008 hurricane season, the 
CCRIF paid out nearly US$6.3 million to the 
Turks and Caicos Islands following Hurricane 
Ike. The payments provided much needed 
liquidity to the government to support the 
recovery effort.
For additional information see Caribbean 
Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (2008) 
and World Bank (2008).
Flooding in Haiti. The CCRIF may add rainfall to the product in the future, so that damage due to flooding is covered;  
Matthew Marek/American Red Cross
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Insuring development goals in the Millennium Villages Project
As part of this mission, in 2006 the MVP 
surveyed local development professionals in 
each village to obtain their opinions on the 
predominant risks to project goals. While all 
villages mentioned some form of climate risk 
as a primary threat to village livelihoods, 10 of 
the 12 mentioned drought as the number one 
long-term threat.
To manage this climate risk, the MVP 
has joined forces with IRI and Swiss Re to 
develop an index insurance scheme to insure 
the project’s development goals. The aim of 
At the Millennium Summit in 2000, the 
nations of the world agreed on a comprehen-
sive set of Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) to reduce extreme poverty and other 
forms of deprivation in the developing world. In 
2005, the Millennium Villages Project (MVP) 
was launched to achieve these goals in 12 
‘villages’ across Africa, using an approach that 
combines science-based development initiatives 
with community participation. The sites were 
chosen to be representative of the continent’s 
diverse agricultural regions (see map).
Millennium Villages and agroecological zones.
Adapted from Dixon et al. 2001. Farming Systems and Poverty. FAO
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the partnership is to mitigate losses during 
catastrophic drought years that would oth-
erwise lead to a major redirection of project 
resources and put the project in jeopardy. 
Payouts are tied to two risk levels – a moder-
ate drought (defined by a 1 in 8 year trigger), 
and catastrophic drought (defined by a 1 in 20 
year trigger). Indices have been designed for 
each of the 12 MVP locations, and in 2007 
were transacted for three of these locations 
(one each in Kenya, Ethiopia and Mali).
In keeping with the aim to ensure project 
sustainability, it was specified that payouts 
from this scheme would be used to sup-
port core development interventions, such 
as subsidizing a school feeding program 
which provides a market for local farmers 
and encourages primary school attendance. 
Insurance payouts would also provide 
resources to replace agricultural inputs, which 
the project subsidizes for the local community. 
Thus this product aims to keep people from 
falling back into the poverty traps the project 
is working to remove.
The result is a unique development inno-
vation. For the first time, a major development 
project has insured itself against a major 
climate risk – drought – which was identified 
by project participants as most likely to affect 
the project’s achievement of its objectives. 
Equally as innovative, the project is working 
with insurance experts at Swiss Re to explore 
a combination index based on vegetative 
remote sensing and local rain gauges. The 
remote sensing component is used to diagnose 
large-scale regional drought, while data from 
rain gauges identifies more localized drought.
The contract
The index was designed to indicate moderate 
to catastrophic drought events, which recur 
at intervals of 8 to 20 years. The basis for 
the remote sensing portion of the index was 
NDVI, with an 8 km pixel resolution. The 
NDVI signal was aggregated using a spatial 
average of approximately 100 km × 100 km, 
an area roughly 100 times larger than the 
village. The index was designed to target the 
period in local cropping calendars between 
flowering and harvest, which showed the 
strongest relationship between local rainfall 
and historical yields (taking into account 
the lag time of vegetation response to rain). 
This large coverage area allowed the index 
to capture regional climate trends, which are 
more coherent than trends at smaller spatial 
scales. Research conducted by IRI showed 
that, for many of the MVP locations, when 
native vegetation shows signs of stress at this 
spatial scale, crop yields are typically greatly 
reduced.
To make the index still more robust, local 
rain gauge data were added in those locations 
which are less spatially coherent (such as 
humid forest, mountains and coastal ecosys-
tems). These data were then weighted with 
the regional scale vegetation data to provide 
a greater sense of local climate variability. 
Regional scale vegetation only was consid-
ered sufficient to underpin contracts for the 
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semi-arid regions of Senegal, Mali, Ethiopia, 
northern Nigeria and northeastern Kenya, 
while an index of vegetation combined with 
rainfall was recommended for the wetter (and 
less variable) climates of Uganda, Rwanda, 
Tanzania, Malawi and western Kenya. No 
drought index was recommended for villages 
in Ghana and southern Nigeria, as village 
surveys there showed a greater risk of flooding 
than drought.
The premiums were paid by MVP villages, 
through donor support.
Experiences
While none of the three transacted contracts 
resulted in a payout in the first year, the 
process of thinking through CRM strategies 
at the local, national and continental scale in 
the unique context of a major development 
project did provide many opportunities to 
refine working concepts of weather insurance 
and its interactions with development. In the 
villages that had contracts, local project man-
agers were able to operate in a less risk-averse 
manner and were better able to take advan-
tage of the good rains that were experienced, 
knowing that their input costs for fertilizer 
and improved seeds would be covered if 
a drought did occur. The experience also 
stimulated discussions of risk pooling mecha-
nisms. In theory, for projects like MVP, self-
insurance guided by CRM concepts could be 
an effective strategy for reducing the impact 
of moderate climate shocks. The project as 
a whole could then reinsure for high-impact 
climate shocks. Because the MVP is in 
transition from the initial donor provision of 
resources towards self-financing of activities, 
insurance strategies are evolving to reflect the 
changing structure of the project. This is part 
of a larger CRM assessment of the project. 
Following this transition, it is likely that 
the future of insurance in the MVP will be 
more targeted towards encouraging farmers’ 
adoption of inputs.
The challenge of designing an index that 
can represent regional scale catastrophic 
drought was overcome by combining the 
remote sensing of vegetation with local 
rain gauge data, with weighting to capture 
drought impacts varying according to 
climatic zone.
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Vietnam: Flood insurance in the Mekong Delta
An index-based flood insurance product 
has been offered to the Vietnam Bank 
of Agricultural and Rural Development 
(VBARD). The product is designed to pay 
for consequential losses that are suffered by 
VBARD when flooding creates problems 
for farmers in repaying loans. The contract 
is being offered by a Vietnamese insurance 
company, has support from a global reinsurer, 
and has been approved by the Vietnam 
regulatory authority. Flood insurance products 
are a challenge to develop and as such this 
project represents a significant contribution 
to the application of index-based risk transfer 
approaches.
Index insurance market development in 
Vietnam is being led by GlobalAgRisk, Inc., 
following a request by the Government of 
Vietnam for investigation of index-based 
solutions to agricultural risks. The project, 
which has received financial support from 
the Asian Development Bank and the Ford 
Foundation, seeks to expand rural financial 
markets by developing means to transfer 
The offered product will protect the Vietnam Bank of Agricultural and Rural Development against loan defaults by rice 
farmers, when early flooding damages crops; Ariel Javellana/CPS, International Rice Research Institute
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catastrophic production risk out of agriculture. 
It comes at an important time of transition 
for Vietnam, which joined the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in January 2007 – a 
move that is creating pressures for the country 
to adopt international standards on financial 
market behavior and regulation, including 
recapitalization of banks by the state.
During the early phases of risk assessment, 
GlobalAgRisk and local stakeholders identi-
fied flooding and flood impact on rice produc-
tion as a primary concern in both the Mekong 
and Red River deltas. Feasibility and product 
design investigations have focused on Dong 
Thap province of the Mekong Delta, where 
the flood regime is influenced predominantly 
by upstream water flow and where delta-wide 
flood modeling has previously confirmed that 
downstream and overland flooding in the 
province is highly correlated with water levels 
measured at the Tan Chau water level gauging 
station on the upper Mekong River at the 
Vietnam–Cambodia border.
Flood occurs in the delta as part of a 
natural annual process that is critical for 
maintaining crop productivity. Rice farmers 
have adapted their cropping strategies to 
accommodate and benefit from the annual 
flood. However, the second season (summer–
autumn) rice harvest is put at risk when the 
flood cycle begins earlier than normal. Early 
flooding leads to yield and quality losses as 
well as additional harvest and post-harvest 
handling costs. Water levels in excess of 2.5 
meters at Tan Chau are known to begin 
causing downstream flooding and to interfere 
with the harvest when occurring in late June. 
Early flooding remains a risk despite infra-
structure improvements, as confirmed through 
flood risk modeling and mapping which 
incorporates these improvements.
The financial strain on farmers from early 
flooding often translates into loan repayment 
difficulties. As a result, VBARD is exposed 
to significant direct and opportunity costs, or 
‘business interruption loss’.
The prototype index insurance contract, 
designed to offset these early flood-induced 
business interruption losses, is underwritten 
against recorded water levels. This is similar 
to weather index insurance using weather 
measurements at meteorological stations, but 
using river gauge data as a proxy for flood 
damage. The flood event index is calculated 
as the maximum 3-day moving average of 
daily water levels at the Tan Chau station 
during the period of cover, 20 June to 15 July. 
Indemnities are paid for each centimeter of 
water once the river level index reaches the 
2.8 meter threshold, with maximum payout 
occurring when the index reaches 3.5 meters. 
Early flooding that exceeds 2.8 meters is 
empirically estimated to occur approximately 
1 in 7 years, a recurrence rate that represents a 
commercially insurable risk.
The product was fully priced and loaded 
by a domestic insurance company, Bao Minh 
Insurance Corporation, which then sought 
and obtained reinsurance against its exposure 
from the international company Paris Re. 
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No subsidies were involved in the price for 
underwriting. A contract for a sum insured 
of US$1 million sum was first offered to 
VBARD in 2008. This represents a maximum 
insurable loss that is approximately 14% of 
the maximum possible loss. The product was 
offered toward the end of the sales closing 
period, allowing too little time for the serious 
consideration needed before purchasing this 
new insurance. It is being offered again in 
2009, and VBARD is currently assessing the 
option to purchase.
The accomplishments of this project – (i) 
designing a unique index-based insurance 
against flood in a developing economy; (ii) 
accessing global risk capital through reinsur-
ance against the early flood risk; and (iii) 
achieving regulatory approval of the product – 
represent considerable advances that will ben-
efit index insurance development worldwide. 
This project also illustrates the limitations of 
developing a product for a single client – in 
this instance VBARD, which is still partially 
publicly supported and can be recapitalized by 
the government in the case of portfolio and 
business interruption losses. Thus, the main 
motivation for participation hinges on a desire 
to demonstrate leadership and to learn how 
to assess and manage risk exposure using new 
financial products, with an eye to the future.
Several additional investments are needed 
to continue the development of this insur-
ance product in Vietnam. First, considerable 
education and outreach is needed to create 
greater stakeholder recognition of residual 
flood risk, even in the presence of improved 
infrastructure. Second, a next step in the 
regulatory process is to investigate whether 
these forms of index insurance product 
can serve as a type of credit warranty that 
reduces the level of required reserves. Finally, 
the meso-level product, while a stand-alone 
policy, is a first step toward finding workable 
solutions at the micro-level, since even if the 
bank is protected, very careful thinking is still 
needed on how to deal with bad debt. While 
rescheduling debt rather than debt forgiveness 
improves the commercial viability of VBARD, 
rescheduled debt does little to help finan-
cially stressed producers – the primary target 
market of VBARD – recover from a natural 
disaster.
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Scaling up index insurance: Operational issues
demand for index insurance products, local 
ownership of products, legal and regulatory 
issues, and the complex question of subsidies.
Demand for the product
Demand for index insurance is the most fun-
damental issue confronting scaling up efforts. 
For a product to be successful it must be 
worthwhile, address an important risk to the 
clients and basis risk must not be too high.
Index insurance is not a viable proposition 
in all situations. Also, it is essential that client 
This section examines critical operational 
issues that could frustrate the scaling up of 
index insurance if not addressed. Our discus-
sion is drawn from the pilot projects, whose 
community of implementers has acquired 
considerable experience of these issues. Here, 
we draw attention to the main issues, while 
more detail can be obtained directly from 
the implementers (World Bank, 2005; Hess, 
2007; UNDESA, 2007). We have structured 
the discussion according to broad headings 
that capture the main recurrent themes: 
Groundnut farming in Nicaragua (see case study on page 72); Eric Niu
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expectations are reflected in product design. 
It is therefore important to perform basic 
risk assessment exercises prior to designing 
a product, and to undertake demand assess-
ments of product prototypes to determine 
if they address demands and expectations, 
and how they might be improved to be 
more effective (UNDESA, 2007). WFP, for 
example, carried out a large-scale demand 
assessment including a survey of target client 
risk perceptions and needs. Clients must be 
active participants in the development and 
implementation process.
To ensure that demand is sustained, 
products must be adapted and improved as 
implementation proceeds. Several of the case 
studies modified products after dry runs or 
in response to initial performance gaps. In 
the Caribbean CCRIF case, for example, 
changes to the index are being considered to 
better capture flooding risk associated with 
hurricanes (see ‘Catastrophe risk insurance 
in the Caribbean’ on page 52). Validation 
and robustness investigations begun during 
contract design must be continued during 
implementation, with improvements made 
in response to the issues uncovered. This is 
particularly important in places like India, 
where there are competing index products 
being offered by different companies, which 
have payouts under different conditions.
To be worth buying, the insurance must 
represent a value proposition to the client, 
that is, the product must be seen to yield a 
benefit that exceeds its cost. When subsidies 
are being considered for index insurance, it 
needs to be established whether the benefits 
exceed the unsubsidized cost. If they do not, it 
is likely that the product does not address an 
important need and that the subsidy money 
would be better used in other ways.
When evaluating demand it is important 
to consider other interventions that may 
be available, for example subsidized crop 
insurance, bank credit guarantees or relief 
programs. These will often reduce the demand 
for index insurance. The case studies in 
Nicaragua, Malawi, Ukraine and India all 
faced challenges of this kind (see ‘Central 
America – a different approach for launching 
index insurance’ on page 72 and ‘Barriers to 
implementation in the Ukraine’ on page 74).
The insurance must be affordable. Index 
insurance should not be used to insure against 
high frequency risks with big losses, since the 
pure risk cost is likely to be too high. The cost 
must also be competitive with the alternatives 
for managing the risk.
Weather index insurance makes sense only 
where weather is one of the major risks con-
fronting households, banks or relief agencies. 
In many cases market risks may be greater for 
farmers and bankers, while the risk of war or 
conflict may be greater for relief agencies.
Local ownership and capacity
Insurance markets
When projects seek to address the needs of 
the poor, it is essential that local partners 
have strong ownership from the outset. 
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Implementations that are not championed 
by local institutions cannot gain the traction 
necessary to have meaningful impacts, scale 
or be sustained. At the scaling up stage, it is 
vital that local markets are strong enough to 
support widespread implementation. However 
weather insurance markets are virtually non-
existent throughout the developing world, 
and other markets are weak as well. Unless 
addressed, this limits the scope for local 
partners to participate.
India forms a marked exception, with local 
markets well developed in urban areas and 
even in some more remote rural areas (see 
‘The private sector builds a market in India’ 
on page 76). Indeed, much of the dramatic 
scaling up of index insurance in India is due 
to the dynamism of local markets. Highly 
active brokers have strong ownership of the 
products they offer, competing keenly with 
each other to reach the farming community 
with affordable and attractive products. There 
is a high level of local expertise due to the 
government’s historical mandate that micro-
insurance be made available in rural areas. 
Thus, the starting point in developing weather 
insurance markets is often to lay the knowl-
edge foundations.
Skills
It can be challenging to find good contract 
designers at the international level – such 
people must combine mathematical skills with 
a knowledge of climate science and experi-
ence with agro-meteorological models. At 
the local level, this challenge is even greater. 
In addition to specialized index design skills, 
local partners need insurance selling skills. 
These need to be especially highly developed 
in areas where weather insurance products are 
new and have to be explained to the farming 
community. All this means that public invest-
ment is vital at project start-up, to ensure 
the necessary knowledge and skills are firmly 
established by the time scale-up gets under 
way. This has been forthcoming: the World 
Bank Climate Risk Management Group and 
World Bank Institute have developed training 
courses to build capacity in the wide range of 
tasks necessary in index insurance; they have 
also created online contract development tools 
in partnership with IRI and others. Despite 
these efforts, more needs to be done if scaling 
is to be developed and sustained. 
Delivery channels
Closely related to the issue of local ownership 
and capacity is that of delivery – the challenge 
In India, BASIX take the message to farmers in mobile units;  
Sridhar Reddy/BASIX
Index insurance, development and disaster management
65
of making sure that the farming community 
knows about index insurance products and has 
access to them. This challenge is the same for 
all types of agricultural insurance and other 
financial products targeting rural farmers. 
Many projects have relied on intermediate 
institutions to overcome this challenge. When 
these institutions are involved, it is important 
their staff have a thorough understanding 
of the insurance product, are able to market 
it with enthusiasm, and are competent at 
handling the complex financial transactions it 
may involve.
In Ethiopia the development of coop-
eratives is being strongly encouraged by the 
government as a means to facilitate service 
delivery for agricultural inputs, extension 
advice, processing and marketing, and to 
improve the ability of farmers to market their 
products. This avenue was used to reach farm-
ers with index insurance products (see ‘Laying 
the foundations for farm-level insurance in 
Ethiopia’ on page 79). In Brazil, insurance 
providers are taking advantage of a network 
of distribution points under a government 
seed program (see ‘Supporting farmers – and 
a government seed program – in Brazil’ on 
page 82).
A new delivery concept for index insur-
ance in disaster management is the early 
recovery assistance voucher. These vouchers 
are intended to achieve more timely and better 
targeted recovery support for those affected 
by natural disasters such as droughts, floods 
or hurricanes. Still in the proposal stage, the 
concept is that vouchers would be distributed 
to people in vulnerable areas ahead of disasters 
and would be redeemable after them. A 
voucher would give the right to, say, US$200 
worth of food or cash at local shops, trading 
stations, post offices and other public outlets. 
When eligible people obtain vouchers they 
would also be able to register their residence 
and leave their cell phone number to receive 
localized early warnings as well as payment 
notifications (Hess and Portegies, 2009).
Risk takers
Risk takers – local insurance companies will-
ing to underwrite index insurance contracts 
or intermediate the risk to the international 
market – are essential. Given that index 
insurance is a nascent industry, insurance 
companies must often build expertise at the 
same time as they implement pilot projects, 
a factor that increases the level of risk they 
face in the short term. Some of the pilots have 
taken ‘dry runs’, which allow for the company 
to gain experience and trust and for contracts 
to be adjusted before the product is launched 
‘for real’ on the open market (see ‘Stakeholder 
communication is key in Thailand’ on page 
85). Government policies, such as those in 
Ethiopia and India, which stipulate more 
emphasis on microinsurance products or sup-
port a range of agricultural insurance options, 
may encourage risk takers to get involved. 
However, in some situations they may have 
the opposite effect, either by crowding out 
index products through other interventions or 
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by creating administrative burdens that risk 
takers may not be comfortable carrying.
Data
Constraints concerning the measurement and 
validation of data, which are key design issues, 
must also be actively addressed during the 
operational phase. The Agricultural Insurance 
Company of India (AIC), for example, conduct-
ed a study of paired automated weather stations 
operating on the same premises across a range 
of zones, to test the reliability of data. It found 
significant short-term differences between the 
stations. If these differences cause problems for 
the insurance products, either the products need 
to be improved or the data measurements must 
become more accurate (see ‘Scaling up in India: 
The public sector’ on page 87).
Measurements must be reliable, timely 
and resistant to tampering, with fallback 
options formally specified when there are data 
problems. Capacity building may be needed 
to ensure that these criteria are met. And 
local meteorological stations and the national 
meteorological service must be included in the 
list of national partners needing to take owner-
ship of index insurance projects. This can be 
difficult to achieve where already overstretched 
national services do not see the project as a 
priority. Data issues are discussed in detail in 
the previous section.
Trust
The importance of trust is a theme running 
through all the pilots. The glue that binds 
partners together, trust is a vital element in 
the willingness and ability of local providers 
to take projects over and continue them after 
the pilot phase. Because the relationships 
between players often become strained 
during the intense interactions that can take 
place over insurance, these relationships must 
be underpinned by substantial levels of trust, 
which tends to be stronger if established 
through collaboration that predates the 
insurance project. In the India contract farm-
ing case study, surveys indicated that farmers 
trust the program because of its timely 
settlement of claims (see ‘Insurance for 
contract farming in India’ on page 47). This 
is consistent with the experience of BASIX, a 
microfinance institution that first introduced 
rainfall index-based insurance to farmers 
in India together with the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC) of the World 
Bank (see ‘The private sector builds a market 
in India’ on page 76). Oxfam’s long-standing 
presence in Ethiopia, combined with high 
levels of respect and trust for the local 
partner NGO, the Relief Society of Tigray 
(REST), made farmers willing to explore 
weather index insurance (see ‘A farmer-
centric approach in Ethiopia’ on page 44). 
Feedback from Thai farmers suggested that 
the primary motivation for purchasing insur-
ance was trust in the Bank for Agriculture 
and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC), an 
institution that has long-term relationships 
with the farmers (see ‘Stakeholder commu-
nication is key in Thailand’ on page 85). The 
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lesson is clear: identifying partner organiza-
tions that farmers already trust is critical to 
successful scale-up.
Legal and regulatory issues 
Often legal and regulatory frameworks 
must be developed or improved so that they 
address the new issues raised by the introduc-
tion of index insurance. The International 
Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) 
has yet to produce guidance on how insurance 
laws, regulations and practices may need to be 
adapted to ensure that index-based insurance 
is regulated and supervised in accordance with 
international standards. However, a number 
of pilot projects have shown that index 
insurance can fit within existing national 
legal and regulatory frameworks while at the 
same time adhering to the basic principles 
underlying international standards. Regulators 
are generally supportive of efforts to develop 
index insurance once properly informed about 
its potential social benefits. They are also 
much more comfortable when they know that 
other countries have successfully developed 
contracts for this new class of insurance.
In general, regulators have two primary 
responsibilities. First, they must protect the 
consumer from any form of misconduct that 
can emerge when this new form of insur-
ance is developed and sold. Second, they 
must protect the insurance provider from the 
financial exposure that can follow when offer-
ing insurance against events that have highly 
correlated losses, requiring many payouts in 
the same year (Skees and Collier, 2008). By 
doing the latter, the regulator is also ensuring 
that the consumer will be paid when he or 
Building trust is critical; Janot-Reine Mendler de Suarez/GEF-IW:LEARN
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she does suffer losses. A central mechanism 
for this protection, found in most of the case 
studies, is the purchase of reinsurance from 
international markets. The Mongolia case 
study shows an alternative way of provid-
ing protection, using donor support (see 
‘Livestock insurance in Mongolia’ on page 90)
One significant regulatory issue is whether 
index products should be classified as deriva-
tives or insurance. Insurance contracts are 
intended to cover losses, whereas deriva-
tives are purely finance market contracts. 
Derivatives are financial instruments whose 
values are derived from the value of some-
thing else (known as the underlying value). 
The underlying value can be an asset, an index 
(e.g. interest rates or exchange rates), weather 
conditions or other items. The option taken 
depends on the application.
For programs aiming at development, 
insurance is the preferred classification as it is 
simpler to regulate. This is because the regula-
tory framework for insurance is well suited 
to protect the interests of a large number of 
smaller clients, with regulations focused not 
only on honoring contracts, but also guaran-
teeing protection against losses. It is also a 
widely accepted financial instrument, often 
with existing delivery chains that currently 
reach intended clients.
Derivatives are more common as negotiat-
ed deals between two large entities, each with 
a substantial capacity for analysis. Because 
of this, disaster relief contracts are typically 
transacted as derivatives.
The laws of most countries require that, 
to be considered insurance, a risk transfer 
product must have certain key characteristics. 
The two characteristics that offer the greatest 
challenge for an index-based product are: 
(i) an insurance contract must indemnify or 
compensate the insured for loss sustained 
due to the occurrence of the insured risk; 
and (ii) the insured must have an insurable 
interest in the subject insured. If the index is 
a sufficiently good proxy for the loss, there is 
a clear link between loss and payout and the 
first condition can be satisfied. Although there 
may be some basis risk, this is also the case 
for traditional insurance products, even where 
the loss is assessed by a loss adjuster (Barnett 
et al., 2005). In some cases, framing the 
index insurance product as a form of business 
interruption insurance also eases the regula-
tor’s concerns about basis risk, by allowing 
the insurance to target risks it can cover more 
transparently. The second condition is less 
of a challenge when products are developed 
with exposed users in mind as it is relatively 
easy to make the case that the insured has an 
insurable interest. In some cases, limits may 
be needed on the sum insured, so as to ease 
the regulator’s concerns that users might take 
on larger financial commitments due to the 
availability of insurance and thereby increase 
their risk exposure rather than reduce it. The 
second condition can make it challenging to 
offer insurance to laborers or merchants who 
do not own cropland but who are impacted by 
the crop losses of others.
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Regulators should be involved from 
the beginning of the product development 
process, as specific aspects of the contract 
design may determine whether or not it meets 
regulatory conditions. Likewise, if contingent 
capital is required, potential reinsurers should 
be involved in contract design to make sure 
that the risk can be transferred into reinsur-
ance markets. 
The challenge of subsidies
Issues surrounding subsidies are very different 
for the two major kinds of application – 
disaster relief and development. Since disaster 
relief programs are themselves funded by 
subsidies, the insurance is simply a financing 
mechanism to make more effective use of 
these subsidies. Responsibility for addressing 
the subsidy-related problems of distortions, 
delivery issues and perverse incentives falls 
to the relief program as opposed to the index 
insurance provider.
When the objective is to address pov-
erty and development, the very poor may 
be excluded because they cannot afford 
risk-based premiums. Some therefore argue 
that premiums should be subsidized, so that a 
higher proportion of this group will be reached. 
However, when insurance is part of a package 
that promises significant income gains – for 
example, a package that includes credit and 
inputs – subsidies may be less justified. When 
an inability to pay is not a problem of insuf-
ficient wealth or productivity but instead a cash 
constraint at the beginning of the season, loans 
that cover the premium as well as the inputs 
may be the answer, not subsidies.
It is important that the insurance leads to 
societal benefits that exceed its opportunity 
costs; that is, the benefits that would have 
accrued had the subsidy been used differently. 
Once participating households have achieved 
higher levels of productivity, the subsidy 
should be withdrawn. Proponents argue that 
premium subsidies can thus be used to chan-
nel social benefits to the poor in a structured 
and controlled way.
Another argument for subsidies is that 
they ‘prime the pump’ for insurance markets 
by offsetting high start-up costs until the 
market expands, economies of scale are real-
ized, and prices decline. In this approach, the 
government or donor guarantees the deficit in 
the initial years, thereby instilling confidence 
in the insurer and allowing time for the 
insurance-buying habit to become established 
in the farming community. The premiums can 
gradually be brought into line with ‘commer-
cial reality’, turning the deficit into a profit. It 
would be foolish to experiment with a product 
that is not priced to the risk, but it does make 
sense to exclude the development costs and 
to predicate the economies of scale and the 
benefits of reinsurance that will apply only 
once a scheme is fully scaled up.
It is also argued that premium subsidies 
can stimulate adoption by encouraging 
farmers to use insurance and learn about its 
benefits (World Bank, 2007). However, care 
should be taken to ensure that subsidies are 
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not used to encourage the adoption of ineffec-
tive products.
There is a significant school of thought 
that directly subsidizing premiums distorts 
the insurance process and makes it counter-
productive, encouraging people to engage 
in overly risky behavior (Skees et al., 1999; 
Siamwalla and Valdes, 1986). Opponents of 
direct premium subsidies note that farmers 
may take out insurance because it is cheap 
rather than because it targets a risk they 
are facing. Subsidies may directly challenge 
the development objectives of index insur-
ance. Because the common mechanism for 
direct premium subsidies is to make them a 
percentage of the premium, subsidies tend to 
be captured by the imprudent or those who 
take out large amounts of insurance simply to 
obtain the subsidy, eroding the poverty objec-
tives of index insurance. Also, it may become 
more difficult to obtain client feedback to 
determine if a product is useful if the client 
is merely seeking a subsidy. Finally, subsidies 
may encourage clients to over-insure, which 
can lead to insurance that increases the level 
of income variability, making the insurance 
payments the source of variability instead of 
the crop loss.
As an alternative to direct premium sub-
sidies, governments and/or donors may agree 
to pay for the most extreme risk layers, cover-
ing catastrophic losses, while other layers of 
risk are covered by the commercial market 
(World Bank, 2005; see also ‘Livestock insur-
ance in Mongolia’ on page 90). For example, 
for an extreme rainfall insurance contract, the 
commercial sector may set an upper limit, 
with the government and/or donors covering 
the risk above that limit. Using this approach, 
a commercial layer of risk can be fully priced 
to allow the insurance market to expand. 
Should the cost of covering the subsidized 
catastrophic layer of risk become too great, 
a commercial market would stand a much 
greater chance of remaining in place when 
governments or donors decide to abandon 
the subsidy. The balance between direct relief, 
insurance and hybrid approaches is complex. 
For example, there are arguments that pro-
viding the poor with post-disaster assistance 
directly may be more distorting than subsi-
dized insurance (Bayer and Mechler, 2007).
Governments need to consider carefully 
whether subsidies for insurance are the most 
cost-effective option for achieving the desired 
social objective, compared with such alterna-
tives as food aid, better extension services and 
cash transfers (World Bank, 2007). Whenever 
possible, it is important to use a subsidy to 
remove the cause of a high premium instead 
of subsidizing the premium itself.
Instead of direct subsidies, governments 
and the donors could also invest in making 
the provision of insurance more efficient 
and effective, by, for example, creating new 
weather stations, setting up weather index 
insurance standards, providing technical 
assistance to the insurance sector, extend-
ing delivery mechanisms, benchmarking 
and evaluating impact, building capacity 
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and raising awareness of insurance. There is 
a public good problem in establishing the 
initial products and infrastructure associated 
with insurance. It is expensive to create a new 
product and the infrastructure to support the 
product. And it is difficult for a private firm to 
recoup these expenses, since competitors may 
use both the product and the infrastructure as 
a basis for developing and offering their own 
products without having to pay the start-up 
costs. Because of this free rider problem, there 
is a role for subsidies to cover many of the 
costs associated with initial product develop-
ment and the introduction of pilots. 
If the premium itself must be subsidized, 
the subsidy should be used primarily to 
reduce excess premiums due to data uncer-
tainty. It should not be so large that it reduces 
the premium below the actuarially fair cost of 
risk (World Bank, 2005).
Damage following Hurricane Ike; Marko Kokic/ International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
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Case studies III
Central America – a different approach for launching index 
insurance 
from all countries in Central America plus 
Mexico. Building on this enthusiasm, the 
World Bank formed a partnership with the 
Inter-American Development Bank and 
the Central American Bank for Economic 
Integration and began financing activities to 
strengthen the agricultural insurance market. 
Among these activities were training, work 
on regulatory issues, efforts to improve access 
to reliable weather data, and the launching of 
pilot index insurance projects in Nicaragua 
and Honduras. The Nicaraguan pilot began 
selling contracts in 2007, while the Honduras 
pilot is still at the development stage.
In Nicaragua, the project team worked 
from 2005 to 2007, laying the foundations 
for the pilots. The team consulted widely, 
began building stakeholder interactions, and 
started capacity building among the primary 
partners, particularly the public Nicaraguan 
insurer, the Instituto Nicaragüense de 
Seguros (INSER), which agreed to be the 
implementing partner. At the same time, 
CRMG and IRI worked on technical aspects 
of the contracts. Nicaragua has good and 
accessible weather data, which facilitated the 
progress of the pilots. The national meteoro-
logical service was supportive, providing data 
for the indices.
Different strategies have been pursued to 
explore the best approaches for launching 
development-oriented index. These strate-
gies have included directly approaching 
smallholder farmers, or approaching con-
tract farming corporations that work with 
smallholder farmers. In Central America a 
third strategy has been followed. Instead of 
beginning with smallholder farmers, insurers 
worked first with medium- and large-scale 
farmers to quickly build a commercial 
product that can later be extended to a wider 
clientele, including small-scale farmers. In 
addition, this project was a collaborative 
effort involving several countries in the 
region, encouraging the spread of ideas and 
the pooling of efforts. These efforts were 
combined with a great deal of capacity 
building, with strong leadership from local 
insurance companies.
Projects in India and Mexico aroused 
interest in index insurance in Central 
America, and the Latin American Federation 
of Insurers asked the Commodity Risk 
Management Group (CRMG) of the 
World Bank to explore opportunities for 
supporting insurance market development 
in the region. A regional workshop held in 
Guatemala in May 2005 attracted participants 
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Initial design activities were not con-
sciously targeted to large farmers, but these 
farmers demanded the products and provid-
ed enough data to tailor the products to their 
needs. Because of the scale of the farmers, 
the information available was substantially 
different to that in a pilot focusing solely on 
smallholders. Farmers had multiple plots at 
different distances from the weather sta-
tion. They measured precipitation at each of 
their plots, and had computerized records of 
rainfall and historical yields, allowing them 
to directly validate and provide feedback 
on index contract options. Their data and 
feedback led to the possibility of addressing 
risks that are more challenging to model 
than drought, such as excess rainfall. In addi-
tion to the feedback offered by these farmers, 
the farm size helped jump-start the index 
insurance by providing a larger, more viable 
base for the project.
In 2007 INSER sold two contracts to 
groundnut farmers, protecting an area of 181 
hectares, with average premiums of 4.9% of 
the insured value. The contracts were offered 
for any combination of three weather risks: 
(i) excess rainfall at sowing; (ii) drought 
during growth; and (iii) excess rainfall during 
harvest. The contracts were designed with 
a flexible start date to accommodate areas 
with different sowing periods. The contracts 
triggered payouts and INSER paid indem-
nity losses equal to approximately 32% of the 
total premiums.
In 2008 INSER sold 12 contracts for 
groundnuts and four contracts for rainfed rice, 
protecting a total area of 1,774 hectares, with 
premiums averaging 5.5% of the total insured 
sum of US$1.7 million. Contracts for both 
crops covered any combination of the three 
risks above, plus rainfall excess throughout 
the season, with a flexible start date. Due to 
unusually heavy and prolonged rains during 
the country’s 2008 growing season, INSER 
received claims equivalent to 86% of the total 
collected premiums for groundnuts.
Though insurers’ profits for both years 
have been small, INSER believes that the 
contracts have provided an excellent dem-
onstration and primed the market for the 
next season, when it plans to launch a more 
aggressive marketing campaign for the prod-
ucts. The expectation for the 2009 season is 
that approximately 400 farmers will partici-
pate and 16,000 hectares will be covered, to a 
total value of up to US$10 million.
As anticipated, the project has attracted 
interest from the Ministry of Agriculture 
and the Fondo de Credito Rural (FCR). In 
the coming years, FCR plans to work with 
INSER to bring index insurance to some of 
its small-scale farmer clients.
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Barriers to implementation in the Ukraine
Partners in the project team included the 
World Bank’s CRMG, Credo-Classic and 
the IFC’s Agribusiness Development Project. 
Starting in 2003, the team worked to develop 
an index insurance contract. It carried out 
extensive consultations with stakeholders, 
including farmers, local officials and scientists. 
Approximately 400 producers were questioned 
during stakeholder events.
The pilot site was chosen around two 
weather stations, at Kherson and Behtery. 
Weather data were provided by the Ukrainian 
Hydrometeorological Center (UHC), which 
maintains 187 weather stations across Ukraine. 
Historical weather data were available for the 
past 30 years. UHC also provided a vegeta-
tion and risk-sensitivity report for grain crops 
(wheat, rye and barley). Computer simulation 
models were carried out, and consultations 
with farmers revealed that they were most 
concerned about the period from early May 
until mid-June, when high temperatures and 
lack of rain could damage grain crops.
Based on this work, the team developed an 
index insurance contract to protect grain crops 
from drought. The contract covered the period 
15 April to 15 June and captured low rainfall 
as a cumulative amount over the period (less 
than 70% of the normal 80 mm). Another 
contract was developed to capture high 
temperatures (+30°C or excessive accumulated 
temperatures).
An index insurance pilot project in Ukraine 
in 2005 built on some good preparatory 
work, but sold just two contracts and has not 
been continued. Reflecting on the experi-
ence, several key obstacles are evident. The 
insurance industry in the country was not 
‘ready’ for the new product and was therefore 
not sufficiently engaged. The index product 
was competing with a subsidized crop insur-
ance program. Regulatory hurdles limited 
the product to direct coverage of individual 
farmers only, eliminating potentially success-
ful options involving the targeting of other 
groups, such as agribusiness and finance 
institutions. There may, however, be a role 
for index insurance in the future in Ukraine, 
particularly as farmers move towards grow-
ing more high-value crops.
Planning and preparation
A role for index insurance was proposed 
because of the weather risks to agriculture in 
the country. Multi-peril crop insurance was 
available, but the loss adjustment procedures 
were unclear and payouts were often delayed 
for up to 6 months.
The pilot project team consulted six insur-
ance companies, but only one – Credo-Classic 
– agreed to join the project; the others cited 
lack of funds for the development of new 
products and a desire to focus on the govern-
ment’s subsidized crop insurance program.
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Problems
Marketing was in the hands of Credo-Classic, 
but unfortunately the company did not 
register the index insurance product until 
the end of March 2005, which did not allow 
sufficient time for effective marketing. The 
insurer managed to sell only two cumulative 
rainfall contracts for Behtery and none for 
Kherson. However, it should be noted that 
the company sold only six of the multi-peril 
contracts in the same season. Also, regula-
tions in Ukraine mean that only primary 
producers of agricultural commodities can 
purchase index insurance; the product could 
not, therefore, be marketed to input suppliers, 
processors or loan providers to insure their 
agricultural portfolio.
More problems followed. The insurance 
company decided to extend the coverage to 
30 June, but they made no recalculation of the 
product and did not notify the other partners 
on the project team. The total amount of 
rainfall during the new contract period, 15 
April to 30 June, was 81.8 mm, which is close 
to the 30 years’ average (87 mm), so the farm-
ers received no payouts. However, the weather 
station at Behtery recorded very low rainfall 
in April, May and the first half of June, with 
most of the rainfall occurring in the second 
half of June, when the farmers did not need 
rain. In fact, the last day of June delivered 27 
mm of rainfall and this strongly affected the 
index value.
Thus this pilot project was not a success 
for several reasons, including competition 
with other products, lack of awareness of 
index insurance among insurance companies, 
insufficient marketing, and lack of expertise 
to manage the contract properly. But there is 
still potential for index insurance in Ukraine, 
if these basic obstacles – and some others, 
such as too few weather stations and charg-
ing for weather data – can be overcome. The 
agricultural sector is developing rapidly, and 
the insurance products currently available do 
not meet the needs of producers. The country 
has generally good quality data on weather 
and crop yields, and scientific and practical 
expertise that could be applied to developing 
index insurance. National legislation is in 
place to facilitate insurance for agricultural 
applications. There is also interest from the 
government in catastrophe risk management 
through index insurance.
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The private sector builds a market in India
explain to clients, reducing costs and time for 
the insurance company. In 2007 the minimum 
sums that could be insured were increased 
to reduce the number of very small contracts 
and thereby reduce costs. This also reduced 
the number of farmers reached but made the 
program more sustainable. Sales subsequently 
recovered, with more than 9000 contracts sold 
in 2008.
Several other private insurance companies 
followed ICICI Lombard and introduced 
similar index insurance products in India. For 
example, IFCCO-Tokio, another joint venture 
insurance company, launched several products 
in 2004, selling more than 3000 policies 
to farmers that year, and increasing to over 
46,000 farmers in the 2008–09 season. ICICI 
Lombard has expanded its program through 
a number of partnerships, for example with 
the Indian conglomerate ITC Ltd, which 
allowed it to sell policies through ITC’s 
e-choupals (Internet kiosks). ICICI Lombard 
also joined forces with the government of 
Rajasthan to launch a program in that state in 
2004, insuring 783 orange farmers and 1036 
coriander farmers from insufficient rainfall. 
One program linked weather insurance 
policies to seed sales, whereby the seed costs 
would be refunded to the farmer if there was 
insufficient rainfall during the germination 
period. All this was scaled up to include more 
crops and farmers in 2005. ICICI Lombard’s 
Index insurance was offered to farmers for the 
first time in India in 2003 by a private insur-
ance company. Since then, both the private 
and public sector have developed index 
insurance programs, and several of these have 
scaled up and out, with a total of more than 2 
million clients across the subcontinent. 
ICICI Lombard General Insurance 
Company – a joint venture between one of 
India’s largest banks and a large Canadian 
financial holdings company – piloted the 
country’s first rainfall insurance product in 
the state of Andhra Pradesh, with support 
from the World Bank, the IFC and BASIX 
– a Hyderabad-based microfinance group 
of companies that aims to promote sustain-
able rural livelihoods through financial and 
technical services (Hess, 2003). Reinsurance 
was provided by the ACE Group, an inter-
national reinsurance company. The insurance 
was sold to 154 groundnut farmers and 76 
castor farmers. The pilot was characterized 
by intensive interactions with clients, both to 
help them understand the product and to get 
detailed feedback from them after the first 
season, in order to improve the product. Over 
the next few years there was a steady increase 
in contracts sold, until 2006 when 11,500 
customers bought the insurance. The product 
evolved over this time, and in 2005 a generic 
product was introduced to cover a range of 
crops. This simplified product was easier to 
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agricultural weather insurance sales reached 
approximately 108,000 farmers in 2006, and 
currently (in 2008) covers around 45,000 
farmers.
 The private sector now offers contracts 
across many states, for many crops, cover-
ing many agricultural problems: insufficient 
rainfall, excessive rainfall, extreme tempera-
tures, weather-linked crop diseases, fog and 
humidity. Most contracts use a simple index 
linking the weather parameter the produc-
tion shortfall. The reinsurers Swiss Re, Tokio 
Marine, Endurance Re and SIRIUS Re as 
well as hedge funds have been all participating 
in the market.
Farmers have seen some benefits of index 
insurance over the government’s conventional 
crop insurance, which is offered through 
the National Agriculture Insurance Scheme 
(NAIS) – but also some drawbacks. Claims 
are usually settled within 45–60 days of the 
end of the contract, which is significantly 
faster than payouts from NAIS. However, 
basis risk has been a problem because of the 
limited number of weather stations and insuf-
ficient weather data. To address this, private 
data providers have set up over 500 auto-
matic weather stations on behalf of insurance 
companies, across the country. However, the 
network needs to be substantially increased 
if weather index insurance is to be offered 
widely (see discussion below).
Another problem was that premiums 
for private contracts were not subsidized 
and were therefore higher than for NAIS 
contracts (6–14% of the sum insured versus 
2–3.5%). To address this price discrepancy, in 
2007 a few state governments began subsi-
dizing index insurance products offered by 
private insurance companies, paying 40–50% 
of the premium. The subsidy applied only 
to products bought by farmers voluntarily 
and not to products bundled with loans. In 
2008 the Government of India also began 
Index insurance was first offered to farmers in India in 2003; Ray Witlin/World Bank
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making subsidies available to private weather 
index insurers, in addition to channeling 
subsidies to the public Agriculture Insurance 
Company (AIC), which had also started sell-
ing weather index insurance. These subsidies 
will likely increase uptake significantly from 
the current level of around 150,000 farmers 
annually.
Distribution channels have been key in the 
scale-up of these projects. The private insur-
ance providers have joined with partners such 
as companies involved in contract farming 
or agricultural input supply in order to take 
advantage of their existing links with farmers. 
IFCCO-Tokio, for example, sells the bulk of 
its policies through the extensive coopera-
tive network of its parent company, IFFCO 
Fertilizers. ICICI Lombard has worked with 
ITC as described above, taking advantage of 
ITC’s Internet kiosks. ICICI Lombard is also 
working with contract farming operations 
such as that of PepsiCo for potatoes (see 
page 47), to take advantage of their well-
established distribution networks.
The BASIX and PepsiCo programs, 
together with a Bt cotton seed program, 
are all private unsubsidized index insurance 
programs that have successfully targeted 
small-scale farmers, have proved sustainable 
and have scaled up to some extent. According 
to BASIX, the main reasons for its success 
are: (i) efforts during the pilot stage to work 
intensively with clients at the village level, to 
raise awareness and improve product design; 
and (ii) strong delivery channels, enabling 
it to reach small-scale rural clients (in 2007 
BASIX had 1281 staff in more than 10,026 
villages in seven states across India).
The BASIX program has identified the 
following needs for further expansion of the 
insurance market in India: 
Provide subsidized premium financing to  •
farmers, to ensure that cash-constrained 
smallholders can participate 
Develop a multiyear continuity plan  •
to ensure speed and energy in business 
expansion
Build partnerships with multiple  •
insurance companies to overcome the 
underwriting limitations incurred by 
reliance on a single company
Increase investment (both private and  •
public) in the network of weather sta-
tions throughout the country, especially 
in rural areas
Improve product design for better  •
correlation between indices and crop 
losses; yet ensure products remain simple 
enough to be understood by farmers and 
other stakeholders.
Index insurance, development and disaster management
79
Laying the foundations for farm-level insurance in Ethiopia
Feasibility research was carried out in Ethiopia 
on index-based weather insurance for farmers, 
starting in 2006. This work, carried out by the 
World Bank’s Commodity Risk Management 
Group (CRMG), included a small farmer-
level pilot program, and aimed to determine 
if the basic conditions were in place to imple-
ment micro-level weather risk management 
more widely. As part of this work, CRMG 
joined forces with the Ethiopian Insurance 
Corporation (EIC) to develop and implement 
a small pilot to protect small-scale maize 
farmers against drought. These feasibility stud-
ies also laid the foundations for future index 
insurance work through local awareness raising 
and capacity building.
Feasibility study
CRMG’s feasibility research focused on the 
three areas that were believed, from previous 
experience, to be the main prerequisites for 
implementing an index-based weather insur-
ance program. These were (i) weather data 
and analysis of where index-based insurance 
might be feasible; (ii) identifying a risk taker 
to underwrite or intermediate the insurance 
contracts; and (iii) finding a company or 
institution to deliver the contract to farmers.
Ethiopia has some 600 weather stations, 
which are controlled and monitored by the 
National Meteorological Agency (NMA) 
in Addis Ababa. Of these, only 17 are 
24-hour synoptic (SYNOP) stations, which 
report every 3 hours to the WMO Global 
Telecommunication System (GTS), when con-
ditions permit. An additional 50–60 stations 
report daily to the Addis Ababa office. In 
summary, there were a limited number of sta-
tions that could be used to develop insurance 
products for rural communities in Ethiopia.
To address the second prerequisite, it 
was necessary to identify a local insurance 
company and/or an international counterpart 
that would be willing to underwrite the 
contracts or intermediate the risk to the inter-
national market. Ethiopian law required the 
participation of at least one insurer. However, 
the Ethiopian insurance sector had minimal 
experience with agricultural insurance and 
had yet to develop the technical know-how to 
develop index-based products. Nonetheless, 
three insurance companies showed interest in 
index-based weather insurance. One of these 
companies was the state-owned EIC, which 
had been researching new products to market 
in the agricultural sector. The two others were 
private companies, but at the time of the pilot 
they had little outreach in the rural sector2. 
Ultimately, EIC’s high level of enthusiasm, 
together with its mandate from government 
to look for agricultural insurance options and 
2 Since this work was initiated one of the companies, Nyala 
Insurance, has begun building expertise in index-based 
weather insurance.
Case studies III
80
its capacity in this area, made it a natural ‘risk 
off-taker’ for the pilot program.
The third prerequisite is an institution 
sufficiently embedded in the agricultural sec-
tor to deliver the product to a wide number 
of clients. Due to poor infrastructure 
and communications, it would have been 
extremely costly to develop a new delivery 
channel. The partners therefore sought to use 
existing institutions with outreach to rural 
areas, and cooperatives were identified as the 
best option. In Ethiopia, the development of 
cooperatives is being strongly encouraged by 
the government to facilitate service delivery 
for extension advice, inputs, processing and 
marketing. The major constraint to working 
with cooperatives is the lack of technical 
skills and expertise needed to manage the 
delivery of insurance, which is a new product 
for most of the staff involved. Financial 
institutions were also a natural candidate for 
this role, but at the time the government had 
a lending guarantee program through the 
banks for fertilizer credit that minimized the 
incentives of banks to pursue weather risk 
management products.
Pilot project
EIC and CRMG worked together to 
develop the pilot project. This involved iden-
tifying pilot areas, crops and cooperatives; 
carrying out market research to determine 
the major risks and the demand for insur-
ance; designing contracts to meet the needs 
of farmers; testing the contracts; marketing 
them; establishing agreements between 
participants; and finally implementing and 
monitoring the project. Weather data, yield 
data, input from farmers and agronomic 
information on the crops were used to design 
a weather index that closely predicted yield 
losses.
Before the product was offered to farm-
ers, CRMG hosted a number of training ses-
sions with local and national EIC employees 
and a local agent from the Ministry of 
Agriculture. These sessions aimed to ‘train 
the trainers’ on the product and to provide 
guidance on marketing it to their potential 
clientele. EIC relied on these trainees and 
on farmer cooperative leaders to market the 
product. Twenty-eight farmers subsequently 
bought the insurance as a stand-alone 
product.
Once contracts were under way, weekly 
weather data were received from the local 
meteorological department and were used 
to measure the index. In 2006 the rainfall in 
Alaba, where the pilot was carried out, was 
sufficient for maize growth and there was 
no payout from the contract. Following the 
pilot, EIC offered index insurance to farmers 
the following year but there was minimal 
take-up, with only 13 farmers participating. 
The product is under revision and may be 
offered again. Meanwhile, Nyala Insurance 
recently offered an innovative ‘double trigger’ 
index insurance contract to farmers that uses 
multiple sources of information to trigger 
payouts.
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Challenges for market development 
in Ethiopia
Key challenges for scaling up a farmer-level 
index insurance scheme in Ethiopia were 
broadly identified as lack of data, weak delivery 
channels, limited linkages to finance and to 
inputs for farmers, and a lack of capacity within 
Ethiopian insurance companies and banks.
Preliminary research conducted during the 
pilot found that the number of stations whose 
data could be used to develop insurance 
products was very limited. Only 31 stations 
had under 10% of their data missing.
Effective delivery channels are critical 
to successful scale-up. In Ethiopia it has 
been difficult to identify organizations 
that combine outreach to farmers with the 
technical capacity to serve as the partner and 
market intermediary for delivering index 
insurance products. Farmer cooperatives, 
which were used in the pilot, have varying 
levels of capacity and, in many cases, would 
require significant capacity building to offer 
the product to farmers. Possible alternatives 
explored for this role included financial 
institutions, service providers for agricultural 
inputs, insurers and other retail agents, but 
none of these had incentives or the ability 
to provide this service to farmers. Financial 
institutions are the prime candidates for 
marketing this product, but were unmoti-
vated due to the government guarantee for 
fertilizer credit that addressed the risks in 
loan repayment that the insurance might 
have otherwise targeted. Changes to this 
arrangement could create an opportunity to 
expand the use of weather insurance prod-
ucts linked to lending.
In order to implement a weather risk 
management program in Ethiopia on a large 
scale, capacity building would need to include 
a larger number of insurance companies and 
banks. In addition to expanding agricultural 
insurance products, banks could use the risk 
assessment components of the contract design 
process to improve their credit risk analysis. 
This type of initiative could allow banks to 
better assess the risks related to agricultural 
lending and expand their portfolio in an 
informed way.
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Supporting farmers – and a government seed program  
– in Brazil 
This case study from the Rio Grande do Sul 
region of Brazil shows how an index insur-
ance program can be developed by a public–
private partnership and used to complement 
other agricultural programs, in this case a seed 
distribution program. Rio Grande do Sul is 
one of Brazil’s biggest producers and export-
ers of grains. Weather risks are mainly related 
to the El Niño phenomenon and its sister 
effect, La Niña: El Niño often causes floods, 
while La Niña is characterized by dry spells 
and droughts.
The state government of Rio Grande do Sul 
set up a seed distribution program in 1989 to 
help farmers grow maize for animal feed. The 
program supplies farmers with certified maize 
seed, with payment for the seed delayed until 
after the harvest. Thus when the harvest fails 
the government loses money; repeated failure, 
might render the program no longer viable.
The government was therefore interested 
in an insurance scheme to transfer and spread 
this risk. It invited partners to develop and 
implement a scheme that could be offered 
to all farmers who were eligible for the seed 
program – some 170,000 low-income farmers. 
AgroBrasil, a private agricultural risk manage-
ment agency took the lead and proposed an 
area–yield index-based product that it had 
already developed. The partners have worked 
with several private insurance and reinsurance 
companies over the past few years to provide 
cover to farmers using an adapted version of this 
product. From 2001 to 2008, between 15,000 
and 46,000 households took out the insurance 
each season (see the table). The insurance is 
Aggregate data on the insurance scheme offered to farmers participating in the Rio Grande do Sul 
seed distribution program
Crop year
Families 
insured
Sum insured 
(R$) Premium (R$) Claims
Indemnities 
paid (R$)
2001/2002 25,068 17,834,385 1,978,154 17,590 4,247,742
2002/2003 38,620 28,445,320 4,174,436 59 5,550
2003/2004 20,122 14,993,630 2,278,775 4,254 1,063,611
2004/2005 24,151 19,320,800 2,749,323 23,248 10,364,084
2005/2006 46,175 36,940,000 6,139,370 9,547 1,914,202
2006/2007 25,071 20,056,800 3,343,580 129 30,461
2007/2008 14,893 11,914,400 2,037,171 2,951 593,551
Total 194,100 149,505,335 22,700,810 57,778 18,219,201
Source: Agrobrasil Seguros (2008).
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only available to farmers in the seed distribution 
program, and its adoption is voluntary.
The area-yield index insurance scheme 
protects insured farmers against any risk that 
decreases the average yield for a defined area, 
compared to the productive history of the 
crop within the same area. Triggers were set at 
10% deviation from average regional yield for 
the first year of operation, but changed in the 
following years to a 20% deviation.
The premium paid by farmers is subsidized 
by about 90%. The government pays the 
entire premium directly to the insurers at the 
beginning of the season, and collects the cost 
of the insurance minus the subsidy, together 
with payment for the seeds, from the farmers 
after the harvest.
Promotion and delivery of the product 
were strengths in this case study. A cartoon 
booklet was developed, ‘Mr Chico and agri-
cultural insurance’, to explain the insurance 
to farmers (see below). More than 60,000 
booklets were distributed during the first 
year of the scheme. AgroBrasil also promoted 
the insurance via radio and other media. 
Marketing activities had its own dedicated 
team of about 45 people, which included 
ground staff located close to distribution 
points. To deliver the product, the insurance 
providers took advantage of the established 
seed program and its more than 600 seed 
distribution points. When a farmer came to 
collect seed, the insurance was explained and 
offered at the same time. These efforts led to 
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good uptake, although uptake rates were also 
affected by events of the previous season (see 
table). Contract sales increased following a 
season in which claims were high; while fewer 
contracts were sold following a ‘good’ year 
when claims were low.
A new software program called AgroNet 
was developed to keep track of contract sales, 
sums insured and farmers’ details. The soft-
ware was installed at seed distribution points 
so that data could easily be collected. The data 
are used to produce a daily report, which is 
made available on the Internet and can be 
accessed by the marketing team, insurers and 
reinsurers. This makes for a relatively high 
level of transparency, although the system 
does depend on the release of official yield 
data by the government.
The insurance has been successful in 
reaching low-income smallholders par-
ticipating in the government seed program. 
However, there are barriers that need to be 
addressed if the scheme is to be scaled up 
and to prove sustainable in the longer term. 
The main one is that the scheme currently 
uses the seed program as its only delivery 
channel; this means it is dependent on the 
seed program and the government’s support. 
AgroBrasil is interested in extending the 
scheme to other regions and has proposed 
including it in the programs of other states. 
The participation of more private companies 
in the initiative could also offer more distri-
bution channels.
For additional information see Neves 
(2008).
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Stakeholder communication is key in Thailand
The station also had approximately 40 years 
of rainfall data for use in contract design and 
premium pricing.
Preparatory technical work for the pilot 
involved collecting rainfall, yield and other 
key agro-meteorological data; interviewing 
farmers about the amount of rainfall and the 
losses they have suffered due to rainfall deficit; 
running crop models to derive quantitative 
relationships between maize yield and rainfall; 
and designing a prototype rainfall index 
insurance contact.
The Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural 
Cooperatives (BAAC) was the operational 
partner in the pilot, while CRMG provided 
technical expertise. Nine national insurance 
companies jointly underwrote the contracts 
under the coordination of the country’s 
General Insurance Association. BAAC’s role 
was to lead the fieldwork and data collection, 
act as agent/intermediary for the insurance 
companies, conduct (with the companies) 
farmer education sessions, and carry out 
marketing and sales of the insurance contracts. 
BAAC was also responsible for collecting and 
transferring premiums to insurers, distribut-
ing insurance certificates, creating databases 
of participating farmers, and distributing 
daily rainfall information to insured farmers 
during the period of insurance coverage. The 
World Bank funded and provided guidance for 
designing the index for the prototype insurance 
The Thailand case study demonstrates how 
careful pilot project management within a 
conducive external environment contributes to 
success. Thailand has a relatively developed, 
commercially oriented agricultural sector 
and a strong agricultural bank with extensive 
outreach activities, which facilitated project 
development and implementation. The pilot 
put considerable effort into communication 
between farmers, the technical team and local 
partners. Over the past three years, the project 
has developed a product that reflects feedback 
from clients and continues to be adjusted to 
suit local risk characteristics in new areas as 
the pilot expands. The project has also laid 
the foundations for further market expansion 
by building capacity, raising awareness at 
different levels, and engaging the government 
in dialogue over policy needs.
Despite earlier efforts by the government 
to introduce it, agricultural insurance had 
failed to find a market in Thailand. The oppor-
tunity for an index insurance pilot arose when 
the CRMG, which had been working on a 
similar project in India, was requested by Thai 
stakeholders to assist with a pilot in Thailand. 
The pilot was set up in the Pak Chong district 
of Nakorn Ratchasrima Province. It was 
aimed at maize farmers and addressed the 
drought risk. The district has high-quality 
historical weather data and reliable real-time 
data from the nearby meteorological station. 
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the project to other locations. In the 2008 
season the project covered 388 farmers near 
11 weather stations in five provinces. The 
insurance companies also offered farmers 
more contract variations, including choices in 
contract start date, sum insured and premium. 
A total of US$300,000 was insured in this 
second year. After the season a group of 
farmers around one weather station received 
a large payout due to rainfall deficit measured 
during the first phase of the contract.
Even with the limited experience of just 
two seasons, the project has had a significant 
demonstration effect and has generated wide 
interest from other institutions in Southeast 
Asia, as well as international reinsurers. The 
primary constraint to expansion is the lack 
of local capacity to design index insurance 
contracts. This is due, in particular, to the cur-
rent lack of a local agro-meteorological team 
to work with the insurance team. Continued 
investment in weather stations, and ongoing 
cooperation between the insurance sector, 
BAAC and the government, are also impor-
tant for expansion.
Feedback from the farmers suggested that 
trust plays a key role in product take-up. From 
qualitative interviews after the pilot seasons, 
farmers stated motivations for purchasing 
insurance included risk management, experi-
mentation and word-of-mouth from peers, 
but most importantly, trust in BAAC – an 
institution with long-term relationships with 
the farmers.
contract for Pak Chong. The contract was later 
fine-tuned by the local insurance team based 
on feedback received from farmers, BAAC 
and a local maize expert. Premium pricing was 
also done by the local insurance team based on 
standard international methodology.
A ‘dry run’ of the pilot was carried out in 
2006 in Pak Chong. The clientele consisted 
of BAAC clients who grew maize within 
a 20 km radius of the Pak Chong Agro-
meteorological Station. The insurance was 
introduced as a voluntary unsubsidized 
product, and was not bundled with credit. The 
dry run allowed project partners to practice 
product marketing and customer enrolment, 
and to set up a rainfall monitoring system to 
measure the index. It also provided the pilot 
team with input from farmers to improve the 
prototype rainfall index. The dry run revealed 
that the simple cumulative rainfall index did 
not reflect the disproportional impact on yield 
of prolonged water stress during the vegeta-
tive phase. This critical information resulted in 
changes to the product for the next phase.
With the refined product, the partners 
implemented the first year of the full-scale 
pilot during the 2007 growing season. In 
order to expand the geographical coverage 
within the Pak Chong district, the insurers 
funded the installation of a new automatic 
weather station. A relatively small sum of 
US$42,400 was insured in the two locations 
in the Pak Chong district. Following the 
2007 season, the partners decided to expand 
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Scaling up in India: The public sector
small-scale growers. Another product introduced 
in 2005 targeted wheat in parts of Haryana and 
Punjab states, and used the remotely sensed 
Normalized Difference Vegetation Index 
(NDVI) as a proxy for crop health. However this 
has encountered problems due to cloud cover 
during critical crop growth periods. A generic 
(non-crop-specific) product was also developed, 
in 2006. Contracts for this product were sold 
through the ITC e-choupal network in the states 
of Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan 
and Maharashtra. Crops covered were potato, 
mustard, chickpea, barley and wheat, which were 
protected against low and high temperature as 
well as unseasonal rainfall. By 2008, AIC had 
developed products for about 30 different crops, 
including perennial horticultural crops such as 
cashew nut, grapes, mango and apple.
To begin with AIC sold contracts directly or 
through cooperatives and NGOs. To do this it 
recruited staff called ‘agri-preneurs’. These were 
agriculture graduates who toured rural areas call-
ing on village heads, farmers’ associations, NGOs 
etc, explaining the product, distributing product 
literature and enrolling interested farmers. As 
part of its scaling up efforts, in 2006 AIC began 
using insurance intermediaries to help deliver 
the product, such as insurance brokers, corporate 
agents and, from 2008, micro-insurance agents. 
At the same time, pamphlets, posters, radio 
advertisements and short films were used to raise 
awareness.
The Indian government has offered various crop 
insurance options to farmers since the late 1970s. 
In 2002 it set up the Agriculture Insurance 
Company of India (AIC) to facilitate this 
service. At that time the main crop insurance on 
offer was the NAIS scheme, an area-yield-based 
insurance that was first offered in 1985. AIC’s 
mandate was to develop new options in addi-
tion to NAIS, and in 2004 it launched a pilot 
weather index insurance scheme to this end.
AIC’s pilot insured field crops against losses 
due to inadequate rainfall. The policy targeted 
three risks: inadequate rainfall over the entire 
cropping cycle; inadequate rainfall during critical 
stages of crop development; and sowing failure 
due to inadequate rainfall at the start of the 
season. In 2004 the scheme covered 20 districts 
in four states, reaching nearly 1100 farmers. In 
2005 it was extended to over 125 locations in 10 
states and reached as many as 125,000 farm-
ers. By 2008 more than 700,000 farmers were 
insured through this program.
Over the years AIC has developed further 
index insurance products for a broader range of 
crops as well as expanding its geographical cover-
age. In 2005, for example, with technical inputs 
from the Coffee Board and Central Coffee 
Research Institute, AIC developed a product for 
coffee farmers, protecting against inadequate and 
excess rainfall during critical growing periods. 
Since 2007 the Coffee Board has offered a 
50% subsidy on premiums for this product for 
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expansion of index insurance. It is estimated 
that, to minimize basis risk, India needs at least 
5000 automatic weather stations and 20,000 
automatic rain gauges.
There have been delays in receiving data 
from IMD stations, which have held up insur-
ance payouts. To facilitate index insurance some 
private companies have set up weather stations 
and rain gauges where these were lacking, 
and they sell data to AIC. National Collateral 
Management Services Limited, for example, 
has a network of over 400 automatic weather 
stations across 17 states, of which nearly 300 
provide data for AIC’s weather insurance 
products; Weather Risk Management Services 
operates some 75 weather stations; Agrocom 
also has about 50 weather stations in the state 
of Maharashtra; and Karnataka State Natural 
Disaster Monitoring Centre has about 600 rain 
gauges in the state of Karnataka. State govern-
ments have also begun investing in automatic 
weather stations; for example, the state of Tamil 
Nadu is investing about US$5 million in the 
installation of 225 stations.
Other challenges
Beyond data limitations, several other challenges 
need to be met if further scaling up is to proceed 
smoothly. Benchmarking is needed, to help clients 
better understand and compare the different 
products available. For example, besides AIC, 
two insurers from the private sector are currently 
providing weather index insurance with the same 
level of support from the government. These 
insurers are selling products with different trigger 
The Weather Based Crop Insurance 
Scheme (WBCIS) was launched in 2007, with 
government support in the form of subsidies. 
This project aims to use the best scientific and 
technical inputs available to develop products 
that are less prone to basis risk. It has focused 
on improvements in three areas: (i) cleaning 
and simulation of historical weather data; (ii) 
developing a crop growth simulation model 
to capture the yield–weather relationship; and 
(ii) expanding the network of private-sector 
automatic weather stations.
Reinsurers working with the public sector 
in India include the national company GIC Re 
and the international companies Paris Re, Scor 
Re, Endurance Re and Swiss Re. About 50% of 
the total coverage is placed in the international 
market.
The Indian Ministry of Agriculture has 
now recommended that some states replace the 
NAIS product with index insurance in select 
locations. This is a major step towards main-
streaming index insurance in India; however, 
expanding coverage still faces data and other 
challenges.
Weather data
Historical and current weather data are pro-
vided by the India Meteorological Department 
(IMD). About 25–30 years of historical 
daily weather data are available for about 500 
locations in the country. For rainfall data alone 
the situation is better, with about 3500 stations 
having good historical data. However, there are 
significant gaps and this is a limitation for the 
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values, so that, for the same crop in the same 
location, one product may pay out while the other 
may not. Benchmarking set up by the government, 
with an appraisal mechanism and established 
standards, would enable clients to better under-
stand and ultimately to trust these products. 
The pricing of index insurance products has 
been a subject of contention, as in some cases 
(mostly private insurers) the price is decided by 
the reinsurer and may be up to 200% of burning 
cost (the cost determined strictly on the basis 
of historical data). Although the numbers of 
contracts sold in India have greatly increased 
over recent years, geographic spread has been 
limited, as many states are not convinced that a 
weather index can be superior to a yield index, 
as the latter is almost ‘all-risk’ insurance. This 
reduces opportunities for risk spreading and 
reducing costs.
The calibration of automatic weather stations 
is a pressing need, as most of these stations are 
producing data which are not consistent with 
historical data. For example, in 2008 AIC carried 
out a validation of data from automatic weather 
stations for 12 different locations across different 
agro-climatic zones and found discrepancies 
with the data from ‘ag-met observatories’ run by 
agricultural universities or research institutes.
Explaining how insurance works has been a 
challenge. Farmers often expect the product to 
give them regular payouts, but with premiums 
typically at around 6–8% of the sum insured 
the actual rate will be one full payout in 20–25 
years or partial payouts once every 6–8 years. 
This misunderstanding has meant that contracts 
are often not renewed, especially if the initial 
years are without payout – there is evidence that 
repeat buyers decline with each payout-free year. 
Concerted efforts in insurance education are 
needed to overcome this challenge, which can 
also be met by designing products that combine 
savings with weather insurance.
Indeed, one of the most important reasons 
for low take-up of weather insurance is that the 
product is too complex and/or is not properly 
understood by stakeholders, especially farmers. 
Capacity building at different levels (including 
government and facilitators) and simple and 
clear product communication will be key for 
further scaling up.
In some places, high premium subsidies have 
led to farmers using index insurance to ‘gamble’. 
They may buy weather insurance for crops they 
are not actually growing, or buy more units 
of coverage than the area they have. Market 
practices, such as across-the-table policy issuance 
without even checking basic information about 
the supplier, are encouraging these tendencies.
Reinsurers’ expectations have been difficult 
to meet and have pushed up costs. For example, 
some companies want to receive weather data 
on a near ‘real-time’ basis and require regular 
updates of how contracts are performing each 
week. This is obviously labor- and resource-
intensive and insurers often find it difficult or 
impossible to comply.
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Livestock insurance in Mongolia
Livestock herding has played a vital role in 
the culture of Mongolia for thousands of years 
and continues to contribute significantly to 
its economy. The livestock sector accounts for 
17% of Mongolia’s gross domestic product 
(GDP) and employs 33% of its workforce. The 
country’s human population totals 2.6 million 
and, according to the 2007 livestock census, 
there are close to 40 million head of livestock.
The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 
1991 had a significant effect on Mongolia. The 
government switched from a socialist system 
to a democratic enterprise economy. Herder 
households shifted from collective farming to 
family-based herding. Due to lack of jobs in 
the cities, many families moved to the coun-
tryside to take up herding. From 1990 to 1997, 
the number of households engaged in herding 
doubled and the overall livestock population 
grew from 25 million to 31 million.
While episodic drought and harsh winters 
have always been a fact of life for herders in 
Mongolia, conditions happened to be largely 
benign during the early years of economic 
transition in the 1990s. From 2000 to 2002, 
however, severe winter conditions created dzud 
– sudden-onset winter storms that include 
bitterly cold temperatures and can create ice 
that prevents livestock from foraging. These 
events occurred during a period when many 
novice herders were placing increased pressure 
on the natural resource base at precisely the 
same time that state-supported risk mitigation 
systems (providing forage and groundwater 
wells) were breaking down. Some 11 million 
animals perished during the winters of 2000, 
2001 and 2002. Weak insurance companies 
defaulted on payments to herders, families 
returned to the city, the general economy was 
adversely affected, and a national debate was 
initiated regarding the introduction of manda-
tory livestock insurance.
Even before the crisis, the World Bank 
had been actively involved in Mongolia, 
developing a Sustainable Livelihoods Program 
that emphasized pastoral risk management. 
This included improved early warning 
systems and risk preparedness actions, access 
to supplementary feed and grazing reserves, 
coordination of pasture-land use, and conflict 
management. These measures were combined 
with efforts to extend the outreach of micro-
finance services to herders and to encourage 
investments in basic infrastructure, identified 
as priorities by communities. Taken together, 
these complementary interventions strength-
ened the wider risk management framework, 
thereby reducing herders’ vulnerability to 
climate and non-climate hazards.
As part of its support for the Sustainable 
Livelihoods Program, the World Bank was 
invited to assist the Government of Mongolia 
in its debate on mandatory livestock insurance. 
It was clear that it would be impossible to 
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implement a traditional livestock insurance 
program that performed loss assessments in 
the vast spaces of Mongolia in the midst of 
harsh winter conditions, so alternative meth-
ods for measuring livestock losses were sought. 
Mongolia had been conducting a census of 
animals every December since the early 1920s, 
which provided estimates of mortality rates of 
animals by species and by sum (rural district). 
It was proposed to use these data as a basis 
for making payments under a new insurance 
program. Policy makers and others under-
stood that paying out according to sum-level 
mortality rates would retain the incentives 
for herders to work hard to save their animals 
during a dzud.
In 2005, the Government of Mongolia 
entered into a credit agreement with the 
World Bank to begin a pilot program on 
Index-Based Livestock Insurance (IBLI). The 
first sales season was 2006. The goal of the 
IBLI is to provide an insurance product for 
catastrophic livestock mortality events within 
a region, recognizing that smaller, individual 
livestock mortality risks are better addressed 
through appropriate household-level risk 
management strategies.
The IBLI pilot program consists of a 
public–private partnership and includes a com-
mercial insurance product, the Base Insurance 
Product (BIP), and a Disaster Response 
Product (DRP), designed to compensate 
herders when major livestock losses occur. The 
BIP pays out when sum mortality rates exceed 
6%. Losses beyond 30% are managed by the 
DRP and are currently paid using a contingent 
loan from the World Bank, with the intention 
that this component will be financed by the 
Government of Mongolia after the pilot ends. 
Thus, the commercial exposure (BIP) is for the 
layer between 6% and 30% mortality and the 
social component (DRP) is for losses exceeding 
30% mortality. Herders are allowed to select 
their sum insured based on an aggregate value 
of all their animals belonging to a given species. 
Typically, herders have been insuring about 
30% of the estimated value of their animals. 
Herders have the option to pay a small fee to 
obtain the DRP product, with a sum insured 
representing 50% of the value of their animals. 
They can do this whether or not they purchase 
the BIP policy.
The sales season begins in mid-March 
and ends in mid-June, before signs of an 
early or harsh winter start to materialize, 
thereby preventing adverse selection on the 
part of herders. If sales were extended into 
July and August, the knowledge herders have 
of pasture conditions and the health of their 
animals could cause them to buy only when 
the likelihood of a loss increases. Payments 
are based on estimates of sum-level livestock 
mortality rates from January through May. 
Payments are generally made in late July or 
early August, after mortality estimates are 
obtained from the latest mid-year livestock 
survey (conducted in late May and early June). 
As of 2009, the IBLI program is being piloted 
in four provinces: Bayankhongor, Khentii, Uvs 
and Sukhbaatar.
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Financing structure
The IBLI pilot program has a unique financ-
ing structure that was designed to account for 
the lack of access to commercial reinsurance, 
the large financial exposure associated with 
correlated livestock losses, and the insurers’ 
and regulator’s lack of experience with this 
class of insurance. This is the first time an 
index insurance product has been used in 
Mongolia (and the first time for livestock 
anywhere). The structure follows best prac-
tices by establishing layers of risk financing. 
Insurance companies retain some portion of 
the risk, pool risk with other companies, pay 
reinsurance premiums to the government, and 
are protected from the most extreme losses 
by a combination of (i) the BIP reinsurance 
reserve (which accumulates from reinsurance 
premiums paid using the herder premium) 
and (ii) a contingent loan from the World 
Bank, which covers the most severe losses. 
Note that the BIP reinsurance reserve is only 
used to pay for losses from the commercial 
layer of risk. It is used as the first line of 
defense, before the World Bank contingent 
loan is used.
The Livestock Insurance Indemnity Pool 
(LIIP) is the foundation of the risk financing 
Livestock insurance can support herders when they face harsh winter conditions; Mark Rosenwald
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structure. The LIIP is a risk-sharing arrange-
ment in which insurance companies pool their 
risk: all insurance companies participating 
in IBLI pay into the pool, and the indemni-
ties from all BIP policies are paid from the 
aggregate funds in the pool.
The LIIP is regulated to ensure that insur-
ance companies have their complete capital at 
risk available for quick payments should there 
be losses. Participating insurance companies 
are required to deposit their capital at risk 
into the LIIP account, which is owned by the 
government. This ensures that herders will be 
paid even if an insurance company goes bank-
rupt. Insurance companies own the right to 
a share of underwriting gains from the LIIP 
account. Shares are based on the premium 
sales made by the insurance company.
Pilot performance
In general, the IBLI program has exceeded the 
expectations and performance goals set for it 
when the project started. Two insurance cycles 
have been completed, the third is ongoing, 
and the sales season for the fourth has been 
launched. Four insurance companies are cur-
rently participating. In 2006, some 2400 poli-
cies were sold; this rose to over 3700 policies in 
2007 and to 4100 policies in 2008, representing 
14% of herders in the pilot provinces. In mid-
August 2008, following high livestock losses, 
MNT 389 million (US$340,000) was paid out 
to 1783 herders. All financing systems worked 
as planned; a small amount was drawn from 
the contingent debt facility.
Lenders have offered lower interest rates 
and better terms for loans to insured herders; 
and the National Statistics Office has suc-
cessfully implemented a mid-year census to 
facilitate timely payments after losses, most of 
which occur in the first 5 months of the year.
Lessons learned and challenges 
ahead
Mongolia represents a novel approach to 
the development of index insurance using a 
public–private partnership. The most extreme 
events (above 30% mortality), which are costly 
to insure against, are completely financed 
by the government. If these risks had to be 
priced in the market, the resulting package 
would be far too expensive for most herd-
ers. Index insurance products provide the 
unique opportunity to layer risk in this way. 
Mongolia represents one of the strongest cases 
of mixing social and commercial insurance in 
a carefully designed project that meets both 
needs. Should the government decide it can 
no longer afford to take the extreme risks, a 
commercial product will still be firmly in place. 
At that stage it might even be possible for the 
insurance companies to increase their exposure 
to at least some of the extreme risk through 
reinsurance markets.
The IBLI program is designed to avoid 
many of the incentive problems faced by 
government efforts to support agricul-
tural insurance. The program’s financing 
and regulatory structure, which pools risk 
among insurance companies, is designed to 
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strengthen trust among herders, participating 
companies, the government and the global 
reinsurance market.
Among the most significant challenges 
for IBLI is to make it a sustainable program 
with a system for data collection and analysis, 
product delivery and contract administra-
tion that can be paid from herder premiums. 
Performing a mid-year survey is an added 
cost. Delivering insurance products to herders 
in the vast expanses of rural Mongolia is also 
proving to be costly. These are micro-products 
with small premiums, issued to individual 
herders. Linking the products to herder loans 
will be an important next step, reducing deliv-
ery cost. Despite these challenges, the delivery 
and administrative costs should be manageable 
as the premium base grows. 
Above all, it is important to view this 
initiative as one element within a wider 
risk management framework. Mutually 
supportive interventions across a number of 
areas – including disaster risk preparedness, 
reduction and response; financial intermedia-
tion; supporting infrastructure; and social 
safety nets – are all needed to address the 
interlocking forms of vulnerability that 
Mongolian herders face in the unpredictable 
and often harsh environment where they 
earn their living.
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Lessons learned and recommendations
At the farmer and community scales, 
index insurance has brought access to credit 
and insurance for high-risk populations previ-
ously considered uninsurable. Some farmers 
have received credit for the first time, allow-
ing them to buy and use critical agricultural 
inputs and technologies such as improved 
seeds and fertilizers. Index insurance makes 
this possible by lowering the transaction costs 
of designing and managing contracts and pay-
outs, thereby making it viable to sell insurance 
with low premiums that are affordable even to 
poor farmers. To be successful, the transaction 
costs will have to be kept low without dimin-
ishing the quality of the insurance coverage as 
it is scaled up. This concern underlies many of 
the issues discussed below.
At the national and multinational scales, 
experience shows that index insurance within 
a comprehensive disaster management frame-
work can play a role in providing more timely 
and reliable relief.
Lessons learned and 
recommendations
Low data quality and quantity restricts  
the implementation and scale-up of 
index insurance. It is important to 
improve data systems and explore new 
technologies to fill data gaps
Climate variability can amplify poverty, espe-
cially in the developing world (Dercon, 2004; 
Hansen et al., 2004). The potential of index 
insurance to help manage climate variability – 
to enable economic development despite it and 
to manage the disasters that result from it – is 
being tested in a growing number of develop-
ing country settings. The case studies presented 
in this report provide a wealth of practical 
experience and knowledge which must be 
drawn on if this new tool is to be successfully 
scaled up so that it has widespread impact. 
This section is an attempt to distill the lessons 
learned thus far – and so to provide guidance to 
donor agencies and others planning to invest in 
index insurance in the future.
What is the potential of index 
insurance for development and 
disaster management?
In this publication, index insurance has been 
examined under two broad categories:
•		 Index	insurance	for	development	(farmer	
and community scales), and
•		 Index	insurance	for	disaster	relief	(national	
and multinational scales).
For both purposes, index insurance has 
unleashed new capital, ideas and approaches. 
It has led to new research on how to address 
risk, new methods for risk pooling and 
transfer, and new roles for national insurance 
companies.
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Lack of data is a fundamental issue in most 
of the pilot cases. Developing regions are at 
a distinct disadvantage – Africa, for example, 
has 23% of the world’s land but only 11% 
of its climate observations (WMO, 2005). 
Meteorological, crop, loss and socioeconomic 
data are all essential. The fair and sustainable 
pricing of insurance – and its usefulness – 
depend on understanding the likelihood of 
the insured event occurring, which requires 
historical data.
Installing new weather stations is a 
straightforward investment to support data 
collection for index insurance scale-up, and it 
is happening in some countries – for example 
Malawi, India and Ethiopia (see case studies 
on pages 42, 47 and 44). Such expansion of 
observation systems will be critical in the 
coming years, not only for insurance purposes. 
Weather stations need ongoing maintenance, 
as well as skilled staff to operate them, and 
these needs must be factored into invest-
ments. New weather stations cannot, however, 
provide historical data.
There are technologies that can help over-
come the limited data availability. Technologies 
tested in pilots include remote sensing (of 
rainfall and vegetation), rainfall modeling and 
simulation, seasonal forecasting, techniques for 
modeling risk over time and space, modeling 
of long-term processes and trends, systematic 
communications tools, agricultural systems 
modeling, and water resource techniques 
(see earlier text boxes, and papers at http://
iri.columbia.edu/csp/issue2/workshop). Not 
initially designed for index insurance, many of 
these technologies are nonetheless performing 
well in this application. However, each also 
has documented failings. It is important to 
understand the uses and limitations of these 
technologies, and this will require systematic 
testing. At the same time, research and devel-
opment of new technologies to help overcome 
data barriers is advocated.
Insurance has stimulated new markets for 
weather data. In some cases private companies 
are stepping in to fill the void – in India, for 
example, there is an active private-sector effort 
to build new weather stations and sell the data 
to insurance providers. This has demonstrated 
that there can be a useful role for the private 
sector; however, public investment is likely 
to be far more important in most developing 
countries. Governments need to support their 
meteorological services so that quality data can 
be collected, processed and made available.
Premium subsidies for development- 
oriented projects need to be carefully 
thought through. Investments in 
public goods may reap more benefits 
and result in more sustainable markets 
over the long term
Subsidies are a complex area and there are 
many questions surrounding their use. In 
practice, in India for example, subsidies for 
development index insurance products have 
resulted in products reaching larger numbers 
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of poor people. However the long-term 
impacts on livelihoods are largely unknown. 
Without subsidies, premiums more accurately 
reflect the cost of the risk, and this helps the 
farmer decide whether it is a risk worth tak-
ing. With a subsidy, a farmer might take risks 
she should not take, increasing her vulner-
ability. Historically, subsidized agricultural 
insurance has been used in many countries 
as part of welfare programs. While these 
programs have often been politically expedi-
ent and popular, they may perpetuate poverty 
and have long-term negative impacts on the 
rural poor who adapt their livelihoods around 
seeking and using subsidies. There is a risk 
that subsidized index insurance could have 
the same negative impacts on livelihoods.
There are investment alternatives to 
premium subsidies that appear less likely 
to have these unintended consequences. In 
the case studies, donors often subsidized the 
design and development costs of products, 
for example. Other public goods investments 
that might contribute to the development of 
sustainable markets include improvements in 
data systems and data collection, and promo-
tion and capacity building. Governments 
should take the lead in establishing a regula-
tory framework and ensuring that certain 
public goods, such as meteorological data, are 
available. Donors can help strengthen local 
financial systems in a variety of ways, from 
technical assistance to capacity building, 
insurance education and awareness raising, 
developing product benchmarking standards, 
creating a pool of historical weather data, 
providing generic software for designing 
products and supporting public–private 
partnerships. The latter will be key as markets 
expand. Strengthening the global market for 
reinsurance is another key investment that 
governments can make in order to allow 
insurance to be more affordable at the local 
level (see following section on global initia-
tives on financial risk transfer).
Index insurance works best when  
integrated into broader programs 
for development and disaster 
management. It should form part of 
a comprehensive risk management 
package with complementary 
resources targeted to other 
components of the package
Index insurance is not a stand-alone solution, 
but is one tool in the risk management portfolio. 
It works most effectively where it is addressing 
a clear and defined risk, with other risks covered 
by other risk management options.
There are also many practical reasons why 
index insurance works best when inte-
grated into broader development and disaster 
management strategies. In the case studies, 
the best targeted and designed products, and 
the most cost-effective implementations, were 
those where insurance programs worked with 
existing networks and programs for rural 
development. National cooperative move-
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ments, farmer credit access programs, contract 
farming and rural development programs, 
for example, all acted as platforms for index 
insurance. Access to delivery channels, facili-
tation of marketing, and promotion of local 
ownership are some of the advantages that 
were seen in these collaborative arrangements.
In these integrated settings it is important 
that equal or even greater attention should 
be paid to the interventions the insurance is 
complementing. The insurance should be built 
to address the risks remaining when these 
other interventions have been developed.
Investments in capacity building and  
marketing are needed to support the 
scaling up of index insurance
Index insurance is new to many stakehold-
ers in developing countries. The potential 
client needs to understand the product – and 
so too do all the organizations involved in 
contract development, product marketing and 
the management of transactions. Capacity 
building must be focused on the full range 
of stakeholders as successful scaling up 
depends on the knowledgeable participation 
of all groups. It is particularly important to 
strengthen local capacity to design contracts 
that respond to local needs.
Significant marketing efforts are also 
needed for successful scaling up. Many of 
the pilots demonstrated innovative ways of 
marketing the product. In Brazil, a cartoon 
character was created to explain index insur-
ance in an entertaining way. In India, mobile 
units and short video films were used to bring 
the product to a broad audience. Awareness 
raising should also address the full range of 
potential stakeholders, from insurance compa-
nies and other financial groups, through 
potential clients, to policy makers.
There are obvious investment opportuni-
ties here for donors interested in promoting 
index insurance. Efforts already under way 
include an online tool developed by the World 
Bank and IRI.
Evaluation is needed to find out if  
there is a real impact on poverty, and 
to improve the products. Evaluation 
and impact studies should be built 
into future project design and 
implementation
Even where index insurance markets are 
beginning to flourish, it is not yet known 
exactly what impacts the insurance may be 
having. Impact evaluations of index insurance 
projects are thus essential, but have not been 
systematically included in project design 
or implementation. Quantitative evidence 
indicating the economic benefits and invest-
ment tradeoffs is imperative to understand the 
added value of index insurance. Faced with 
competing needs and limited resources, it is in 
the donor’s best interest to meet this critical 
need. It is vital to determine whether index 
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insurance should be prioritized in develop-
ment and disaster management strategies. 
Understanding the impacts of index insur-
ance would stimulate the creation of new and 
better targeted products and services. A better 
understanding of the development impacts 
can also stimulate scale-up, promote access to 
government support, and open doors to new 
and additional resources.
Because many of the questions around 
implementation are about the appropriate 
scale of intervention, evaluation strategies 
should provide unbiased scrutiny across all 
scales. Pre-implementation strategies must be 
further developed to better understand and 
target demand, and the appropriate role of 
insurance in the context of other interventions 
and traditional practices.
There is major scope for donor contribu-
tions in this area. Learning on impact should 
feed into an international index insurance 
product development community of practice 
(see below). It will be important to persuade 
private-sector companies to share their 
knowledge of what works and what does not.
Insurance must be demand driven  
and locally owned. Risk and needs 
assessments should be carried out 
before designing and implementing a 
project
This lesson may seem obvious, but it is all too 
often overlooked. If insurance is not designed 
to meet a demand that is keenly felt by clients 
it is unlikely to work, regardless of its price. 
No level of technical sophistication or subsidy 
can rescue a product that does not offer a 
clear and concrete benefit to its potential 
clients and is not wanted by them. Index 
insurance projects that are driven from the top 
down by NGOs, governments or the financial 
sector have not been successful.
Most donor-funded projects conduct 
needs or risk assessments before going ahead 
with a new project, but other stakeholders 
may be tempted to cut this preliminary step, 
either to save costs or because they think 
they know the answers. All potential partners 
in a new index insurance project should 
keep an open mind during the early stages, 
and even the product champion should be 
prepared not to go ahead with a project if the 
needs assessment does not indicate a clear 
need for it.
 
Index insurance can help vulnerable  
populations better manage climate 
risk, and could be a useful strategy 
for climate change adaptation. Index 
insurance should be investigated as an 
adaptation strategy
Whether it targets development or disaster 
management, index insurance is designed to 
help vulnerable people, communities or gov-
ernments manage climate risk. The scale-up 
seen in India and in Mexico shows that this 
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tool can indeed play this role, alongside other 
risk management options.
As a climate change adaptation tool, 
index insurance has three potential uses. It 
can work as a risk transfer mechanism within 
a comprehensive strategy for managing 
climate risk in the face of climate change; 
as a mechanism to help people access the 
resources needed to escape climate-related 
poverty; and as a mechanism to incentivize 
risk reduction.
However, the uncertainty linked to 
climate change threatens the affordability 
of premiums. The challenge is to accom-
modate the added uncertainty due to climate 
change while keeping premiums affordable. 
Insurance companies increase the price of 
the product if they think there is significant 
uncertainty or an emerging trend that needs 
to be built in; but in fact most of the pricing 
of contracts at present reflects year-to-year 
variation. Longer term processes represent 
just a small component, but one that may 
become more important over the years.
There is growing consensus that index 
insurance can play a role in facilitating 
disaster risk reduction and adaptation to 
climate change. As a tool designed to help the 
most vulnerable manage climate risks, there 
is much potential for its use within a broader 
adaptation strategy. Initiatives such as the 
Munich Climate Insurance Initiative (MCII) 
proposal (see next section) examine ways 
of formally including and financially sup-
porting index insurance in the Copenhagen 
Agreed Outcome, the follow-up to the Kyoto 
Protocol. Such proposals merit strong support.
Governments should prioritize the  
development of a strong legal and 
regulatory system for index insurance 
Strict regulation is an important element in 
avoiding abuses and building trust. As such, 
it is vital to have a robust regulatory system 
in place before scaling up is attempted. 
Regulators must be actively involved in devel-
oping the market for index insurance, making 
sure that products, and the ways in which 
they are managed, are fair to both buyers and 
sellers. Because payouts are not necessarily 
correlated with actual losses, a robust regula-
tory system is needed to mitigate the legal and 
other risks that can emerge with the introduc-
tion of index insurance. This is why insurers 
often choose to develop these products 
collectively, for example through their insurer 
association, as occurred in Malawi.
Capacity-building for regulators is a criti-
cal investment, needed at an early stage of 
a country’s involvement in index insurance. 
Experiences in several projects – Malawi, 
Mongolia, Ukraine – showed that regulators 
need time to gain familiarity with index 
insurance before they are in a position to 
approve its promotion on the open market. 
Policies and regulations may need to be 
fine-tuned to accommodate this new kind 
of product and barriers to its introduction 
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lifted. Explicit support may be needed to 
promote the process of assimilation and this 
is only rarely provided at present. However, 
once regulators appreciate the advantages 
of index insurance, they may move quickly 
to approve new products. The case study in 
Vietnam shows this process at work.
Index insurance players could benefit  
from each other’s knowledge. A 
network forum for sharing information 
and experiences is needed
All the case studies contain elements of good 
practice, innovative approaches and solutions 
to challenges that commonly arise when index 
insurance is introduced. It is important to 
share knowledge of these, so as to replicate 
successes and avoid repeating mistakes.
Interest in index insurance as a tool for 
development and disaster management is 
growing, and as the community of practice 
grows it will be increasingly valuable – and 
difficult – to manage and share the knowledge 
acquired by different players. To ensure that 
knowledge is transferred as the community 
grows, a network or forum for sharing ideas 
and experiences is essential. Processes which 
engage the community of experts are useful, 
but the knowledge generated needs to be 
more widely accessible. Establishment of a 
knowledge management system is recom-
mended to promote the rapid and effective 
uptake of innovative practices, technologies 
and research results.
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Global initiatives on financial risk transfer
Index insurance is also being formally 
considered as a climate change adapta-
tion tool in negotiations under the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) (see ‘Insurance and the 
climate change negotiations’). Support is 
growing amongst policy makers to incor-
porate index insurance into the agreement 
that is to succeed the Kyoto Protocol (the 
Copenhagen Agreed Outcome), particularly 
as evidence from pilot projects in developing 
countries starts to demonstrate its benefits. 
Two proposals were presented to delegates 
at the UNFCCC talks in Poznan in 2008 
(COP 14), from the Alliance of Small 
Island States (AOSIS) and the Munich 
With climate issues high on the global 
agenda, interest in insurance as a CRM tool 
is growing. The potential role of insurance in 
development, in disaster risk reduction and 
in climate change adaptation is attracting 
widespread attention among governments 
and donor agencies. Various initiatives are 
under way or at the planning stage that aim 
to bring together interested groups, resources 
and expertise to support the development 
of financial risk transfer methods, including 
index insurance. This section describes these 
initiatives. It will be important for the dif-
ferent groups to coordinate their efforts and 
work together to build a framework in which 
these tools can realize their potential.
Insurance and the climate change negotiations
Insurance is mentioned as a CRM tool in the 1992 UNFCCC (Article 3.14), the 1997 Kyoto Protocol (Article 4.8), and 
the 2007 Bali Action Plan (adopted at COP13). The Bali Action Plan calls for “consideration of risk sharing and transfer 
mechanisms, such as insurance” to address loss and damage in developing countries particularly vulnerable to 
climate change (Decision -/CP.13, Bali Action Plan). At the 2008 climate talks in Poznan, Poland, insurance was one 
of the major items of discussion on the adaptation agenda, promoted in proposals by Parties (notably AOSIS) 
and Observers (such as MCII). Insurance was mentioned over two dozen times in the draft text, which served as 
a starting point for negotiators.
The many elements proposed between Bali and Poznan must now be combined into a coherent framework 
that will become the agreement on how the international community mitigates and adapts to climate change 
after 2012, when the current Kyoto Protocol commitment period ends. The essentials of this agreement are to 
be hammered out at the UN Climate Change Conference (COP15), to be held in Copenhagen in December 2009. 
A UNFCCC pre-negotiation text called for Parties to consider the establishment of an insurance mechanism to 
facilitate disaster risk reduction and climate adaptation, to identify funds to pay for such insurance activities, and 
to identify a suitable operational arrangement for implementing insurance solutions (UNFCCC 2009).
Index insurance, development and disaster management
103
Climate Insurance Initiative (MCII). The 
next round of climate talks, culminating in 
a new climate agreement in Copenhagen in 
December 2009, is expected to include index 
insurance as part of a wider climate risk 
management strategy.
Weather Risk Management Facility
The International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD) and WFP are devel-
oping technical collaboration through the 
Weather Risk Management Facility, which 
aims to facilitate access to weather index-
based risk management tools and to develop 
replicable models that are sustainable and 
have potential for being scaled up. The focus 
is the rural poor. Early activities are taking 
place in China and Africa, with the aim of 
demonstrating the feasibility of index insur-
ance and learning from pilot projects. This 
knowledge, along with expert inputs, will be 
used to develop a long-term strategy for the 
Facility.
Specifically, the Facility is working to 
build the market for weather index-based 
insurance by supporting: (i) the establishment 
of weather infrastructure and data collection 
and analysis; (ii) the provision of technical 
assistance to insurance companies, to enable 
these to develop and deliver index-based 
products (this includes training in contract 
design, pricing and marketing); (iii) the use of 
Discussing index insurance at COP14 in Poznan in 2008; Koko Warner/MCII
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science and technology (e.g. remote sens-
ing, crop models) to ensure robust contract 
design; and (iv) the development of enabling 
regulatory environments for weather index 
insurance that encourage growth and allow 
for bundling with credit, savings and other 
financial products.
Global Index Insurance Facility
The Global Index Insurance Facility has been 
set up by the IFC with the support of donors, 
to develop and promote index insurance for 
weather and other natural disaster risks in 
developing countries. The Facility is estab-
lishing an international commercial reinsur-
ance company to support local insurance 
companies by underwriting index insurance 
contracts, thereby protecting clients, including 
governments, private companies, financial 
intermediaries and farmers. The Facility also 
includes a trust fund to provide technical 
assistance and capacity building, and premium 
cost-sharing funds to promote the growth of 
markets.
Climate Risk Transfer Facility
The United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) is considering options 
for supporting index-based insurance and 
other risk-transfer mechanisms in the 
developing world. One option is a Climate 
Risk Transfer Facility, which would assist 
public authorities in implementing develop-
ment- and risk-reduction-oriented climate 
risk transfer mechanisms at the local and 
regional levels. Such a facility could have 
many functions, such as delivering knowledge 
services (e.g. expertise on risk assessment), 
implementing pilots to test and demonstrate 
the feasibility of proposed approaches, and 
promoting national and global policy dia-
logues, in order to expand access to financial 
risk transfer and pooling mechanisms.
Global Facility for Disaster 
Reduction and Recovery
The Global Facility for Disaster Reduction 
and Recovery is a long-term global partner-
ship under the United Nations International 
Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR), 
aimed at reversing the trend of rising disaster 
losses by 2015. It operates on three tracks: (i) 
global and regional advocacy, partnerships, 
knowledge management and standardiza-
tion of disaster risk management tools; (ii) 
country-level programs on institutional 
development, innovative hazard mitiga-
tion projects, and learning, research and 
knowledge management; and (iii) a standby 
recovery financing facility for low-income 
countries stricken by natural disasters, to 
be implemented through the World Bank’s 
International Development Association 
(IDA). Index insurance is being explored as 
one of many options for managing climate 
risks, and exploratory work is being carried 
out in Vietnam on index-based flood risk 
insurance.
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